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“You gain strength, courage and confidence by every experience in which you 
really stop to look fear in the face. You are able to say to yourself : I have lived 
through this horror I can take the next thing that comes along … You must do the 





According to Near and Micelli
2
 “whistleblowing is the disclosure by organizational 
members of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their 
employers, to person or organizations that may be able to effect action”. Borrie
3
 
stated: “whistleblowing is the disclosure by an employee of confidential information 
which relates to some danger, fraud, or other illegal or unethical conduct connected 






 defined whistleblowing as a “deliberate non-obligatory act of 
disclosure, which gets onto public record and is made by a person who has or had 
privileged access to data or information of an organization, about non-trivial illegality 
or other wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated which implicates and is 
under the control of that organization, to an external entity having potential to rectify 
the wrongdoing”. 
 
A further definition noted by PB Jubb
6
 is “whistleblowing is the act, by an employee 
or officer of any institution, profit or non-profit, private or public, of informing the 
public about a belief that (s)he has, or (s)he has obtained knowledge that the 
institution is engaged in activities which (a) cause unnecessary harm to third parties, 
                                                 
1
 Quotation No. 2258 from Laura Moncur’s Motivational Quotations. 
www.quotationspage.come/quotes/Eleanor_Roosevelt (Accessed: 5 August 2009). 
2
 JP Near et al “Organisational Dissidence : The case of whistleblowing” (1985) 4 Journal of Business 
Ethics 1-16. 
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 British Charity Organisation, Public Concern at Work 1996. 
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 CJ Auriacombe “What happens when one blows the whistle? Recent SA Cases” (2005) 24 (1) 
Politeia 88. 
5
 PB Jubb “Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation” (1999) 21 (1) Journal of 
Business Ethics 78. 
6
 See fn 5. 
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The objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the concept of whistleblowing and the 
specific role the Protected Disclosures Act (26 of 2000) (hereinafter referred to as the 
PDA) and the Public Interest Disclosures Act 1998 (hereinafter referred to as PIDA) 
promulgated in the United Kingdom play in fulfilling their mandate to protect 
whistleblowers. The practice of whistleblowing has been growing steadily over the 
past two decades and this research is concerned with not only determining the factors 
that employees use to make true disclosures but also determining the factors that 
motivate employees to make false disclosures.  
 
This study draws attention, not only to the disclosures that are made by employees 
who have true and substantive allegations to make, but also the situation where 
disclosures are made for malicious and vindictive personal gain. It takes a look at the 
psychological and ethical standing of employees who have an “axe to grind” with 
their employers, leaving behind a trail of devastation which has to be cleaned up 
afterwards. The concept of “good faith” and a “reasonable belief” which appear in the 
legislation, are discussed and examined in detail.  
 
The focus is mainly on unsubstantiated allegations and the consequences of those 
mala fide disclosures. The questions that are dealt with are: how do these allegations 
affect the victims and organizations of mala fide disclosures, and how equipped are 
organizations to deal with them? 
 
This study begins with the history, background and definition of whistleblowing, and 
an examination of how the PDA views the issue of whistleblowing and how it 
interprets it. The reason behind the discussion on PIDA is that South Africa has 
borrowed largely from it to establish its PDA. Although these two Acts are not 
identical, the concepts are the same and the United Kingdom has enacted a large 
amount of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ERA) into 
its PIDA (PIDA) whereas South Africa has not taken much out of the Labour 
                                                 
7
 Adapted from the Borrie and Duska definition of whistleblowing 1990, page 73. 
 7
Relations Act (66 of 1995) (hereinafter referred to as the LRA) and introduced it as 
part of the PDA. However, when cases are determined in terms of the PDA, the LRA 
is looked at very closely in terms of constructive dismissal, and most commonly 
unfair labour practices or unfair dismissal. Both Acts have “good faith” and 
“reasonable belief” as requirements to fulfil in order to fall under the ambit of the 
protection of the Acts. Right through this study you will see a thread of United 
Kingdom cases that are used so that the reader is able to see how the Employment 
Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ET) and/or the Employment Appeals Tribunal 
(hereinafter referred to as the EAT) have looked at the different aspects of 
whistleblowing cases. What is important to note in Chapter 2 is the reason why it was 
important to establish whistleblowing legislation. The urgency of this legislation was 
simply because of the disasters and tragedies that were taking place without anything 




We see that in both the United Kingdom and in South Africa there was much work 
done through negotiation and comment that came from different Commissions, legal 
professionals and academics before the Acts were passed. One can say that there was 
an incredible amount of thought that was applied by many minds in order to put 
together legislation that would allow people to disclose information without the fear 
of intimidation, victimisation or dismissal.  
 
The framework of the PDA and PIDA are highlighted in Chapter 4 in order to 
understand how the different Acts work. It is important to highlight the particular 
sections of the Acts that are relevant and often taken into account when a case has to 
be decided. Important to note is the fact that both Acts highlight the requirements of 
“good faith” and “reasonable belief”. In literally all of the sections of these Acts, good 
faith is a requirement which is understandable. Although there is no absolute or fixed 
standard of good faith, it is important that a person disclosing information has this 
requirement to prevent the disclosure from being made with the motive of bad faith. 
As you will see from the Chapter 6 concerning unsubstantiated allegations, it is very 
difficult to determine whether the person who disclosed information in fact had a 
                                                 
8
 These situations are discussed in Chapter 2. 
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motive of “good faith”. I will consider how the EAT looked at the issue of good faith 




It is common knowledge that blowing the whistle is an incredibly difficult moral 
decision to make. This is because whistleblowing is seen as something negative and 
although there is now legislation to protect whistleblowers, there are still 
organizations that believe that whistleblowers are troublemakers. However, it is 
submitted that the more credible a person is, the more likely it is that top management 
will listen and investigate the problem, thus relieving the pressure to whistleblow. 
This, however, is debatable as we have seen in the case of Tshishonga v Minister of 
Justice & Constitutional Development & Another
10
 who should have been seen as a 
credible witness but who got no help from top management, simply because the topic 
was too difficult to deal with. A difficult problem is how to prevent organizations 
from victimising a person who has made such a disclosure.  
 
In Chapter 5 the difficulties for whistleblowers disclosing legitimate information is 
highlighted, even though there was legislation in place to protect them. They were still 
victimised and inevitably ended up suffering negative consequences such as being 
disciplined and dismissed even though ultimately legal recourse was available.  
 
Tshishonga’s case took four years to be finalised, in which time he had endured 
disciplinary action and was severely affected by the elements of the content of the 
occupational detriment which included being insulted, ill-treated and having his 
dignity impaired
11
. What I will emphasise in this case is the fact that although 
organizations are aware of the legislation that protects whistleblowers they still do not 
have the correct mindset which would enable them to deal with the problem 
efficiently. Instead, true whistleblowers like Tshishonga may suffer the worst kinds of 
consequences for something that was in the public interest and for the benefit of the 
public sector. It was only through sheer bravery, strength and dedication to put a stop 
                                                 
9
 (2004) EWCA Civ 964. 
10
 (2007) 4 BLLR 327 (LC). Can also be found at (2007) 28 ILJ (LC). 
11
 See fn 10, para 300. 
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Tshishonga’s case is a ground breaking case concerning whistleblowers in South 
Africa and will be used as a precedent case which will determine how other similar 
whistleblowing cases will be decided. This case illustrates how the court applied its 
mind to all the aspects of the case and the close examination of the PDA. This is 
evident from the list of cases that were referred to, not only South African cases but a 
wide variety of foreign jurisprudence. The majority of the case law discussed in this 
dissertation were quoted and referred to in the Tshishonga case. The outcome of this 
case was a favourable one, and according to the South African Law Reform 
Commission Report
13
 (hereinafter referred to as the SALRCR) “this was a significant 
victory for whistleblowers in that legal costs were awarded in the whistleblower’s 
favour”, and brings to the fore the importance of whistleblowing especially if it is for 
the benefit of society as a whole. The issues of “good faith” and “reasonable belief” 
were highlighted in this case as important factors that must be considered when 
disclosure of information concerning any wrongdoing is made.  
 
However, it must be noted that generally, by the time a disclosure is made, there tends 
to be ill feelings between the whistleblower and the organization or person directly 
involved. This does not necessarily mean that the disclosure was not made in good 
faith. It would be inconceivable for one to believe that when a disclosure is made that 
the relationship between that organization and the whistleblower is healthy. However, 
the personal feelings one has before whistleblowing must not interfere with the fact 
that one must have made the disclosure in good faith and with a reasonable belief. 
This entails that there must be a reasonable belief in the truth of the disclosure, which 
should be able to be substantiated by evidence. As illustrated in the Street case
14
, note 
must be taken of how easy it is for the element of good faith to turn into an element of 
bad faith. It is submitted that personal feelings should not distract one from the fact 
that the disclosure must be made with the requisite good faith. The underlying motive 
                                                 
12
 Refer also to a critical analysis of the Tshishonga case in a case note by F Van Jaarsveld 
“Arbeidsregtelike perspektief op die lotgevalle van fluitjieblasers” (2008) 2 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 324-329.  
13
 Project 123 Protected Disclosures (August 2008) 74. 
14
 See fn 9, para 41. 
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behind one’s disclosure is an important factor that must be considered when 




History, Background and Definition of Whistle-blowing 
 
Corruption in all its different forms is a complex and multi-layered issue. The 
reporting of corruption is an age-old practice which can be dated back to early China 
and is today known there as jubao. In comparison to whistleblowing in the West 
where there usually is (or was) an existing relationship between the employee and 
employer, in China, jubao can be made by any individual against any government 
official or institution as long as there was some kind of wrongdoing. China not only 
makes provision for reporting centres, but jubao is also an officially controlled 
process in which the government attempts to involve the ordinary citizen in the anti-
corruption campaign and supervision of its officials.
15
 The notion of whistleblowing 
in America was first documented in 1963 and it is therefore a new name for an ancient 




During the apartheid era in South Africa, spies surfaced increasingly, blaming and 
pointing fingers at each other because of the monetary rewards they were offered to 
act as informers to “spill the beans” on their comrades. Because of the poverty and 
high unemployment rates and greed, these rewards were tempting and for many 
irresistible. People who decided to take these rewards spoke up and were reportedly 
called ‘impimpis’
17
 by their betrayed comrades. If they were caught by their 
comrades, they suffered gruesome public deaths as a deterrent for behaviour that 
would not be tolerated. The lesson to be learned was “not to tell tales” and to protect 





                                                 
15
 F Uys “Whistleblowing in Disaster Prevention and Rehabilitation”. (2006) 41 (2.1) Journal of Public 
Administration 219.    
16
 See fn 15. 
17
 A derogatory term reserved for apartheid era police spies. 
18
 R Calland and G Dehn. Whistleblowing around the world: Law, Culture and Practice 1st ed (2004) 
143-144. 
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In addition, according to Calland and Dehn,
19
 South Africa’s private sector was 
generally unaccountable to the public and public authority for their wrongdoing, 
causing them to be open to the abuses of fraud and corruption.  
 
Transformation of this culture began in 1994 with South Africa’s first democratic 
election. 
 
The Interim Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 200 of 
1993) was negotiated prior to the 1994 elections enshrining the principle that 
“democracy empowers the people to participate in their governance and for 
government to be accountable to them for its decisions”.
 20
 Furthermore the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996 aspires to an “open and 
democratic society”. 
 
In 1995, the Task Group on Open Democracy submitted its policy proposals for an 
Open Democracy Act.  
 
This long drawn out process resulted in the final draft Bill which was published in the 




The whistleblower protection provision in section 63 of the Bill provided protection to 
whistleblowers that made “disclosures in good faith about evidence of contravention 





However, one of the glaring flaws in the Bill was the fact that it applied to the public 
sector only and did not offer the same protection to potential whistleblowers in the 
private sector. 
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 See fn 18. 
20
 Section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution. 
21
 One of the objectives stated in the Bill was to: “provide for the protection of persons disclosing 
evidence of contraventions of the law, serious misconduct or corruption in governmental bodies, and to 
provide for matters connected therewith”. http://us-cdn-
creamermedia.co.za/assets/attachments/00506_draftopedemactbill.pdf (Accessed: 25 March 2009). 
22
 Section 63(1)(a) of the Open Democracy Bill, 18 October 1997. Government Gazette No. 18381. 
Pretoria. 
 13
The Bill was finally tabled in Parliament in July 1998. Public submissions were 
received including those from the Open Democracy Campaign which comprised ten 
leading non-governmental organisations. The campaign group argued that the 




The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), organized a number of seminars on the 
practical implications and potential effects of the proposed legislation. Key among its 
proposals was that the whistleblower protection section be removed from the 
legislation dealing with freedom of information and be made separate legislation. The 





The Institute’s other proposals included looking at other legislation in other 
jurisdictions that may have been relevant to the South African situation. This included 
looking at British i.e. United Kingdom law, in particular PIDA.  
 
In October 1999, the Chairperson of the Justice Committee was introduced to the 
Executive Director of the London-based non-governmental organisation, Public 
Concern at Work. Advocate Johnny De Lange (Chairperson of the Justice Committee) 
stated in the Committee that the United Kingdom law would be used as the central 




A new whistleblower protection Bill was being drafted at this time, borrowing from 
the concept behind the British Public Interest Disclosure Act and being adapted to 





The PDA was finally passed in 2000 as “The Protected Disclosures Act (26 of 2000)”.  
The Protected Disclosures Act (26 of 2000)
27
 has come a long way in alleviating the 
worst fears of those who decide to blow the whistle in good faith. Blowing the whistle 
                                                 
23
 See fn 18. 
24
 See fn 18, page 146. 
25
 See fn 18, page 147. 
26
 See fn 18, page 148. 
27
 Commonly known as the PDA. 
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is subject to certain conditions put in place by the Act, and deals with what constitutes 
a protected disclosure. The Act creates legal protections for employee whistleblowers 
against reprisals by employers. The Act only provides protection against reprisals for 
whistleblowing done in good faith, provided there is reliable evidence to support the 
concern. 
 




In the United Kingdom, The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 was introduced as a 
Private Member’s Bill and later promoted in the House of Commons. It received very 
strong support from the Government because it was relevant across all sectors. The 
legislation also received broad support from the Confederation of British Industry and 
the Institute of Directors. The protection formed part of employment legislation and 
was put forward in the Fairness at Work White Paper as one of the key new rights for 
individuals. It was recognised as a valuable tool to promote good governance and 
openness in organisations and received broad support from the Confederation of 




The legislation was linked to the work of the whistleblowing charity, Public Concern 
at Work (hereinafter referred to as PCaW) which was launched in 1993. PCaW 
offered confidential legal advice free of charge to any worker with a concern about 
malpractice within the workplace, yet this charity remained relatively unknown 
among the general public.  
 
The background to the Act lies in the analysis by PCaW because of a number of 
scandals and disasters during the 1980s and early 1990s. Most of the public inquiries 
investigated resulted in the finding that workers had been aware of the danger but had 
been either too scared to say anything or they had raised the matter in the incorrect 
manner or with the wrong person. 
  
                                                 
28
 http://www.pcaw.co.uk/law/pida.htm (Accessed: 18 February 2009). 
29
 See fn 18. 
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The following tragedies are examples where staff knew of serious problems, but were 
too afraid to say anything:
30
  
(i) Clapham Rail crash, was an incident which occurred in 1988 and concerned 
the issue of safety. The inquiry into the crash found that workers i.e. the 
inspector, knew and had seen the loose wiring but had said nothing because he 
did not want ‘to rock the boat’. Thirty five people were killed and 500 were 
injured in this tragedy;   
(ii)  Piper Alpha disaster also occurred in 1988 and concerned oil platform safety. 
The Cullen Report found that workers did not want to put their continued 
employment in jeopardy through raising a safety issue which might embarrass 
management. This incident resulted in a tragedy of 167 people being killed; 
and the 
(iii)  collapse of BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International) occurred in 
1991 and concerned the issue of fraud and corruption with an estimated value 
of £2 billion world-wide. This incident was kept under wraps and avoided 
exposure for almost 19 years. The Bingham Enquiry found that there was an 
atmosphere of intimidation in the Bank and nobody dared to speak for fear of 
being intimidated. An internal auditor eventually raised concerns and was 
summarily dismissed. 
 
Examples where concern was raised but nothing was done: - 
(i) The Zeebrugge Ferry tragedy concerned a situation where staff had raised 
numerous concerns concerning the fact that ferries were sailing with their bow 
doors open;  
(ii) The collapse of Barings Bank concerned the issue surrounding not blowing the 
whistle when there was a moral duty to do so. In this incident, a regulator of 
the bank failed to blow the whistle with dire consequences; and   
(iii) The Arms to Iraq Inquiry concerned the issue surrounding an incident where 
an employee had written to the Foreign Secretary concerning ammunition 
equipment being unlawfully produced for Iraq. 
 
                                                 
30
 See fn 28. 
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Other cases include the Kirkwood Inquiry into the assault and sexual abuse of 
children in a Leicestershire County Children’s Home where at least 30 concerns had 
been raised and not heeded, as well as investigations into malpractice in the health 
service, i.e. the high mortality rate amongst babies undergoing heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary. Although these were eventually investigated, it took a while 
before anything was done to prevent incidences such as these happening again. 
 
The PCaW group was closely involved in the formulation of the Act and was tasked 
with consulting key stakeholders on various provisions. PIDA (also known as the 
“whistleblowers charter”) was passed and endorsed by business, professional bodies 
and unions.
31
 PIDA is part of the United Kingdom’s employment law
32
 and builds on 
the principle that “there is no obligation on an employee to keep information secret if 
it relates to such misconduct on the part of the employer or fellow employees that 
there is a public interest in its disclosure”.
33
 PIDA also shifts the focus from the 
motivation of the whistleblower to the nature of the information and the appropriate 
recipient of it. It is important to note that information that qualifies as information that 
falls under the auspices of PIDA is subject to the provisions of the Act regardless of 
whether it is confidential or not.
34
 Section 43B of PIDA provides that a qualifying 
disclosure is information concerning criminal acts, health and safety risks, 
environment dangers, a breach of a legal obligation, potential miscarriages of justice 
and any other information that tends to show concealment of the above. 
 
The provisions of PIDA shift the legal burden to the employer in order to prove that 
the dismissal of the employee was a fair one. Section 5 of PIDA (or section 103A of 
the ERA) provides that, if an employee is dismissed for the principal reason of 
making a protected disclosure, that dismissal will be deemed unfair. The effect of this 
is that the tribunal determining the case will not consider whether the employer’s 
actions were reasonable or not.  Even if there were a number of reasons for the 
dismissal, the dismissal will still be deemed automatically unfair if the predominant 
reason for the dismissal was because of a protected disclosure. PIDA also provides a 
quick resolution to an unfair dismissal through its provisions for interim relief and 
                                                 
31
 See fn 18, page 101. 
32
 Employment Rights Act 1996; s 103A. The section was added as from 2 July 1999. 
33
 See fn 18, page 106. 
34
 See fn 28. 
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allows access to a tribunal system which is designed to facilitate quick, non-legalistic 
resolutions to disputes in accordance with the United Kingdom employment law. 
Section 9 of PIDA (or s 128(1)(b) and s129(1) of the ERA) which relates to interim 
relief provides that an employee dismissed for making a protected disclosure can 
claim for interim relief by seeking an order for reinstatement within seven days of 
his/her dismissal. If the order is granted and the employer refuses to reinstate the 
employee, the employer is still liable to pay the salary of the employee until the date 
of the full hearing. Section 43C of PIDA stresses the procedural correctness of the 




What is Whistleblowing? 
 
Disclosure of information in South Africa is a fairly new concept which has only 
recently been developed into legislation. With the help of this legislation, employees 
are able to disclose information knowing that the disclosure, if done according to the 
prescribed legislation, will be protected. However, in order to deal with the concept of 
whistleblowing, an explanation of what this whistleblowing concept is all about needs 
to be discussed. 
 
“Whistleblowing generally entails that employers facilitate disclosures by employees 
concerning wrongdoing in the workplace. This is often done by making available to 
employees a dedicated telephone number or other mechanism to be used in the event 
of the employees having knowledge of criminal or other wrongful conduct within the 
organization. Employees are often in the best position to detect criminal activities and 
irregular conduct at work. Whistleblowing legislation generally aims to protect 




In the definition of Calland and Dehn
36
 “whistleblowing is: 
(a) “bringing an activity to a sharp conclusion as if by the blast of a whistle 
(Oxford English Dictionary); 
(b) raising a concern about wrongdoing within an organization or through an 
independent structure associated with it (UK Committee on Standards in 
Public Life); 
(c) giving information (usually to the authorities) about illegal or underhand 
practices (Chambers Dictionary); 
(d) exposing to the press a wrongdoing or cover-up in a business or 
government office (US, Brewers Dictionary)”. 
 
According to the Open Democracy Advice Centre’s (ODAC) Boardroom Brief – 
whistleblowing is about ‘raising a concern about malpractice within an organization”. 
 
                                                 
35
 SA Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 107 Project 123 Protected Disclosures (June 2004) 
1. 
36
 See fn 18.   
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According to the United Kingdom Standing Committee on Standards in Public Life 
(formerly known as the Nolan Committee but now known as the Wicks Committee)
37
 
whistleblowing is defined as “raising a concern about malpractice within an 




It is clear from the above definitions that there is no universally accepted definition of 
whistleblowing. The Australian Senate Select Committee however maintains that 
“what is important is not the definition of the term but the definition of the 
circumstances and conditions under which the employees who disclose wrong-doing 




Thus, in spite of the many discussions on whistleblowing, exact definitions are 
seldom found. Some definitions are extremely complex whereas others are 





All these definitions stress the importance of whistleblowers “because they promote 





“Whistleblowing is a key tool to promoting individual responsibility and 
organizational accountability. It is also about acting in good faith and in the public 
interest to raise concerns. Unfortunately, whistleblowers often risk victimization, 
recrimination and sometimes dismissal”.
42
  
                                                 
37
 This is a standing committee set up by the UK Parliament to safeguard standards in public life and 
was first chaired by Lord Nolan. The Nolan committee produced three reports. In its first (1995) it 
recommended that all civil servant departments in the UK should nominate a member of staff to hear 
the concerns of employees in confidence; its second and third reports recommended that local 
authorities should introduce codes of practice and procedures for whistleblowing. 
38
 K Drew “Whistleblowing and Corruption: An initial and comparative review”. January (2003) 1 
http//www.psiru.org/report/2002-08-C-whistle.doc  (Accessed: 9 June 2009) 
39
 MP Glazer and PM Glazer. “The Whistleblowers”, New Jersey, Basic Books (1989) 5. 
40
 F Uys “Whistleblowing in Disaster Prevention and Rehabilitation”, (2006) 41 (2.1) Journal of Public 
Administration 218-230. 
41
 P Latimer and AJ Brown “In whose interest? The need for consistency in to whom, and about whom, 
Australian Public Interest Whistleblowers can make protected disclosures”. (2007) 12(2) Deakin Law 
Review 3. 
42
 National Anti-Corruption Forum -Guide to the Whistle-blowing Act.  Section 1 “What is 
Whistleblowing” http://www.nacf.org.za/guide_to_the_whistle_blowing_act/section_one.html 
(Accessed: 16 February 2009) 
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For all intents and purposes, whistleblowing is a process whereby employers make 
available to employees ways in which they may disclose confidential information 
about any worrying facts that they may have concerning the company that employs 
them. Companies have now initiated programmes, policies, rules and regulations 
concerning how employees can disclose confidential information. Just about every 
company and employer has initiated some sort of whistleblowing program for their 
staff. It is however up to the employee to utilize these programs properly and to use 
them in the way in which the legislation intended them to be used.  
 
3.1 A brief commentary on the relevant provisions of the Protected 
Disclosures Act (26 of 2000) 
 
In order for whistleblowers to effectively disclose information, the employee must 
understand what the PDA provides, what a disclosure is, what a general protected 
disclosure is and, how it is defined within the Act. Whistleblowers or potential 
whistleblowers need to understand how the Act will help to protect them if they 
intend to disclose information and under what circumstances their disclosures will be 
protected.  
 
Section 1 of the PDA provides that a disclosure is information concerning criminal 
acts, a breach of a legal obligation or failure to comply with any legal obligation, 
environment dangers, potential miscarriages of justice, unfair discrimination in terms 
of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (4 of 
2000), and any other information that tends to show concealment of the above. 
 
Section 2 of the PDA states what the objects and application of the Act are and 
provides that an employee will be protected from being subjected to an occupational 
detriment on account of having made a protected disclosure. 
 
Section 3 of the PDA reinforces the provision in section 2 in that it provides that no 




The PDA further provides that a disclosure will be deemed to be a protected 
disclosure if it is made in good faith to a legal adviser (section 5); an employer 
(section 6); a member of Cabinet or of the Executive Council of a province (section 
7); or to a person or body such as the Public Protector or Auditor-General (section 8).   
 
It must be noted that each of these provisions have a requirement of good faith which 
is an essential requirement that a person must have in terms of the Act in order that 
the disclosure is deemed a protected disclosure.  
 
Section 9 of the PDA is an important section to note for purposes of disclosure of 
information, in that it provides the requirements for a general protected disclosure. 
Section 9(1) provides that any disclosure made in good faith and with a reasonable 
belief that the information is substantially true and was not made for personal gain is 
deemed to be a general protect disclosure. Section 9(2) provides that a disclosure will 
be a protected disclosure if an employee has reason to believe that they will suffer an 
occupational detriment if they disclose the information to their employer; if there is a 
reasonable belief that the evidence will be concealed or destroyed; that substantially 
the same information was previously disclosed and action was not taken within a 
reasonable period after the disclosure; and the impropriety was exceptionally serious 
in nature.  
 
Section 4 of the Act provides remedies for employees who have disclosed information 
and who have suffered or reasonably believe will suffer or endure an occupational 
detriment on account of their disclosure.  
 
The following cases are an example of where the disclosure of information did not 
adhere to section 1 of the Act (or any of the other above provisions of the Act) thus 
causing the disclosure not to be protected.   
 
In the Council for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (hereinafter referred to as 
the CCMA) case of Gama v Checkers Hyper
43
 the issue was whether the applicant’s 
dismissal for alleged misconduct was procedurally and substantively fair and if not, 
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what would constitute appropriate relief. It was found that the dismissal was 
procedurally and substantively fair based on the fact that the applicant’s disclosure did 
not adhere to the definition of what a disclosure is in terms of s1 of the PDA.  
 
The facts of the case are as follows: the applicant worked as a cashier at Checkers 
Hyper since 1999. In August 2005 she went on sick leave and on her return to work 
submitted a sick note from a traditional healer which was not accepted. According to 
the company policy in respect of sick leave, only sick notes received from registered 
traditional healers would be accepted. The applicant was given a copy of the policy on 
sick leave when she complained that she did not get paid for the sick leave, but did 
not accept it. The applicant then complained to other employees that she had been 
badly treated. The applicant submitted that she had first lodged her complaint 
internally with her supervisor, then with her manager, then with personnel, and finally 
with her shop steward, but all in vain. She thereafter went to the Department of 
Labour because she had lost hope of anything getting done internally and proceeded 
to make serious allegations against the company. At the Department of Labour she 
was given a form to fill in which she took to work in the hope of getting other 
employees to help her fill it in and sign their names at the back of the form. The 
applicant submitted that the signatures at the back of the form constituted collective 
grievances. The applicant’s allegations consisted of the following: 
 
• pay slips were not provided for employees; 
• lunch breaks were not given especially at month end and employees were 
not paid in lieu of that time worked; 
• employees did not get leave; 
• employees did not receive payment for sick leave taken; and 
• employees were not paid double payment for Sundays that they worked 
 
The respondent disputed all the above allegations and submitted that the applicant did 
not follow protocol in reporting her complaint. 
  
At the hearing the applicant was issued with a notice of disciplinary inquiry which 
outlined her alleged misconduct. The applicant did not give evidence or call any 
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witnesses and on this basis was charged and dismissed for bringing the company’s 
name into disrepute by giving false information to the Department of Labour. The 
applicant referred the dispute to the CCMA on the basis that her dismissal constituted 
an occupational detriment in terms of section 3 the PDA because she made a protected 
disclosure to the Department of Labour.    
 
In analysing the evidence and arguments the Commissioner had to consider whether 
the allegations made to the Department of Labour by the applicant constituted gross 
misconduct or if they were a protected disclosure in terms of the PDA.  
 
The Commission considered section 192(2) of the LRA which provides that the 
employer bears the onus of proving the fairness of the dismissal and the burden of 
proof must be discharged on a balance of probabilities. Based on the evidence, the 
Commissioner submitted that he was satisfied that the applicant had not discussed 
other issues with anyone internally before lodging a complaint with the Department of 
Labour. The Commissioner therefore submitted that the burden of proof was 
discharged in that the respondent’s version regarding the alleged misconduct was 
plausible because the allegations were found to be unsubstantiated.  
 
In terms of the PDA, the Commissioner considered section 1(vi) which defines an 
occupational detriment, section 1(ix) which defines when a disclosure constitutes a 
protected disclosure and section 3 which stipulates that an employee may not be 
subjected to an occupational detriment on account of having made a protected 
disclosure. After considering the relevant sections of the PDA, the Commissioner 
found that the applicant’s disclosure did not constitute a protected disclosure in terms 
of the Act because the allegations were made to the Department of Labour without 
first addressing any of her grievances with her employer or shop steward. 
Furthermore, when inspectors from the Department of Labour investigated the 
allegations they found them all to be untrue and discontinued their investigation. 
Accordingly, the Commissioner submitted that the discontinuation of the investigation 
was a reasonable suggestion that the complaints were untrue. It was further submitted 
that it was not the intention of the legislature to protect any disclosure or to create a 
situation whereby employees can make disclosures that are not based on fact and still 
believe that they will be protected.  On this basis the Commissioner submitted that the 
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applicant’s disclosures to the Department of Labour were not a protected disclosure 
but instead constituted gross misconduct therefore the applicant’s dismissal was fair 
and to be upheld. 
 
Although this case was decided correctly in terms of the PDA, the Commissioner did 
not discuss the particular sections of the PDA in detail and focussed his attention only 
on section 1 of the Act whereas other relevant sections such as section 3 and section 9 
could have been discussed. Section 9 of the Act would have highlighted the fact that 
the allegations were not only unfounded but the elements of good faith and a 
reasonable belief were absent from her disclosures. However, this case is a good 
illustration of the Act not extending its protection to any kind of disclosure and also 
not protecting employees who for revengeful and troublemaking purposes divulge 
unsubstantiated information. 
 
JR Francey v Nedcor Bank (Ltd) ARB
44
 is another case where the truthfulness of a 
disclosure was considered under the LRA and the PDA. The issue that had to be 
decided upon was whether the dismissal of the applicant was fair. The applicant was 
dismissed on the basis that he was deliberately dishonest in that he fabricated untrue 
and misleading information concerning the respondent which resulted in the 
respondent’s reputation being tarnished. The applicant believed that his dismissal was 
unfair and that the respondent coerced him into signing a waiver concerning 
whistleblowing that all managers in the bank had to sign. 
 
The facts of the case are as follows: the applicant was employed by the respondent as 
an asset-based financier. It is common cause that the applicant made a disclosure 
telephonically to the company’s tip-off facility concerning the General Manager (Mr 
Payne). The applicant admitted that the reason he made the disclosure to the tip-off 
facility was simply because (i) he was influenced by other staff; (ii) he was aware that 
Mr Payne wanted to transfer him out of his department; and (iii) that Mrs Payne was a 
family friend and he was “irritated by all the information he had – it made him think 
that Mr Payne was a sod”.  
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Based on the evidence, the Commissioner found that the applicant was not coerced 
into signing the waiver, because he had fully understood the nature of the document 
and its consequences. Furthermore the applicant could not sufficiently explain how he 
was coerced into signing the waiver. 
 
In terms of the charges of allegations against the applicant, the Commissioner 
considered the fact that “the point of protected disclosures and the relevant protection 
extended to employees in terms of the LRA and the PDA when making disclosures 




The Commissioner referred to the cases of Grieve v Denel (Pty) Ltd
46
and 
Communication Workers Union & Another v MTN (Pty) Ltd
47
 which provided a very 
useful analysis of protected disclosures. The Commissioner submitted that in terms of 
section 6 of the PDA, a number of conditions had to be satisfied before a disclosure 
could be protected, in particular, the conditions of having a reasonable belief that the 
information tends to show that it forms the basis for the definition of a disclosure and, 
that the disclosure must be made in good faith. The Commissioner submitted that it 
was clear that both judgments of the above cases upheld the principle that for a 
disclosure to be protected it must have been made in good faith.  
 
In looking at section 1 of the PDA, the Commissioner held, that the definition of 
“disclosure” meant that only a disclosure that discloses or tends to disclose forms of 
criminal or other misconduct and, made in good faith is subject of protection under 
the PDA.  
 
The Commissioner went further to highlight the fact that the protection extended to 
employees by the PDA is not unconditional and the intention of the PDA was not 
intended to protect all disclosures. Thus, an employee who deliberately sets out to 
embarrass and harass an employer will not satisfy the requirement of good faith nor 
be protected by the Act. 
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The Commissioner found that the applicant’s disclosure could not be protected by the 
PDA because it was based on mere rumours, conjecture and personal opinions and, 
the applicant’s clear dislike for Mr Payne prompted his call to the tip off line. The 
applicant was also unable to demonstrate that his disclosure was based on supporting 
documents and evidence.  
 
Based on the evidence of the case and in terms of the PDA, the Commissioner 
submitted that the applicant’s disclosures were not protected by the PDA because (i) 
they did not fall within the definition of a disclosure in terms of section 1 and were 
not based on any kind of genuine concerns or suspicions; and (ii) the applicant did not 
possess the required elements of good faith and reasonable belief in that the 
applicant’s clear dislike of Mr Payne was the sole motivating factor for his actions. 
On this basis the applicant’s disclosures did not constitute a protected disclosure and 
were not protected by the PDA.  The Commissioner submitted that the applicant’s 




The PDA was enacted for the purpose of disclosing corruption and fraudulent activity 
within the workplace. Its main purpose was to create a way in which employees can 
disclose information without feeling intimidated and fearful. The PDA is very precise 
in regard to the procedure that a whistleblower or potential whistleblower must follow 
in order that the disclosure is a protected one. When an employee discloses 
information in accordance with the PDA, (s)he will be protected against any 
occupational detriment that the employer might subject her/him to. The PDA seeks to 
allow whistleblowers who have a reasonable belief in the truth of the allegations, and 
who are acting in good faith, to disclose information of corruption and fraud. Good 
faith and reasonable belief are two essential elements that a whistleblower must have 
in order to strengthen their case.  
 
“The PDA makes the South African government’s resolve and commitment to 
freedom of speech and its intention to create a climate of transparency in both the 
public and private sector abundantly clear. It also makes extensive provision for 
simple procedures to assist employees in making protected disclosures on the 
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unlawful or irregular conduct of their employers or co-worker, without the fear of 





However, it must be noted that the legislature did not intend for the PDA to protect 
any disclosure that is made. It is submitted that the Act will not protect a 
whistleblower that divulges information for the sole purpose of vindictiveness or 
personal gain. 
 
Similarly, the United Kingdom’s PIDA aims to protect whistleblowers from 
victimisation and dismissal where they raise genuine concerns about a range of 
misconduct and malpractice. The Act also stresses the importance of the 
whistleblower’s motives of good faith and reasonable belief. According to K Drew,
49
 
some academics argue that this requirement for a motivation is misplaced on the basis 
that the public interest may not be served if a whistleblower has to concern 
him/herself of his/her motives being examined when he/she discloses information. 
This may deter potential whistleblowers from disclosing relevant information to 




For the purposes of understanding the origins of the PDA the significant sections of 
PIDA are listed as the following:  
 
 A “protected disclosure” in terms of section 43A of PIDA is defined as a qualifying 
disclosure which is made by an employee in accordance with any of the following 
sections of the Act: 
• Section 43B sets out the types of “disclosures” that qualify for protection as 
criminal acts, health and safety risks, environmental dangers, a breach of a 
legal obligation, potential miscarriages of justice and any concealment of the 
above. 
• Section 43C (to an employer); 
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• Section 43D (to a legal adviser); 
• Section 43E (to a Minister of the Crown); 
• Section 43F (to a prescribed person by an order made by the Secretary of State 
e.g. the Audit Commission for local and government and NHS finances, the 
Health and Safety Executive for workplace safety and accident investigation, 
the Charity Commission for charitable registration and governance and, the 
National Care Standards Commission for care homes and facilities); 
• Section 43G (disclosures in other cases e.g. wider closures. Protection is less 
easily available here and it is here that the tribunal has to examine and 
determine the appropriate balance between the public interest and the interest 
of the employer. This section is much the same as section 9 of the PDA in 
South Africa. ); 
• Section 43H (disclosures of exceptionally serious failure); 
• As PIDA is part of the UK Employment Rights Act 1996, section 103 A is of 
importance. The ERA is designed to address concerns in the workplace and to 
balance the interests of employers with employees in comparison to PIDA 
which balances the rights of employers with the wider public interest to 
prevent wrongdoing and protect society at large. Section 103A of the ERA 
provides that an employee who is dismissed will be regarded as unfairly 
dismissed for purposes of this section if the reason for the dismissal is that a 
protected disclosure was made.  
  
Different authors have defined whistleblowing in various ways, and it is clear from 
their definitions that there is not a single clearly defined concept of what 
whistleblowing is. However, there is a clearly defined definition of what a disclosure 
is in terms of section 1 of the PDA. In terms of the PDA, whistleblowers can promote 
an essential and valuable service by exposing wrongdoing (i.e. corrupt and fraudulent 
activity) to the public, as long as the disclosure(s) are in accordance with the 





Framework of the Protected Disclosures Act (26 of 2000) and the UK Public 
Interest Disclosures Act (1998) 
 
Before discussing the PDA and the case law surrounding disclosures, it is necessary to 
set out a framework which promotes an understanding of exactly what this piece of 
legislation provides and how it is applied to whistleblowers and the disclosures that 
are made. A comparison will be undertaken looking at PIDA and selected UK cases.  
 




One of the objectives of the PDA is to combat fraud and corruption, through 
disclosing wrongdoing in the workplace. Other objectives include disclosing 
information concerning damage to the environment, health or safety or unfair 
discrimination as contemplated in the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (4 of 2000). The intention of the Act is to create a culture in which 
employees are able to disclose information relating to irregular conduct in a 
responsible manner without fear of any reprisals. The PDA provides a comprehensive 
statutory guideline for the disclosure of information and provides protection against 
occupational detriment to whistleblowers who disclose information concerning 
unlawful or corrupt conduct. 
 
Advocate Johnny De Lange in his speech at a Roundtable Discussion
52
 mentioned that 
there has always been a slight misunderstanding amongst the general public that 
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whistleblowers are protected by the PDA regardless of what they have disclosed, why 
they have disclosed it and how they have gone about disclosing the information.  
 
This chapter will show that the PDA has very clear procedures that whistleblowers 
have to comply with in order for them and their disclosures to fall under the ambit of 
the PDA. 
 
The PDA encourages honest employees to raise their concerns and report any 
wrongdoing within the workplace without fear of reprisals.  
 
The PDA sets out a simple framework in order to promote responsible 
whistleblowing
53
. It does this by: 
 
“(a) reassuring workers that silence is not the only safe option; 
(b) providing strong protection for workers who raise concerns internally; 
(c) reinforcing and protecting the right to report concerns to public 
protection agencies such as the Public Protector and Auditor-General; 
and 
(d) protecting more general disclosures provided that there is a valid reason 
for going wider and that the particular disclosure is a reasonable one”. 
 
In order to meet these objectives, this necessitates an inquiry into: 
• what information or disclosure is being protected; 
• remedies available to the whistleblower or employee, and 
• what procedures must be followed when making a disclosure. 
 
The PDA was enacted with the idea that it would be in the common interest of both 
the employee and the employer to disclose wrongdoing internally, to avoid the 




According to the article of the Second National Anti-Corruption Summit : Roundtable 
Discussions
54
, the Act works retrospectively and protected disclosures can involve 
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issues which arose before the PDA. The Act is applicable to both public and private 
sector employees who disclose specific information such as: 
 
• any kind of criminal offence;  
• failure to comply with a particular legal obligation; 
• the possibility of a miscarriage of justice; 
• the endangerment of an individuals health or safety; 
• damage to the environment by the employer or department; 
• practice of unfair discrimination in terms of the promotion of equality 
legislation; and 
• concealment of any of the above. 
 
The above points appear in section 1 of the Act under definition of a disclosure. 
 
Once it has been established that the employee’s disclosure falls within the ambit of   
s 1 of the Act, there are other procedures (such as making sure that the disclosure is a 
protected disclosure in terms of s 1(ix) of the Act) need to be followed in order for the 
employee to be legally protected. A “protected disclosure” is a disclosure that is made 
in good faith and with a reasonable belief according to the requirements of the Act.  
 
In terms of the PDA, a disclosure is protected where the disclosure is made to: 
 
(a) a legal advisor in accordance with section 5; 
(b) an employer in accordance with section 6; 




(d) a person or body in accordance with section 8
56
  
or any other person or body in accordance with section 9.  
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A disclosure will not be protected if the employee committed an offence while getting 
the information or, if a legal adviser discloses information an employee disclosed to 
him/her for purposes of obtaining legal advice. 
  
An example of a case where the court had to consider whether the disclosure 
constituted a protected disclosure was in the case of Communication Workers Union v 
Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd
57
 which was decided in the Labour Court.   
 
In this case the applicant made an urgent application to the Labour Court to interdict 
the respondent from suspending him and proceeding with disciplinary action against 
him pending the outcome of an unfair labour practice dispute by the CCMA. The 
applicant alleged that the suspension and pending disciplinary action constituted an 
occupational detriment in terms of the PDA because he had made a protected 
disclosure against the company.  
 
The applicant’s communication consisted of disseminating an email to fellow 
employees and members of senior management suggesting that certain agencies 
tendering for the supply of temporary staff to the employer were being afforded undue 
preference in the recruitment of staff and that senior management were possibly 
implicated in or benefiting from this process. The applicant called for a large scale 
investigation of this issue. 
 
The court noted that if a disclosure is made to an employer in terms of section 6 of the 
PDA, there are a number of requirements that have to be met, i.e. the person claiming 
protection must be an employee who has reason to believe that the information he/she 
possesses falls within the definition of a ‘disclosure’ in s 1 of the PDA; the employee 
must make the disclosure in good faith; if there is a prescribed procedure the 
employee must follow in disclosing the information, then there must be substantial 
compliance with that procedure; if there is no prescribed procedure then the employee 
must disclose the information to the employer and there should be some link between 
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The court determined that a disclosure must be made in good faith and an employee 
who deliberately sets out to embarrass and harass an employer is not likely to satisfy 
the requirement of good faith. The court further found that when disclosing 
information in good faith, it was not necessary to prove the validity of the employee’s 
suspicion. The court justified this by stating that the PDA would be undermined if 
genuine concerns or suspicions were not protected, even if they proved to be 
unfounded.
59
 This point was mentioned in the Francey
60
case by the CCMA 
Commissioner when considering the CWU case in trying to decide whether the 
applicant’s disclosure was a disclosure in terms of s 1 of the Act. This point however 
did not apply to the applicant in Francey’s case considering that the disclosure was 
not made in good faith nor was it based on supported documents and evidence. 
 
This is problematic in that there is no objective standard of good faith. As will be 
argued below there should always be proof of the validity of the employee’s suspicion 
in order to establish his/her case. Further, having evidential proof will also strengthen 
the employees case when the organisation and the court look at the element of 
reasonable belief. Referring to the Francey case which is evidence of this fact and, a 
good illustration of a disclosure not falling under the protection of the Act, having 
evidential proof is always advantageous considering that if all else fails, there is 
documentation to strengthen your case. This is submitted because very seldom is there 
a pure element of good faith when a disclosure is made, simply because by that time  
the “fuzzy feelings” for the person you are making allegations about have long since 
dissipated. However, it must be noted that the whistleblower’s predominant motive 
must be good faith in order that the disclosure is a protected one in terms of the Act. It 
is submitted that this is a debatable point which will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
If there is a lack of documentation available to back up allegations, then there is 
immediate doubt that arises out of the truthfulness of the allegation. A lack of 
reasonable belief in the disclosure also does not help in convincing the court that the 
disclosure is true. What can worsen the situation is if there is proof that the 
employee’s motive was not pure in that the element of good faith did not exist 
because it was found that the predominant motive was something else e.g. 
vindictiveness. Hence the point made above. The legislature in creating the Act 
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obviously had good reason in including the elements of good faith and a reasonable 
belief because if these elements are attached to a disclosure, it makes it all the easier 
to determine whether the disclosure is protected or not and whether the allegations are 
true.   
 
In referring to the case of CWU, the court stated that the PDA was designed in a way 
that protects disclosures made in private rather than in public. An internal disclosure 
did not require a reasonable belief that the wrongdoing had occurred, however for an 
external disclosure, the whistleblower had to have a reasonable belief that the 
allegation was substantially true.
61
 It is submitted that this is yet another debatable 
point that is discussed later in Chapter 6.  
 
The court concurred with the findings in Grieve
62
  that the PDA seeks to encourage a 
culture of whistle blowing.
63
 However, the protection extended to employees by the 
PDA is not unconditional in that the PDA sets parameters for what constitutes a 
protected disclosure. According to the PDA a ‘disclosure’ must either disclose or tend 
to disclose forms of criminal or other misconduct that is likely to be deliberately 
concealed. Furthermore, the disclosure must be made in good faith with the employee 
not deliberately embarrassing or harassing the employer. The court further stated in 
the MTN case
64
  that the PDA was not intended to protect what amounts to mere 




 that the requirement that a disclosure be made through an 
authorized channel is an integral element in structuring the balance. The intention of 
the PDA is to balance an employee’s right to free speech on a principled basis with 
the interests of the employer in mind. The PDA further tries to establish as a condition 
for protection that a disclosure be made in accordance with procedures that are either 
established or authorised. In this case, MTN did have an elaborate system in place for 
the reporting of allegations of fraud which included confidential hotlines that were 
available to employees. The requirement was that there should be substantial 
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compliance with the procedures of the company that are available to employees. The 
applicant failed to comply with the procedures that the company had set down thereby 
removing himself from the protective ambit of the PDA. This caused the applicant’s 
statement to be deemed an unprotected disclosure contemplated by the PDA and also 
not made in good faith. 
 
The applicant tarnished the reputation of the company by inferring that Management 
was in some way committing fraud. At the general meeting the applicant was advised 
to refer his issues to the business risk unit which he did, but went further by blind-
copying the email to other employees of the company which included his peers and 
other members of MTN. He brought the company into disrepute by the calling the 
executive “fat cats”
66
 which was derogatory. He further threatened them with 
engaging the Scorpions to do further investigation. To exacerbate the problem, he had 
no real evidential proof that his allegations were correct. It is common knowledge that 
employees sometimes disagree with some of the policies and procedures that are 
implemented by their companies, but to seek revenge in a way that will tarnish the 
company and management without any evidential proof indicates bad faith. This type 
of action on the part of the employee immediately disqualifies him/her from 
protection under the Act and the disclosures made are consequently deemed to be 
unprotected.  
 
It was found that the applicant did not suffer an occupational detriment in terms of s 3 
of the Act neither did he follow the procedures set out in s 1(ix) of the Act that had to 
be followed substantially in order that a disclosure be deemed protected. On this basis 
the court found that the applicant’s suspension and pending disciplinary action were 
upheld.  
 
It is submitted that this case was decided correctly and illustrates the fact that 
protection can be lost if an employee fails to comply with the procedures of an 
organisations whistleblowing policy. The Labour Court applied its mind to the 
examination of the PDA, especially the fact that an employee must comply with the 
procedures of the Act for the disclosure to be protected and also to comply with any 
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whistleblower policies based on the Act that the organisation has made available to all 
employees. However, what is debatable is the issue concerning the fact that good faith 
does not require proof of the validity of the employee’s suspicions which is discussed 
in detail in Chapter 6. It is submitted that seldom is there a situation where a 
disclosure is made that a person has an element of pure good faith. Furthermore, 
because the element of good faith is a subjective element, it is very difficult to 
determine whether there is good faith or not unless a preponderance test is done. It is 
further submitted that regardless of the fact that an employee disclosing information 
with a reasonable belief and good faith, there should always be evidential proof in 
order to back up an allegation. If good faith does not require proof of the validity of a 
suspicion, then it is leaving the flood gates open for employees to disclosures all kinds 
of information that could be time consuming for the organisation to investigate. This 
could lead to all sorts of problems which could otherwise be avoided if all disclosures 
had evidential proof attached to them. 
 
 In the case of Charlton v Parliament of RSA
67
 (popularly known as the Travelgate 
Scam Case) the issues the court had to determine was whether a disclosure made by 
the applicant was a protected disclosure for purposes of the PDA and whether 
Members of Parliament are employees of Parliament.   
 
The applicant was employed by the respondent as the Chief Financial Officer on a 
three year fixed term contract. The applicant alleged that he was unfairly dismissed on 
account of having made a protected disclosure in terms of the PDA in relation to the 
improper travel benefit claims by members of the respondent.  
 
The respondent’s alleged defence to this claim was that the disclosures made by the 
applicant were not protected disclosures for the purpose of the PDA because members 
of Parliament (MPs) about whom the disclosures were made, were neither the 
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The respondent submitted that the Members of Parliament hold constitutional 
positions and are entitled to participate in Parliament and as a result do not hold any 
contract of employment. It was submitted that Members of Parliament render no 
service to Parliament in the carrying on of its business and therefore Parliament has 
no business. 
 
It was argued for the applicant that Parliament does have business and that business is 
sui generis and defined in the Constitution, i.e. a member of Parliament can be both 
an employer and an employee and is therefore at liberty to disclose information if 
he/she witnesses something illegal in terms of the PDA. 
 
In trying to determine the issues of the case, the court examined s 1 of the PDA, in 
particular, subsection (i) which is the definition of a disclosure, (ii) which is the 
definition of an employee and, (iii) which is the definition of an employer. The court 




 in favour of the applicant and held that Parliament does have 
business which is to legislate for the Republic of South Africa. What is required is 
that that person must be assisting in carrying on or conducting the business of an 
employer and Members of Parliament therefore fit into the definition of “employee” 
because they perform duties for Parliament being an organ of state and are also 
entitled to and do receive remuneration. The payment to Members of Parliament is a 
reward for services rendered to Parliament. This therefore places them within the 
definition of employee in terms of the PDA.  
 
Ngcamu AJ went further to state
70
 that the parliamentary staff do the work for 
Members of Parliament and if there were no Members of Parliament, the staff would 
not have work to perform. Therefore it is the Members of Parliament that provide 
work to the parliamentary staff and permit the staff to assist in the carrying on of their 
business. For Members of Parliament to be employers in terms of the PDA, they do 
not have to employ or remunerate the support staff, however, they do satisfy the 
definition of being employers by providing work and by permitting other persons to 
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assist in the carrying on of their business. Any Member of Parliament who is 
performing his function does so on behalf of Parliament or on the authority of 
Parliament, therefore, if viewed from the perspective of a staff employee, a MP is an 
employer in terms of the definition in the PDA. 
 
In terms of whether the PDA applies to Members of Parliament, the essence of the 
respondent’s defence
71
 was that Parliament provides the law that protects individuals 
who disclose information. However, this did not apply to cases where the disclosure 
concerned Members of Parliament and persons making such disclosure would not be 
in terms of the PDA.  
 
Ngcamu AJ found that there was no reason why Members of Parliament would be 
excluded from the operation of the PDA. The respondent’s interpretation would lead 
to an absurdity and violate the constitutional principles or the purpose of the PDA.
72
 
In interpreting the PDA, the purposive approach
73
 had to be adopted. With this 
approach used to interpret the PDA, the court held that the applicant’s disclosure was 
protected in terms of s 1(i) of the PDA and to think otherwise would deal a blow to 




The judgment handed down was a positive one for whistleblowing cases, and was 
indicative of the fact that members of Parliament or prominent government officials 
will be held accountable if they are involved in cases of fraud and corruption thereby 
paving the way for justice to take its course. This case illustrates how the Labour 
Court examined closely the relevant sections of the PDA and how the Act is able to 
protect whistleblowers.    
 
An example of a leading whistleblowing case where the application of the PDA was 
examined closely by the court in order to determine whether a disclosure constituted a 
protected disclosure, and whose judgment has been referred to in other cases is: 
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Tshishonga v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another.
75
  
This case illustrates that not even the justice department can escape the liability of 
corruption. It gives hope to whistleblowers that whistleblowing may be more effective 
than is often maintained. 
 
The facts of the case are as follows: the applicant was employed in the Department of 
Justice as a Director-General in 1978. In 1994 he became a deputy Director-General 
when the various Departments of Justice amalgamated. One of his tasks was to 
eradicate corruption that was prevalent in the administration of insolvent estates, 
particularly around the appointment of liquidators. After a meeting with his staff, it 
was resolved that a panel would be established to appoint liquidators, instead of an 
individual appointing liquidators as was previously the practice. This was intended to 
prevent fraudulent activity.   
 
In 2002, Minister Penuell Maduna (the then Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development) telephoned the applicant to tell him that Mr Motala (who was a friend 
of the Minister) would be contacting him because he (Mr Motala) was knowledgeable 
about liquidations. The applicant and Mr Motala met and Mr  Motala expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the way he was being sidelined by the procedure for appointing 
liquidators. The meeting ended with the applicant being wary of Mr Motala and it was 
clear to the applicant that Mr Motala wanted to influence him for his own purpose by 
abusing his relationship with the Minister
76
. The Minister telephoned the applicant 
expressing his dissatisfaction with the way in which liquidators were being appointed 
and directed the applicant to convene a meeting with the staff so that he (the Minister) 
could address them. 
 
In July 2002, while the applicant was on leave, Mr Van Der Merwe (who was 
deputizing for him) contacted the applicant to inform him that Mr Farouk Vahed (the 
Master of the High Court in Pietermaritzburg) was instructed by the Minister to 
appoint Mr Motala as a liquidator. On the applicant’s return to work, he asked Mr 
Vahed to prepare a report (the Vahed Report) on the reason why he appointed Mr 
Motala as a liquidator. 
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In September 2002 at a meeting between the Minister, Mr Pikoli, Mr Vahed and the 
applicant, the Minister announced that he was appointing Mr Lategan (the applicant’s 
subordinate) as acting Master in Pietermaritzburg to oversee the appointment of the 
liquidations. The applicant was confused because it was irregular that an assistant 





RAG (Retail Apparel Group) was one of the largest liquidation companies in the 
country involving claims in excess of R1 billion. RAG originally appointed four 
liquidators who successfully challenged the appointment of Mr Motala in the High 
Court, KwaZulu-Natal. Mr Vahed was reluctant to follow the instructions of the 
Minister in appointing Mr Motala as a liquidator of RAG for the reason that it did not 
justify a fifth liquidator. The court confirmed the opinion of the legal advisors that the 




It was also noted that Mr Lategan’s relationship with Mr Motala was unusual
79
  in that 
the procedure for appointing liquidators would entail the company in liquidation to 
requisition a person to be appointed, and it was not open to Mr Lategan to make an 
appointment without such recommendation or requisition. 
 
In January 2003, the applicant received yet another call from the Minister accusing 
him of not helping him in the RAG matter and of bad-mouthing him. The Minister 
declared that the applicant would be the “first casualty” in not doing what he (the 
Minister) required done without questioning. He continued threatening the applicant 
by saying that he would remove him as head of the unit with immediate effect and he 





The Director-General executed the instructions of the Minister to remove the 
applicant from his position, but told the applicant that the Minister gave no reasons 
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why the applicant should be removed from his position.
81
 At the beginning of 
February 2003, the applicant was replaced by the Chief State Law Advisor. The 
Minister however, in media reports, allegedly hinted that the applicant had an “axe to 




The applicant received a letter from the Director-General giving him notice of his 
removal to the position of managing director in the office of the Director-General. 
The applicant reported to work daily but was given no work in his new position. 
 
The Business Against Crime investigator (Mr Kinghorn) was seconded to the 
department to investigate the corruption in the Masters’ Office. A report
83
 was drawn 
up, and together with the Vahed Report was handed to the applicant and the Director-
General. The Director-General did not act upon the reports. 
 
The applicant then lodged his complaint with the Public Protector. When he received 
no response from the Public Protector, the applicant lodged his complaint with the 
Auditor-General’s office. When there was no response from that source as well, the 
applicant then reported the matter to the media. Much publicity followed as a result 
thereof. 
 
The Minister responded publicly, allegedly describing the applicant on national 
television as a “dunderhead, a relic of the Bantustans of old who were accommodated 
by Maduna’s people in the new order and who were now biting the hand that fed 
them.” The Minister was also alleged to have said that the applicant was a timid 




The applicant lodged a complaint of criminal defamation against the Minister. The 
Director of Public Prosecutions declined to prosecute and advised the applicant to 
pursue a civil claim. 
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On the basis of the applicant’s disclosures to the media, he was suspended and later 
charged with misconduct. 
 
After a disciplinary enquiry where he was found not guilty, the applicant tried to get 
his job back but was told that the trust relationship was broken and that he and the 
department should come to some sort of settlement. 
 
Mr Woudstra SC submitted the following for the applicant: 
• that the applicant’s case fell squarely within the ambit of the PDA by 
examining what the requirements are for a disclosure and determining 
what the definition is in section 1(a) and (b) of the PDA; 
• that the disclosure was deemed to have been a protected one in terms of 
section 5 and 6 of the PDA;
85
  
• that the disclosure to the media was protected in terms of section 9 of the 
PDA and by submitting that a “wide and unqualified” meaning should be 
attributed to the word “any” in s9(1) 
• that the applicant was subjected to an occupational detriment as defined in 




The main legal issues the court had to decide upon was whether the applicant’s 
disclosures to the media were protected by the PDA and whether the applicant did 
suffer an occupational detriment in terms of the PDA. This would have been decided 
upon by looking at section 9 of the Act. 
 
The court then went on to look at the purpose and philosophy of the PDA and found 
that whistleblowing is healthy for organizations and whistleblowers should not be 
seen as “impipis”.
87
 The court held
88
 that employees have a responsibility to disclose 
irregular conduct in the workplace and have an obligation to report fraud, corruption, 
nepotism, maladministration and other offences. Furthermore, employees have to act 
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in the employer’s best interests in terms of being loyal, and to preserve the company’s 




 that the PDA is conceived as a four-staged process that begins with an 
analysis of information to determine whether it constitutes a disclosure. If it is, then 
one has to determine whether it is protected. The third stage is to determine whether 
the employee was subjected to an occupational detriment. Finally one must look at 
what the appropriate remedy for the occupational detriment and award (for such 
treatment) would be. 
 
In terms of what a disclosure is, the court looked at the definition in section 1 of the 
PDA which states that a disclosure is “any disclosure of information about the 
conduct of any employer or employee who has reason to believe that the information 
shows or tends to show certain improprieties”. However, the requirement is that 
information must be disclosed that includes, but is not limited to facts (i.e. 
information would include such inferences and opinion based on facts which show 
that it is reasonable and sufficient to warrant an investigation).
90
 It is enough that the 
information tends to show an impropriety. 
 
As mentioned in the MTN case by Van Niekerk AJ at para 21, if a disclosure is made 
in good faith it must also include a reasonable belief that the information is true, 
otherwise this could amount to rumour or conjecture which is not what the PDA 
intended.  Therefore, if the employee believes that the information is true, then a bona 
fide disclosure can be inferred.
91
 If a reasonable belief is determined by personal 
knowledge, then it would frustrate the operation of the PDA by setting a very high 
standard. A mistaken belief or one that is factually inaccurate can also be reasonable, 
unless the information is so inaccurate that the public has no interest in its disclosure. 
However, a mistaken belief or information that is factually incorrect could become 
problematic. That is why disclosures, before being made, should have some form of 
evidential proof attached to them to prevent factually incorrect disclosures being 
made.   
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 stated that by setting good faith as a specific requirement, the legislature 
must have intended that it should include something more than reasonable belief and 
the absence of personal gain. Good faith is required to test the quality of the 
information. A factual example of this is when an employee decides to disclose 
information concerning a particular qualification of the director of the company, 
which information is not as represented or as claimed by the director. The employee 
bases his/her information on what s/he believes to be true (normally based on 
hearsay), and discloses that self same information as factual, without having verified 
the information. 
 
The court held, after examining the evidence, that: 
(a) the applicant had a reasonable belief that a crime was likely to be committed 
because he had based his belief on the Vahed and Kinghorn reports and his 
personal encounters with the respondents and Vahed;
93
 
(b) the applicant did not make the disclosures for personal gain;
94
 
(c) the applicant was aware that the retaliation against him was likely to be serious 
as the information was substantially true and the Minister was politically the 
most powerful person in the department and was very angry with him;
95
 
(d) a reasonable time had lapsed before he went to the media, in that seven months 
had passed and his lodged complaints had not been attended to either by the 
Director-General, Auditor-General or Public Protector;
96
 




(f) the applicant’s disclosure to the media was reasonable and that the media’s 
exposition of corruption is good for democracy
98
. Disclosures to the media 
will not be justified if they are not in the public interest. However, in this case 
the disclosures were serious enough to be in the public interest as they 
involved the public service and public officials and in these circumstances the 
applicant’s disclosure was in all circumstances reasonable; 
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(g) the reason the applicant made the disclosures was to put a stop to the 
corruption in the department. It distressed him that the PDA was being 
“killed” by the very department that gave life to it.
99
 
(h) by making the disclosures the applicant had much to lose as a senior public 
servant and therefore it was not a risk he took without thinking about it 




(i) the applicant had been subjected to an occupational detriment in that even 
though he was paid during his suspension and the settlement assured him of 





The court held that, since the victim of an occupational detriment is in much the same 
position as the victim of discrimination or victimization, compensation for unfair 
discrimination was an appropriate guideline. Detriment suffered by whistleblowers is 
a form of serious discrimination which affects the very core of an individual’s right to 
dignity and therefore merits a high award for damages. 
 
The court ordered the respondents to pay the applicant compensation equivalent to 12 
months remuneration at the current rate applicable to Directors-General. 
 
According to the South African Law Reform Commission Report,
102
 “this was a 
significant victory for whistleblowers in that legal costs were awarded in the 
whistleblower’s favour, the fact that the legal struggle was protracted over four years 
should not be lost sight of. The court held that the employer, the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development, was liable for the whistleblower’s legal costs 
including the costs of Senior Counsel.
103
 It based its finding on the fact that legal 
representation is a necessity in cases under the PDA, because employees need to test 
their beliefs and the information they intend to disclose against the objective, 
independent and trained mind of a lawyer”.  
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Minister Maduna was replaced as Justice Minister after the elections on 14 April 
2004. At the beginning of July 2004, Mr Motala and six departmental officials were 
arrested for fraud and corruption. Tshishonga cleared his name when he substantiated 
all the claims made against Minister Maduna in a recent disciplinary hearing. 




4.1.2 Fact or Fiction : Gossip in the Workplace 
 
It is important to elaborate on this issue, because it is a concept which is relevant and 
needs to be dealt with and discussed in terms of disclosure of information, in 
particular whether this type of disclosure qualifies as a protected disclosure. There are 
times when employees base their information on what they believe to be true 
(normally based on hearsay), and they disclose that self same information as factual, 
without having verified the information.  
 
As Pillay J stated,
105
 in the Tshishonga case, “by setting good faith as a specific 
requirement, the legislature must have intended that it should include something more 
than reasonable belief and the absence of personal gain”. Good faith is required to test 
the quality of the information.  
 
In conjunction with good faith, one needs to have a reasonable belief that the 
information disclosed is true.  
 
In terms of whistleblowing or disclosure of information, the concept of reasonable 
belief is based on some evidential proof which must accompany the disclosure if it is 
made internally. This creates an opportunity for employees who want to cause 
disharmony in the workplace by disclosing information and hiding behind the concept 
of reasonable belief and good faith. Most times one will find that disclosures that turn 
out to be a mistaken belief or are factually incorrect are ones which stem from gossip. 
This becomes an issue considering the time and the resources used to investigate 
disclosures, only to find that they were made all in the name of gossip. 
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Gossip and gossip mongers are present in every workplace environment and most of 
their gossip is discussed in the corridors or over a quick tea break during their comfort 
breaks. It is an accepted fact that office gossip and rumours exist and are part of 
everyday work life. It is submitted that the difference between gossip and rumour is 
that gossip tends to affect the victim personally, for example, it will focus specifically 
on information concerning the other person’s personal or non-personal issues, while 
rumour is more general and entails divulging information that leads to gossip. It is a 
well known fact that gossip varies in intensity between extreme gossip as in malicious 
gossip and innocent gossip as in puffery. The question to ask is, when is the boundary 
crossed between healthy communication and malicious gossip?  
 
Gossip, regardless of its intensity has the power to strain the work environment. 
According to Gouveia et al (2005)
106
 gossip has the power to “undermine an 
individual, break down trust between employees, strain ethical values such as 
openness, transparency and honesty. The consequences are decreased staff morale, 
motivation and interpersonal respect between employees. Gossip has the ability to be 
incredibly malicious and destructive to work relationships and has been compared by 
Burg and Palatnik (2003)
107
 to “a virus that can affect the bottom line and ultimately 
kill a business”. Gossip in its negative form is a complete fabrication and mean 
spirited distortion of reality and truth which allows the gossiper to feel a false sense of 
power over the victim/s.  
 
Hearsay on the other hand, is a form of gossip which is not told directly to the person, 
but who overhears it, and then disseminates what s/he heard. 
  
Victims of gossip suffer psychological problems and inevitably end up suffering from 
depression associated with feelings of victimisation, betrayal, degradation and 
embarrassment. Victims could end up losing their motivation to perform their work 
related tasks because of a lack of self-esteem and stress related diseases which can 
manifest themselves in a number of ways.  Gossip, in a nutshell, can destroy the lives 
of it’s victims.  
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The case of Rand Water Staff Association obo Snyman v Rand Water
108
 is an example 
of a disclosure of information arising out of gossip/hearsay, and the effect it has on 
the victims. 
 
The facts of the case are as follows: the applicant (Ms Snyman) was employed by 
Rand Water as a human resources officer and lived in a house on the property which 
she stated was in a “terrible condition”. The applicant gained the impression that 
managers and certain supervisors were given preferential treatment because their 
houses were better than hers, and therefore believed that her circumstances did not 
compare favourably in relation to these managers and supervisors. The situation was 
aggravated when the applicant received news that residents like herself would 
probably have to pay for the maintenance to their properties whereas the managers 
would not need to pay. In her already aggrieved manner, and relying on hearsay 
information disseminated by two of her colleagues, the applicant contacted the 
Hotline to report certain alleged irregularities that she believed the Managers and 
Supervisors were guilty of.   
 
On investigation, all the allegations were found to be untrue yet the applicant insisted 
that the investigation be re-opened whereupon the managers then instituted grievance 
procedures because the inspection of their properties were viewed as an infringement 
of their privacy and witnessed by their family members. The managers took exception 
to being treated in a way which was demoralising to them and also saw it as having a 
negative impact on all staff at Rand Water.  
 
The second investigation proved yet again that all the allegations made were 
unfounded. On this basis the applicant was dismissed for disclosing information that 
was deliberately untrue and trying to discredit management based on her own opinion, 
hearsay and gossip without sufficient proof. 
 
Although the court found that the applicant’s dismissal was unfair, it found that she 
had a reasonable belief that her disclosure was true even though, a little effort on her 
part to verify the information before disclosing it would have proved that her 
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information was incorrect. The court, however, found that the applicant’s conduct was 
open to criticism for relying on hearsay evidence and by persisting with the 
allegations even though she knew that they were unjustified and on investigation 
found to be untrue. 
 
What is of interest is that the applicant did not seek reinstatement and remained 
unremorseful and unapologetic even when she realised that her allegations were 
untrue and unfounded. No doubt, if she had sought reinstatement, the relationship 
between her and her colleagues would have been strained because of the fact that she 
disseminated hearsay/gossip without clarifying the information and without being 
remorseful. Her colleagues would then be reluctant to say anything to her for fear of 
being implicated. Furthermore the trust relationship between her and Management 
was broken. 
 
Even thought the PDA was not enacted when the applicant disclosed the allegations, 
according to the Arbitrator the purpose of the hotline was likened to the purpose of the 
provisions of the PDA in that it required disclosures to be made in good faith with a 
reasonable belief that the information provided was true.  
 
It is submitted that if further investigations had been carried out it would have been 
found that the applicant did not have a reasonable belief, nor was her motive one of 
good faith. This can be inferred from the fact that the applicant relied solely on 
hearsay without investigating the truthfulness of the rumours and the fact that she had 
a grudge against management even though there was no evidential proof of these 
rumours.  
 
The facts of the case show that her motive from the beginning was questionable 
because of her aggrieved state of mind and her attitude to disclose information that 
she no doubt knew to be gossip, without investigating whether those facts were true or 
not. It is submitted that if the PDA had been enacted when the allegations were 
disclosed, the applicant’s disclosures would not have been protected in terms of s1 of 
the Act.   
 
 50
This case is an example of how gossip can destroy the trust relationship and how it 
can demoralise and destroy its victims. The consequences of gossip are such that it 
leaves behind an insidious doubt within people’s minds about the victims and their 
innocence even when the investigations prove the allegations untrue. The victims are 
left picking up the pieces of their reputation and trying to maintain their dignity.  
 
There is no recourse for the victims if the disclosure is unprotected. In terms of the 
Act, the whistleblower has recourse in that they are able to hide behind procedures, 
complaints of occupational detriment and unfair dismissals or procedures, continuing 
as though their actions were justified. At the very least, for the whistleblower the law 
provides an avenue for recourse in regard to occupational detriment. 
 
When whistleblowers are able to hide behind the concept of good faith and reasonable 
belief even when they realise that their allegations are found to be untrue, it can be 
confidently argued that this is an example of a loophole within the Act that can be 
avoided.  
 
It is submitted that, in comparison to gossip, fact is a sustainable truth which the 
purveyor thereof has at least verified in source and nature and, which s/he has a 
reasonable belief to be true as per the Tshishonga case.  
 
It would be an injustice if information that is substantially true is not disclosed, 
especially if it is in the best interests of the public and the company. Disclosing 
information that an employee knows is in the public interest and for the benefit of the 
company and employees, is a principled and moral duty that one has. Disclosing such 
information is always a major decision because of the consequences attached to such 
disclosures.  
 
A protected disclosure is information that is made in good faith and with a reasonable 
belief of its truthfulness. Evidential proof in conjunction with the element of good 
faith and reasonable belief would indicate that there is some substance to the 
allegation, which could then lead to an investigation into those allegations. 
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It is very seldom that a protected disclosure ends up being a mistaken belief if the 
whistleblower has truly done his/her homework by making sure that the disclosure is 
true and does not stem from hearsay or gossip. When a whistleblower has a genuine 
concern about some sort of wrongdoing concerning fraud and corruption, the concern 
will not be the anticipated personal gain for him/herself, but a concern for the 
wellbeing of the other employees, the public and the company. However, because of 
the stigma attached to whistleblowing, employees who want to disclose information 
are reluctant to divulge the information that they have.   
 
The PDA was enacted to protect such disclosures, hence the concept of protected 
disclosures. The intention of the PDA was to protect whistleblowers from any kind of 
occupational detriment. The protection of the PDA, technically, only covers 
disclosures that are substantially true, made with a reasonable belief of their truth and 
in good faith. The majority of disclosures of information do fulfil the requirements of 
protected disclosures, however, as said above, because of the loophole within the Act 
concerning good faith and reasonable belief, what should be clear has turned out to be 
a rather grey area.  
 
However, the PDA has made it possible for whistleblowers to blow the whistle on 
crime, fraud and corruption in the workplace. The Tshishonga case was one such case, 
where the PDA did what it was supposed to have done, by protecting a whistleblower 
who had disclosed information with a reasonable belief and in good faith. Even 
though in this case it took approximately four years for the court to finally give a 
judgment and close the case, the PDA did accomplish what it had set out to do.  
 
The concept of whistleblowing and protected disclosures is a positive move towards 
the elimination of fraud and corruption which has become a prominent problem. 
When whistleblowers have the faith to believe that the PDA will protect their 
disclosures, there is a likelihood that they will disclose information without fear of 
any occupational detriment. In terms of whistleblowing, there is a need for a change 
of attitude of employers. If employers adopt a mindset that is open to whistleblowing, 
the process will become more manageable. Given that this is such a recent concept, it 
may take time for companies to develop the mindset that the PDA had envisaged.  
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It is submitted, that at present, whistleblowers that make protected disclosures are still 
seen as the bad people and this discourages true whistleblowers from divulging 
relevant information that might eliminate fraud and corruption. But, in cases such as 
Tshishonga, it is clear that the PDA will protect relevant disclosures and it is 
encouraging to see that the courts will do what they can to interpret the PDA the way 
it was supposed to be interpreted. The downside of whistleblowing and protected 
disclosures is, regardless of the fact that the whistleblower falls under the ambit and 
protection of the PDA, the side effects of disclosing information are stressful and 
painful and are likely to leave a whistleblower traumatised. This not only affects the 
whistleblower but also his/her family and day-to-day life. But, to disclose important 
or relevant information that is true in order to prevent further fraud and corruption, a 
whistleblower no doubt has to live by the philosophical ethical principle that his/her 
disclosure was for the greater good of all. 
 
It is submitted that the concept of a true and substantiated disclosure that falls under 
the protection of the PDA is a good disclosure, and justice will be served when fraud 
and corruption are eliminated by a few good and brave people, who are willing to go 




When a disclosure is made and the whistleblower has complied with all the relevant 
procedures, the disclosure is then a protected one under the Act. According to section 
1(vi) of the PDA, an employer may not effect an occupational detriment on that 
employee which could include subjecting the employee to disciplinary action; 
dismissal, suspension, demotion, harassment or intimidation; restricting the employee 
from been transferred or promoted; having the employee’s contract subjected to any 
conditions of employment or additional terms; having the employee’s retirement 
brought forward or altered; and refusing to give the employee a reference or 
deliberately giving him/her a bad reference. 
 
If the whistleblower has being subjected to any kind of occupational detriment by 
his/her employer, section 4 of the PDA provides remedies for the employee such as 
approaching any court that has jurisdiction, which includes the Labour Court and 
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utilising any other processes that are provided i.e. the CCMA. The employee might 
want to resort to the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995) for appropriate 
relief (i.e. unfair dismissal in breach of section 3 will be deemed an unfair dismissal) 
because proof of an unfair labour practice would not be necessary since it would be 
deemed as such or the employee might ask for a transfer within the department (this 
transfer may not be less favourable than the present position the employee is in). 
 
According to the Guide to the Whistle-blowing Act,
109
 “people who are dismissed for 
making a protected disclosure can claim either compensation, up to a maximum 
amount of two years salary, or reinstatement and people who are not dismissed but 
who are disadvantaged in some other way as a result of making a protected disclosure 
can claim compensation or ask the court for any other appropriate order”.  
 
In the case of Radebe & another v MEC, Free State Province Department of 
Education
110
 the applicants claimed that the proposed disciplinary enquiry against 
them amounted to an occupational detriment as defined in section 1 of the PDA.
111
 
The critical question before the court was whether the disclosure was made in good 
faith and with a reasonable belief that the allegations made were substantially true. 
 
The facts of the case are as follows”: the applicants were employed by the Free State 
Department of Education in the capacity of school management and governance 
developer and school principal based in Welkom. In December 2005 the applicants 
compiled a document containing allegations against the MEC responsible for 
education in the Free State Province. These allegations pertained to fraud, corruption 
and nepotism. The document was forwarded to the office of the President of the 
Republic of South Africa, the National Minister of Education, the Premier of the Free 
State, the MEC for Education in the Free State, the Head of Education (being the 
Superintendent General for the Free State, the Deputy Director-General of the Free 
State Administration and the Lejweleputswa District Director of Education. The 
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intention of the applicants was to ensure that the relevant authorities investigate the 




The court held that the disclosure fell squarely within the ambit of section 9 of the 
Act
113
 and looked at the requirements which must for fulfilled for a general protected 
disclosure. 
 
The court held that even though the PDA seeks to encourage employees to expose 
wrongdoing in the workplace, it also incorporates mechanisms meant to safeguard the 
reputation and interests of employers, and all those against whom allegations of 




The court referred with approval to the judgment in CWU v MTN (Pty) Ltd
115
 where it 
stated that: 
 
“The PDA contemplates and protects disclosures made in private rather 
than in public. This is obvious given the potential damage to reputation 
of persons against whom allegations are made, and an integral element 
of the balance between the protection of rights to reputations and the 




The court, on looking at whether or not the disclosure by the applicants was made in 
good faith, and in the reasonable belief that it and the allegations contained therein, 
were substantially true, found that there was no attempt by the applicants to verify 
these allegations, that by their nature, were very serious.  
 
Musi J stated that on examining the evidence it was not possible that the applicants 
could have acted in good faith when there was no basis that existed for the allegations, 
neither could there have been a reasonable belief that the information was 
substantially true. The court found that the underlying reason for the disclosure was 
the general dissatisfaction of the applicants with the manner in which the MEC ran 
her portfolio and thus portrayed a complete lack of respect for her. On this basis, the 
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court found that the disclosure was not protected in terms of section 9 of the Act and 
dismissed the application with costs.  
 
Although the Act is available to protect whistleblowers in respect of making remedies 
available to employees who have suffered an occupational detriment, it is important to 
note that the disclosures must be made in good faith and with a reasonable belief that 
they are true. The purpose of the Act is not to protect disclosures that are made for 
revengeful or malicious purposes. Therefore, the implications of this case are that, 
regardless of the fact that the applicants had evidential proof of their allegations, the 
Act will not protect whistleblowers if their disclosures are made in bad faith and for 
malicious or vindictive reasons.  
 
4.2 The Public Interest Disclosures Act in Comparison to South Africa’s 
Protected Disclosures Act 
 
The United Kingdom’s Public Interest Disclosures Act 1998 (PIDA) is an Act 
protecting individuals who make certain disclosures of information in the public 
interest and to allow such individuals to bring an action in respect of victimisation and 
for connected purposes. Section 43A
117
  makes the whistleblowing law part of the 
UK’s employment legislation. It does this by inserting the main provisions of PIDA 
into a new part of the Employment Rights Act 1996. As a consequence, the majority 
of whistleblowing disputes arise in the context of labour issues such as, unfair 
dismissals, harassment, victimisation, occupational detriments, etc.  
 
The employment legislation deals with employees who believe that they have been 
wronged and their cases can be determined and independently reviewed by the 
relevant authorities. These employee rights are considered when an employee seeks a 
remedy for harm or damage he/she believes he/she personally suffered at the hands of 
his/her employer. In respect of an employee who is harmed or damaged because 
he/she has blown the whistle, the PIDA is the legislation that is considered and the 
                                                 
117
 In this Act a “protected disclosure” means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which 
is made by a worker. 
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claim under this piece of legislation can be brought in an Employment Tribunal.
118
 An 
employment tribunal is similar to the CCMA (Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration) here in South Africa and deals with claims on roughly the 
same basis as the CCMA. The claim is examined carefully to determine whether the 
harm or damage to the whistleblower is directly linked to the disclosure and also to 
determine whether the disclosure falls under the ambit of the protection of the Act. 
The Employment Tribunal in terms of section 48 of the ERA will determine whether 
the whistleblower has been treated fairly in terms of whether he/she was suspended or 
unfairly dismissed for the primary reason of making a protected disclosure. The 
Employment Tribunal’s determination will determine whether the whistleblower may 
appeal the case to the Employment Appeals Tribunal or not. 
 
In terms of PIDA one of the key provisions is the fact that compensation is unlimited 
if the dismissal is on the basis of making a protected disclosure which is deemed to be 
automatically unfair in terms of s 103A of the Act. This puts the onus of proof on the 
employer to prove that the dismissal was fair. Section 9 of PIDA provides a quick 
resolution to an unfair dismissal in terms of interim relief.    
 
The Act applies to all employees who raise genuine concerns about misconduct and 
injustice occurring within the workplace. Disclosures concerning malpractice apply 
whether or not the information is confidential. In addition to employees, the Act 
covers third parties such as contractors, trainees, agency staff, police officers and 
homeworkers who may wish to make a disclosure.  
 
To fall into the ambit of the Act, disclosures must be made in good faith. According to 
the Random House Webster’s Legal Dictionary,
119
 good faith is defined as the quality 
of mind and heart possessed by a person who is acting with sincerity and honesty, and 
without intent to cheat or take unfair advantage of another. This means that the 
disclosure must be made honestly and sincerely with a motive to eradicate the 
wrongdoing. A disclosure that is made in good faith to an employer will be protected 
if the whistleblower has a reasonable belief that the information that he/she is 
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disclosing tends to show that the malpractice has occurred or is going to occur. The 
rationale behind the element of good faith is honesty and sincerity in conjunction with 
reasonable belief that the information disclosed is true. If an employee does not have 
the element of good faith or if the legislature did not specify good faith as an element 
to disclosure of information, then disclosures will in all likelihood be made for 
malicious and vindictive reasons, and for purposes of self-interest which would defeat 
the purpose, objective and aim of the Act. 
 
The Act represents a mid-way position and takes a 3-pronged approach to disclosure 
of information: 
(i) firstly, it encourages whistleblowers to use internal mechanisms, so as to give the 
company a chance to address the problem; 
(ii) secondly, in cases where these internal mechanisms either do not exist or fail to 
work, the legislation encourages whistleblowers to use prescribed external agencies; 
(iii) and finally, under a strict set of conditions, the legislation protects whistleblowers 
that make wider disclosures to, for example, the media. This applies in the event of a 
particularly serious issue, where there is fear of reprisal or cover up, or where the 





The Act makes special provisions for disclosures to be made to designated persons for 
example section 43C (disclosure to an employer or other responsible person), section 
43D (disclosure to a legal adviser), section 43E (disclosure to a Minister of the 
Crown) and section 43F (disclosure to a prescribed person). Broader disclosures are 
protected if they are reasonable in all the circumstances and are not made for personal 
gain. A wider disclosure must fall within one of the following categories in order for 
it to be protected: (i) where the whistleblower reasonably believed he/she would be 
victimised if he/she raised the matter internally; (ii) where there was no prescribed 
regulator and he/she reasonably believed the evidence was likely to be destroyed or 
concealed; (iii) where the concern had already been raised with the relevant 
authorities and (iv) where the concern was of an exceptionally serious nature. 
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When a disclosure is made and the whistleblower is victimised or dismissed in breach 
of the Act for making that disclosure, then he/she can bring a claim for compensation 
to an employment tribunal in terms of section 3 of PIDA (section 48(1)(A) of the 
ERA).  
 
Section 43A of the Employment Rights Act (ERA) defines the meaning of a protected 
disclosure as a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a 
worker in accordance with any of the sections 43C to 43H. This section makes the 
whistleblowing law part of the UK’s employment legislation. Because the PIDA is 
part of employment law, many of the legal and procedural issues relevant for tribunal 
claims can be found in the main body of employment law. 
 
Section 43B (Disclosures qualifying for protection) sets out the information which is 
subject to protection, provided that the employee in sourcing the information did not 
commit an offence or that a legal adviser does not disclosure the information which he 
received from the employee for purposes of legal advice. This section covers a wide 
variety of information which applies to most malpractice. An important aspect of this 
section is that these provisions apply to all information whether or not it is 
confidential.  
 
The degree of belief as per Section 43B, (subsection 1), requires that as long as the 
worker has a ‘reasonable belief’, the standard is met. This means that the belief need 
not be correct but only that the worker held that the belief he/she had was reasonable 
at the time. This can be considered a qualifying disclosure if the worker reasonably 
but mistakenly believed that his/her disclosure was true. For the disclosure of 
information to fall within the definition of a qualifying disclosure, it does not matter 





 relates to a disclosure to an employer or any other responsible person. 
This section is central to, and a vital part of, the Act in that it ensures that employers 
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 Disclosure to employer or other responsible person (1) A qualifying disclosure is made in 
accordance with this section if the worker makes the disclosure in good faith – (a) to his employer, or 
(b) where the worker reasonably believes that the relevant failure relates solely or mainly to – (i) the 
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are made aware of the concern in order to investigate it. This section sets out the wide 
circumstances in which a worker is protected if he/she raises any concerns with 
his/her employer. There is no additional evidential test which applies besides those set 
out in s 43B, that the worker reasonably believes that the information tends to show 
the malpractice. Good faith is a requirement for this section in that the disclosure must 
be made honestly, even where it is made negligently or without due care.  
 
Section 43D relates to a qualifying disclosure made in accordance with this section if 
it is made in the course of obtaining legal advice. This provision enables a worker to 
seek legal advice about a concern and to be fully protected whilst doing so. What 
must be noted however is that this is the only disclosure within the Act which does 
not have to be made in good faith in order to be protected. The issue of confidentiality 
and privilege between the client and the attorney has to be respected, therefore the 
attorney is not able to disclose that information as a protected disclosure unless his 
client advises him to do so. In this respect, it is best if the attorney advises his client to 
disclose the information internally him/herself in order to get the full protection of the 
Act. 
 
Section 43E relates to a disclosure made to the Minister of the Crown. This section 
provides that workers in Government-appointed bodies are protected if they report 
their concerns in good faith to the sponsoring Department, rather than to their 
employer.  
 
Section 43F relates to a disclosure to a prescribed person. This section provides that 
the worker is protected if he/she makes a qualifying disclosure to a person prescribed 
by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. If a regulator has been prescribed, 
what is noticeable is that there is no requirement that (i) the particular disclosure was 
reasonable; (ii) the malpractice was serious and (iii) the worker should have first 
raised the matter internally. However, with this section the worker has to meet a much 
higher evidential burden than in s 43C which protects internal whistleblowing. 
                                                                                                                                            
conduct of a person other than his employer, or (ii) any other matter for which a person other than his 
employer has legal responsibility, to that other person. (2) A worker who, in accordance with a 
procedure whose use by him is authorised by his employer, makes a qualifying disclosure to a person 
other than his employer, is to be treated for the purposes of this Part as making the qualifying 
disclosure to his employer. 
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Section 43G relates to wider disclosures and sets out the circumstances in which these 
disclosures can or may be protected e.g. disclosures to the media. If these types of 
disclosures are made, then they must meet three tests in order to be protected. The 
first test (s 43G(1)(a)-c)) deals with the evidence and motive of the whistleblower, i.e. 
the element of good faith must be present. The second test (s 43G(2)) sets out three 
preconditions, which must be met if the disclosure is to be protected, i.e. the worker 
must reasonably believe that he/she will be victimised were he/she to raise the matter 
with his/her employer or prescribed regulator. Finally, to be protected the disclosure 
must be reasonable in all the circumstances (s 43G(1)(e) and (3)), i.e. in determining 
whether the disclosure was reasonable in all the circumstances the tribunal will have 
to take into consideration all the factors of the case. The whistleblower will not be 
protected if the purpose of the disclosure was made for personal gain.  
 
Section 43H relates to disclosures of an exceptionally serious nature. This section 
provides that wider disclosures of an exceptionally serious nature can be protected 
even though they do not meet the conditions in previous sections such as section 43G. 
However, the element of good faith, reasonable belief and personal gain are relevant 
to this section and should be taken into account.  
 
As Justice Mummery stated in the case of  ALM Medical Services Ltd v Bladon [2002] 
IRLR 807 at para 2 “the aim of the provision is to protect employees from unfair 
treatment (i.e. victimisation and dismissal) for reasonably raising in a responsible way 
genuine concerns about wrongdoing in the workplace. The provisions strike an 
intricate balance between (a) promoting the public interest in the detection, exposure 
and elimination of misconduct, malpractice and potential dangers by those likely to 
have early knowledge of them, and (b) protecting the respective interests of employers 
and employees”.  
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In both the above Acts the elements of good faith,
122
 reasonable belief and personal 
gain are to be taken into account and should be adhered to in order for the disclosure 
to fall under the ambit of the relevant legislation. 
 




Below is a summary of the PIDA and the PDA for easy reference and reading. 
 
Legislation  :  Public Interest Disclosures Act – enacted in July 1998 
 
Who is protected? Public and private sector employees (excluding the 
security service and the police) 
 
Information protected? A qualifying disclosure constitutes  (i)  a criminal offence  
(ii) a failure to comply with any legal obligation  (ii)  a 
miscarriage of justice  (iv) danger to health and safety of 
any individual  (v) damage to the environment  (vi) 
deliberate concealment of information relating to any of 




Prescribed disclosure channels –  (i) internal  (ii)  
prescribed routes    (iii) media. 
 
Motive: Good faith/reasonable belief. 
 
Strengths: (i)Covers private and public sector employees  (ii) linked 
to strong employment law that contains strong burden of 
proof  (iiii) no limits in terms of disclosure routes  (iv) 
covers sub-contractors and trainees as per section 43K:  
(v) creates incentives for employers to put in place 
internal procedures.  The process is consultative and 
consensual with the legislation being a vital step towards 
de-stigmatization.  There is a wide scope of protection for 
both public and private sector employees.  There are no 
upper limits on compensation.  Employees are encouraged 
to blow the whistle internally first which encourages 
employers to put in place internal whistle blowing 
procedures.  An interesting fact is that the Act has the 
firm commitment of trade unions who played an active 
role in campaigning for and supporting the PIDA for both 
the pre-legislation processes.   
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 A worker who blows the whistle will be protected if the disclosure is made in good faith and is 
about a criminal act, a failure to comply with a legal obligation, a miscarriage of justice, a danger to 
health and safety, any damage to the environment or an attempt to cover up any of these. 
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 The overview was taken from a report drawn up by K Drew “Whistleblowing and Corruption: An 
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(Accessed: 9 June 2009). 
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Weaknesses: (i)no provision for central monitoring of cases by 
government which makes it difficult to track and  (ii) 
doesn’t compensate for the UK’s cultural reluctance to “go 
public”.  Individuals are not protected if they disclose 
information to track unions which are not a prescribed 
disclosure channel.  However, this is being addressed by 
way of local agreements whereby employers have agreed 
that it is acceptable for employees wanting to speak with 
or consult with their union representatives first, only if the 
trade unions agree that they will act responsibly.  An  
important fact is that with the influence of the culture of 
secrecy that prevails in the UK, this tends to weaken the 
PIDA because it becomes very difficult to monitor cases 
that are settled privately and remain confidential. 
 
Additional Information: (i)the UK legislation was used as the model for the South 
African legislation  (ii) the legislation has the added benefit 
of permitting workers to make disclosures about matters 
that occur outside the UK and which are not covered by 




Legislation :  Protected Disclosures Act – Enacted in June 2000 
 
Who is protected? Public and private sector employees – specifically excludes 
independent contractors. 
 
Information protected? The same as the UK:  i.e. criminal violations of civil law; 
miscarriage of justice; danger to health and safety of an 
individual; damage to the environment; unfair 
discrimination as contemplated in the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (4 of 
2000) or the concealment of information regarding these 
matters.  However, the disclosure must relate to the 






(i)internal disclosures  (ii) disclosures to prescribed 
persons on the following conditions: (a) reason to fear 
retaliation if made internally (b) fear that information will 
be hidden or destroyed (c) no action has been taken within 
a reasonable time after the disclosure to the employer or a 
prescribed person (d) the matter is exceptionally serious.  
  
Motive: Internal disclosures must be made in good faith.  Other 
disclosures are to be made with the required reasonable 
belief that the misconduct is dealt with by the organization 
or person to whom the disclosure is made as well as a 
belief that the allegation is substantially true. 
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Strengths: Provides for transference to another position. 
 
Weaknesses: No independent agency to investigate whistle blower 
complaints  
 
Additional Information: (i)originally drafted as part of the Open Democracy Bill 
together with Access to Information  (i) modeled on the 
UK’s PDA  (iii) like the UK, the legislation permits 
disclosures on violation that occurred outside South Africa  
(iv) like the UK, the Act ‘prefers’ disclosures to be made to 




Below is a brief discussion and highlight of other legislation dealing with fraud and 
corruption in the UK and SA. The sections highlighted within the Acts are done 
specifically to give an idea to the reader that fraud and corruption is something that is 
taken seriously and the intention of the Legislature was to create Statutes in order to 
prevent fraud and corruption.    
 
4.4 Other legislation concerned with whistleblowing in the UK 
The United Nations is in the process of drafting a United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption Act. Negotiations to agree upon this Convention being drawn up began in 
Vienna on the 21
st
 January 2002. Currently there is a draft containing more than 80 
proposed documents
125
which hopefully will be finalised soon.  Article 16(1) of the 
provision states “systems for (safeguarding and) protecting public (servants) officials 
and other persons (private citizens), who, in good faith report acts of corruption, 
(witnesses, informers and experts who participate in proceedings against individuals 
who have allegedly committed acts of corruption), including protection of their 
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4.5 Other Legislation or Acts concerned with whistleblowing in SA 
 
Besides the Protected Disclosures Act there are also other Acts in South Africa that 
aim at promoting openness and transparency and fighting corruption. Although there 
are many Acts, mention will only be made of three for purposes of this study. Please 
note that the following Acts will be spoken about briefly and only relevant sections 
for the purpose of this discussion will be highlighted. 
 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (12 of 2004) came into 
effect after the 1992 Corruption Act was repealed, creating new definitions of 
corruption.  
 
The purpose of the Act
126
 is to provide for measures that could prevent and combat 
corruption, corrupt activities. It provides for the offence of corruption and offences 
relating to corrupt activities and what investigative measures can be taken in respect 
of corruption and related corrupt activities. The Act also provides for the 
establishment and endorsement of a Register in order to place certain restrictions on 
persons and enterprises convicted of corrupt activities relating to tenders and 
contracts. The Act further places a duty on certain persons holding a position of 
authority to report certain corrupt transactions. 
 
Section 3 creates a general offence of corruption and reads as follows: 
“Any person who directly or indirectly –  
(a) accepts or agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other person whether 
for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of another person; or 
(b) gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification, whether for the 
benefit of that other person or for the benefit of another person, in order to act, personally 
or by influencing another person so to act in a manner that – 
 (i) amounts to the – 
  (aa) illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, or biased; or 
(bb) misuses or selling of information or material acquired in the course 
of the exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, duties or 
functions arising out of a constitutional, statutory, contractual or any 
other legal obligations; 
 (ii) that amounts to – 
  (aa) the abuse of a position of authority; 
  (bb) a breach of trust; or 
  (cc) the violation of a legal duty or a set of rules; 
 (iii) designed to achieve an unjustified result; or 
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(iv) that amount to any other unauthorized or improper inducement to do or not 
to do anything, is guilty of the offence of corruption”. 
 
Corruption can therefore, in a general sense, be described as either giving or receiving 
some form of gratification as an inducement to do something improper or not to do 
something that the other party is supposed to do. 
 
Section 34(1) creates a duty whereby corruption must be reported by any person who 
holds a position of authority
127
 and who knows or ought reasonably to know or 
suspect that a crime of corruption is about to be committed in terms of the Act or one 
of the crimes of theft, fraud, extortion, forgery or uttering a forged document 
involving R100 000 or more has been committed must report it to the police. Failure 
to do so would be an offence in terms of this section.  
 
The Public Service Act (103 of 1994) is considered the most important provision 
relevant to the behaviour of public officials. Corruption within the public sector is 
often regarded as the ‘classic’ form of corruption and the predominant part of 
attention of the media is directed to reporting this kind of corruption. Sections 20 and 
21 of the Act deal with misconduct and are typical of the efforts the Public Service 
has made to limit corruption and maladministration. (In terms of the amendments in 
Act 30 of 2007, sections 16A and 16B are relevant to how misconduct is or should be 
handled in terms of discipline and failure to comply with the above Act). 
 
In a media report
128
 the then Minister of Public Service and Administration, Geraldine 
Fraser-Moleketi stated that “corruption was a direct impediment to Africa’s 
development as it took away resources from priority areas such as healthcare, social 
development and education and overstretched the capacity of the state. Fraser-
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Moleketi also emphasised the need for “other sectors of society (besides the Public 
Service) to increase their participation in the fight against corruption and announced 
that she planned to launch a campaign with business support to make people aware of 
the tools available to fight corruption. The campaign would also promote 
whistleblowing as a patriotic duty”. 
 
In a booklet issued by the Public Service Commission (Explanatory Manual on the 
Code of Conduct for the Public Service: A Practical Guide to Ethical Dilemmas in the 
Workplace), section C.4.10
129
 states that “an employee in the course of his or her 
official duties, shall report to the appropriate authorities, fraud, corruption, nepotism, 
maladministration and any other act which constitutes an offence, or which is 
prejudicial to the public interest”. 
 
The Public Service Commission (PSC) reviewed the effectiveness of whistleblowing 
hotlines and has identified ways of improving the public service anti-corruption 
strategy. The PSC found that the hotlines had been unevenly implemented and others 
were ineffective. In August 2003, Cabinet approved the establishment of a single 
national public service anti-corruption hotline. This hotline became available in 
September 2004 and had already received in excess of 2400 calls relating to alleged 
corruption and service delivery complaints which were referred to other departments 
for action as at December 2005. Investigations on public administration and anti-




The Public Finance Management Act (1 of 1999) explains the purpose of the Act in 
the long title as “to regulate financial management in the national government and 
provincial government; to ensure that all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of 
those governments are managed efficiently and effectively; to provide for the 
responsibilities of persons entrusted with financial management in those governments; 
and to provide for matters connected therewith”.  
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Chapter 10 of the Act defines financial misconduct, and deals with the procedures for 
disciplining those public officials guilty of financial misconduct. It also includes a 





The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act (108 of 1996) at section 
195(1) sets out the basic values and principles governing public administration. It 
states that public administration must be governed by democratic values and 
principles which are enshrined within the Constitution. These principles include 
practicing a high standard of professional ethics, which includes the promotion of 
efficient and effective use of resources. Public administration must be developed and 
orientated in a way which offers services which are unbiased, impartial, fair and 
equitable. It must take into consideration people’s needs and must also encourage 
participation of the public in policy-making. The Act further stipulates at section 
195(1)(f)-(i) that public administration must be accountable, transparent, have good 
human resources, and must be able to cultivate and maximise human potential, 
making sure that it provides the public with information that is accurate, accessible 
and timeous. What is of importance is that public administration must be broadly 
representative of the people of South Africa and must be able to redress the 
imbalances of the past in order to achieve broad representation. 
 
Section 195(2) stipulates that the principles set down in s 195(1) are applicable to 
every administrative body in government, organs of state and public enterprises. 
 
The above section sets expectations of an open and transparent system required to 
hold public officials accountable for good governance. In particular is s 195(1)(a),(f) 
and (g) set out that not only must there be transparency and openness but also 
accountability and a high standard of professional ethics. This is relevant for 
situations when disclosures need to be made in cases of fraud and corruption. 
 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act (38 of 2001) provides at section 29(1) that a 
person who is in charge of, manages or is employed by a business and who suspects 
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that the business has received the proceeds of unlawful activities, certain specified 
unusual transactions took place or the business has been used for money laundering 
purposes, must report to the Financial Intelligence Centre prescribed particulars 
concerning the transactions. Section 52 criminalises a failure to report such 
transactions. Section 38 provides for protection of persons making such reports, 
though it appears to be more limited than what is envisaged by the PDA. 
 
All the above pieces of legislation contribute towards preventing corruption in the 
workplace and protecting employees who wish to blow the whistle on such activities 




Legitimate disclosures and the implications of those disclosures 
 
“History will have to record that the greatest tragedy of this period of social 
transition was not the strident clamour of the bad people but the appalling silence 




The purpose of this chapter is to bring attention to the fact that although there is 
legislation in place (the PDA) to protect employees from suffering occupational 
detriments at the hands of their employer/s when they have made disclosures, there 
are still many employees who have to endure unfavourable working conditions 
because of disclosures made.  
 
Section 186(2)(d) of the Labour Relations Act (No. 66 of 1995) (LRA) states that an 
‘unfair labour practice’ means “an unfair act or omission that arises between an 
employer and an employee involving an occupational detriment, other than dismissal, 
in contravention of the Protected Disclosures Act (26 of 2000), on account of the 
employee having made a protected disclosure defined in that Act”. In other words, the 
LRA renders unfair any occupational detriment in contravention of the PDA which is 
specifically designed to protect whistleblowers.  It should be noted that both the PDA 
and the LRA are designed to protect employees against dismissal that is done unfairly 
or prejudicially based on an employee’s protected disclosures. Section 187(1)(h) of 
the LRA states that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing 
the employee, acts contrary to section 5 (which confers protections relating to the 
right to freedom of association on members of workplace forums), or if the reason for 
the dismissal is a contravention of the PDA, by the employer, on account of an 
employee having made a protected disclosure defined in that Act. 
 
The PDA makes it possible for employees,
133
  without fear of reprisal, to disclose 
information relating to suspected or irregular conduct regarding their employer 
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 US black civil rights leader and clergyman. 
www.brainyquote.com/authors/m/martin_luther_king_jr_2.html (Accessed: 21 July 2009). 
133
 The PDA at section 1(ii) defines ‘employee’ as (a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, 
who works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any 
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whether in the private or public sector. However, to enjoy the protection of the PDA, 
the employee who made the disclosure must have a bona fide and reasonable belief 
that the information disclosed is true. The employee must prove that he or she had 
reason to believe that the disclosure is legitimate, therefore the disclosure is protected 
only if it is made in good faith. If the disclosure itself constitutes a criminal offence 
then it does not constitute a protected disclosure. The employee cannot disclose 
information and be protected by the PDA if the disclosure is made for personal gain or 
monetary rewards i.e. the disclosure will not be within the protective ambit of the 
PDA.  
 
A protected disclosure is defined in terms of its content, the manner in which and the 
person to whom it is made, and the state of mind of the person making it.  
 
Based on my research, it is apparent that various themes emerge as to the reasons why 
people blow the whistle. One of the main reasons for whistleblowing is when an 
employee has observed irregular behaviour which, if left unattended, would cause 
immeasurable damage to the company or to the public. Another observation is that 
whistleblowers that have high credibility have a much greater chance of being heard 
by management. When one is credible, one is most likely to be a loyal employee 
whose work and behaviour cannot be criticised in any way. Credible employees are 
often seen by other workers as “teacher’s pets” that are out to get them and earn 
“brownie points” for themselves.  
 
The motives of whistleblowers vary from situation to situation and are not easily 
known by others, however when the whistle has been blown, on investigation, their 
motives are revealed. The employee with the proper motive will have the best 
interests of the company at heart and his/her motive will be to prevent any harm or 
danger either to his/her colleagues or the company by disclosing the information that 
he/she does. Most times it is true to say that a whistleblower with the right motive, i.e. 
good faith and a reasonable belief has valid disclosures and information about what is 
actually happening and will project that motive in comparison to other whistleblowers 
that make disclosures for mala fide reasons.  
                                                                                                                                            
remuneration; and (b) any other person whom in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer.  
 71
 
Credible whistleblowers are able to influence the appropriate people concerning any 
misconduct because they are able to be trusted. Management of organisations or 
institutions is more likely to listen to a credible witness than to a whistleblower who 
has been a troublemaker within the workplace. However, it must be noted that there 
are some employees who are not labelled as credible but have witnessed an incident 
that is irregular and have therefore reported it. However, in situations such as these, 
management is more likely to look at the source of the information than the 
information itself. There are times in these cases, when this type of whistleblower 
suffers some kind of occupational detriment as opposed to the credible whistleblower 




 state that the following factors play a role in the whistle-
blowing process: 
• Individual characteristics like moral development/behaviour (including 
moral judgement, religious and social responsibility, etc.), personality 
variables (like low self-esteem, field dependence, intolerance of 
ambiguity, etc.), demographics (like age, education, gender, etc.) or job 
situation (pay, job performance, supervisory status, professional status, 
job satisfaction, organizational/job commitment) to name but a few. 
• Situational conditions that can be divided into wrongdoing 
characteristics (like quality of evidence, type of wrongdoing, 
wrongdoer low social status, seriousness etc) and organizational 
characteristics (like company policies, group size, bureaucracy, 
organizational culture and climate, incentives for whistleblowing, high 
performing organizations, etc). 
• Power relations and the amount of power that individuals or units have 
in the organization. 
• Other factors like loyalty, issues of conformity, social and/or financial 
support and membership of professional groups. 
 
5.1 South African cases and the implications of disclosure 
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23(2) Communicare 123. 
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5.1.1 Occupational Detriment 
 
An occupational detriment according to section 1(vi) of the PDA means: 
 
“(a)  being subjected to any disciplinary action; 
(b) being dismissed, suspended, demoted, harassed or intimidated; 
(c) being transferred against his or her will; 
(d) being refused transfer or promotion; 
(e) being subjected to a term or condition of employment or retirement which is 
altered or kept altered to his or her disadvantage; 
(f) being refused a reference or being provided with an adverse reference from 
his or her employer; 
(g) being denied appointment to any employment, profession or office; 
(h) being threatened with any of the actions referred to in paragraphs (a) to (g) 
above; or 
(i) being otherwise adversely affected in respect of his or her employment, 
profession or office, including employment opportunities and work security.” 
 
Section 3 of the PDA is quite clear concerning an employee being subjected to an 
occupational detriment by his or her employer on account, or partly on account of 
having made a protected disclosure. This is the principal protection that the Act 
envisages. An occupational detriment is what one would normally call victimisation 




A dismissal arising out of a disclosure will be deemed automatically unfair under 
section 187(1)(h) which states that an unfair dismissal is a “contravention of the 
Protected Disclosures Act, 2000, by the employer, on account of an employee having 
made a protected disclosure defined in that Act”. The most common remedy available 
to the whistleblower where an occupational detriment is threatened would be to obtain 
an interdict preventing the employer from either dismissing or suspending him/her. In 
terms of section 193 of the LRA the Labour Court is entitled to order reinstatement of 
or compensation to the whistleblower.
136
 Maximum compensation is up to an amount 
equal to 24 months remuneration payable to the employee at the dismissal date.
137
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 A Landman “A charter for whistleblowers – a note on the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000” 
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 Section 193 – Remedies for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice: (1) If the Labour Court or an 
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If a whistleblower is aware that he/she may or might suffer some kind of occupational 
detriment because of his/her disclosure, he/she can ask his/her employer to transfer 
him/her to another post or position within the company. However, the transfer must be 
one that does not affect his/her employment terms and conditions, i.e. the employment 
terms and conditions may not be less favourable than those that applied to the 
employee previously. 
 
When it comes to the protection of whistleblowers, the PDA sets down conditions 
where the LRA sets down remedies. The PDA sets out in more detail the types of 
occupational detriments that are prohibited in terms of the protection of 
whistleblowers. It also gives a much clearer path in relation to legal uncertainties than 
the LRA if the LRA alone was at their disposal. The PDA covers a much broader 
spectrum and scope than the LRA when it comes to whistleblowing and disclosure of 
information. Both the PDA and LRA consider an occupational detriment or 
victimization as an automatic unfair dismissal or in the case where the employee is 
still employed but suspended, an unfair labour practice. The cases discussed below 
illustrate the legal remedies that can be used if the whistle was blown in good faith, 
and also how whistleblowers were victimised for acts of impropriety committed by 
the employer. 
 
The following cases are illustrations of employees who are unfairly dismissed and 
victimized when having made a protected disclosure.  
 
In the case of Grieve v Denel (Pty) Ltd
138
 the court looked at how an employee is 
afforded protection against an occupational detriment and whether the threat of 
disciplinary action constituted an occupation detriment in terms of s 1(vi) of the PDA. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
dismissal is automatically unfair or, if a dismissal based on the employer’s operational requirements is 
found to be unfair, the Labour Court in addition may make any other order that it considers appropriate 
in the circumstances. 
137
 In terms of section 194(3), the compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is 
automatically unfair must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but not more than the 
equivalent of 24 months remuneration calculated at the employee’s rate of remuneration on the date of 
dismissal.  
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 2003 (4) BLLR 366 (LC). (Refer also fn 46). 
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The facts of the case are as follows: the applicant was preparing a report for the 
respondent’s Board concerning certain allegations of wrongdoing (i.e. unauthorized 
expenditure, nepotism and financial irregularities) by the General Manager of one of 
its divisions, when he was charged with misconduct, suspended from duty and 
summoned to attend a disciplinary inquiry. The applicant claimed that the respondent 
had infringed the requirements of the PDA by suspending him from his employment 
on full pay and charging him with misconduct pending a disciplinary inquiry/hearing 
because of the allegations that he had disclosed. The applicant then launched an 
urgent application to the Labour Court for an order restraining the company from 
instituting disciplinary action against him which was granted.  
 
The court in granting the restraining order held that, although the PDA requires a 
dispute to be referred for conciliation before the Labour Court is approached, it does 
not prevent the court from entertaining urgent matters before a reference to the 
CCMA, and that it could also order the maintenance of the status quo pending final 




The court in granting the order examined the PDA to establish how it protects 
employees who, in responsible manner disclosure information and what protection is 
extended to the employee/s against reprisals for those disclosures. The court held that 
in terms of s 3 of the Act, an employee may not be subjected to any kind of 
occupational detriment  by his/her employer on account of having made a protected 
disclosure. Furthermore, s 6 of the Act states that a disclosure is deemed to be a 
protected disclosure if it is made to an employer in good faith. Section 9 of the Act 
stipulates that any disclosure made in good faith and with a reasonable belief that the 
information disclosed is substantially true and not made for purposes of personal gain 
is a protected disclosure. If on this basis the employee is subjected to an occupational 
detriment then he/she can rely upon s 3 of the Act for protection. The remedy 
available to the employee is in terms of s 4 of the Act. 
 
                                                 
139





 that the disclosures made by the applicant were made in good faith 
because the information appeared to be documented, supported and revealed a breach 
of legal obligations and possible criminal conduct which amounted to a protected 




 that it was satisfied that the applicant had established a link 
between the charges brought against him and the disclosures made.  
 
It is submitted that the decision of the court was correct and the finding was based 





“the PDA provides wide-ranging relief designed, it seems, to encourage a 
culture of whistleblowing and, in fact, its preamble describes it’s purpose 
as to “create a culture which will facilitate the disclosure of information 
by employees relating to criminal and other irregular conduct in the 
workplace in a responsible manner by providing comprehensive statutory 
guidelines for the disclosure of such information and protection against 
any reprisals as a result of such disclosures”.  
 
Important to note is the fact that, the Act is available as a form of protection for 
employees who disclose information in a responsible way and in terms of the 
procedures set out, making sure that the disclosure is made in good faith and with a 
reasonable belief and, that the information is substantially true. Another important 
point to take note of in cases such as this is the fact that the employee has the onus of 
proving a strong link between the occupational detrimental and the disclosure. 
 
This case is a good illustration of how the court can apply the PDA in cases where 
appropriate relief concerning an occupational detriment is needed urgently.   
 
In the case of H and M Ltd
143
 the applicant maintained that her allegations amounted 
to a ‘disclosure’ in terms of s 1 of the PDA, and that she had suffered an occupational 
detriment due to her disclosures.  
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142
 See fn 138, para 8. 
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The applicant was employed by the respondent company as its human resources 
manager. In September 2004, the applicant addressed a letter to a minority 
shareholder of the company in Spain, in which she listed 42 complaints concerning 
the management of the South African branch of the company and the actions of 
individual managers. She was suspended and charged at a disciplinary hearing with 
intent to cause harm to her employer by abusing and divulging confidential 
information, fraudulent activities while in a position of trust, breach of her duty of 
good faith, and gross negligence. She was found guilty and dismissed.  
 
In examining the case, the Commissioner looked at s 1 of the Act, in particular 
subsection (i) the definition of disclosure; subsection (ii) the definition of employee; 
subsection (vi) the meaning of an occupational detriment and; subsection (ix) when a 
disclosure constitutes a protected disclosure. Section 9 of the Act was also looked at 
in determining under what circumstances a disclosure can be deemed a general 
protected disclosure for purposes of the Act.  
 
The Commissioner considered the decisions of the Labour Court in cases where the 
court examined the definition of an occupational detriment and when a disclosure 
qualified for protection in terms of the Act. The decisions referred to were Grieve v 
Denel (Pty) Ltd
144
, Rand Water Staff Association obo Snyman v Rand Water
145
, 
Communication Workers Union v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd
146
  and the 




In Grieve v Denel (Pty) Ltd
148
 (as discussed above) the court took the view that to 
qualify for protection, disclosures had to be made in good faith, with a reasonable 
belief that the information is substantially true, not made for purposes of personal gain 
and, that there should be a sufficient link between the charges brought against the 
employee and the occupational detriment arising out of the fact that disclosures were 
                                                                                                                                            
143
 (2005) 26 ILJ 1737 (CCMA) also cited as H Bourgstein and Ocean Estates International Case No: 
WE 13061-04 & 11090-04 
144
 (2003) 24 ILJ 551 (LC). 
145
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 See fn 144. 
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made. The court found that the applicant did suffer from an occupational detriment 
due to his disclosure. 
 
The Commissioner also considered the decision in the case of Communication 
Workers Union v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd
149
 where the court held
150
 that 
if a disclosure is made to an employer in terms of s6 of the PDA, a number of 
conditions must be satisfied before that disclosure can be protected. Further, that the 
purpose of the PDA would be undermined if genuine concerns or suspicions were not 
protected in an employment context even if they later proved to be unfounded. 





In the present case, the Commissioner, in concluding his arbitration award, stated
152
 
that the Labour Court will have to provide further guidance on the interpretation of 
the PDA, in particular in interpreting the phrase ‘any legal obligation to which that 
person is subject’ (section 1(1)(b) of the PDA). “It is an established rule of 
interpretation that words are to be given their ordinary meaning. In the present matter 
the legislature has decreed that a disclosure may be made about the failure to comply 
with ‘any’ legal obligation. It seems that this suggests that as wide as possible an 
interpretation should be given to this phrase and should deal with whatever that 




The Commissioner found that while the vast majority of applicant’s allegations were 
not protected,
154
  the employee was, however, perturbed about how the respondent 
was operating the business because it affected her directly as an employee. The 
Commissioner found that in terms of s 9 of the Act, the applicant had the required 
good faith and reasonable belief that the information disclosed was substantially true 
and that her disclosure was deemed to be a disclosure in terms of s 1 of the Act. It was 
found the applicant had suffered an occupational detriment in terms of s1(vi) of the 
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Act in that her suspension and dismissal were directly linked to the disclosures that 
were made. It was on this basis that the applicant’s dismissal was found to be 
substantively unfair. 
 
It is submitted that in a whistleblowing context, this type of case is problematic and 
leaves a loophole for all types of malicious and vindictive disclosure that can be made 
resulting in unfounded hurtful allegations. It is conceded that even though a number 
of allegations can be made, even if one of those allegations are deemed to be 
protected, the employee is safe from any kind of occupational detriment in terms of s 
1 of the Act. However, what is of concern is the fact that so many other allegations 
can be made and the question that arises is, how are those allegations treated if found 
to be unprotected by the Act and what consequences do they carry for the 
whistleblower? Should the employee not have been disciplined for the allegations that 
were unsubstantiated? Many questions arise out of a case such as this, with many of 
them not being able to be answered. This case is illustrative of shooting in the dark 
and hoping for the best. It is submitted that a solution to this problem is to make ethics 
and whistleblowing policies in the workplace stricter by highlighting the 
consequences of disclosing information that is unsubstantiated. It would definitely 
lessen the problem of employees making wild and unsubstantiated claims and make 
them aware that you cannot hide behind the Act for all sorts of disclosures.  
 
In the case of Pedzinski v Andisa Securities(Pty) Ltd (Formerly SCMB Securities (Pty) 
Ltd)
155
  the applicant claimed that her dismissal was automatically unfair on the basis 
that she had made a protected disclosure in terms of s 1 of the PDA.  The issues the 
court had to examine was, (i) whether the applicant had made a protected disclosure in 
terms of s 1(x) of the Act and, (ii) whether the disclosure was the main reason for the 
applicant’s dismissal which would in terms of s 3 of the Act be deemed an 
occupational detriment.  
The applicant was employed as a compliance manager for the respondent. The 
applicant’s duties included monitoring compliance by the respondent, its officers and 
all employees with regard to the statutory requirements applicable to the respondent’s 
business and, she was also responsible for the Private client business Division.  
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In the applicant’s course of duties she reported that irregular trading of shares 
involving staff members who were identified. One of the persons implicated was the 
respondent’s executive director. The applicant’s manager expressed dissatisfaction 
about the fact that the irregularities had been reported to senior employees elsewhere 
in the company before he was informed and deemed the conduct of the applicant as 
insubordinate. This resulted in a deterioration of the relationship between the 
applicant and her manager. The applicant was then informed that she must work full 
days, failing which she would be offered an alternative position in the group or be 
retrenched. The applicant was dismissed and claimed that her dismissal was 
automatically unfair, the reason being that she had made a protected disclosure, or that 
her dismissal was intended to force her to accept a demand, or that she was unfairly 
discriminated against on the basis of disability. The respondent claimed that the 
applicant had been fairly retrenched.  
 
The applicant instituted action against the respondent for her dismissal alleging that 
the retrenchment proceedings were a sham designed to disguise the true reasons for 
her dismissals. The applicant referred the dispute to the CCMA and subsequently the 




When examining the evidence of the case, the court first had to determine whether the 
applicant’s disclosure constituted a protected disclosure in terms of s 1(ix) and s 6 of 
the PDA. The court held
157
 that the applicant claimed that it was within the 
respondent’s regulations as well as her duty and function to report all regulatory 
breaches to Group Compliance which was part of the company’s Risk Management 
team which was not regarded as an external party of the company. Furthermore, the 
respondent conceded that the applicant was fulfilling her duties as Compliance 
Manager by reporting the irregularities. The court held that it was of the view that the 
applicant had a reasonable belief and the required good faith when disclosing the 
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information and therefore under s 6 of the PDA falls squarely under the protection of 
the Act.  
 
The court then had to examine the second issue which was to determine the true 
reason for the applicant’s dismissal. The court was guided by what was stated by 
Froneman DJP in the case of SACWU & others v Afrox Ltd
158
  where it was stated 
that: 
 
“the enquiry into the reason for the dismissal is an objective one, where the 
employer’s motive for the dismissal will merely be one of a number of factors 
to be considered. The issue is essentially one of causation and I can see no 
reason why the usual twofold approach to causation, applied in other fields of 
law, should not also be utilized here. The first step is to determine factual 




 that in order for a dismissal to fall within the ambit of section 
187(1)(c)
160
 of the LRA, a dismissal must have as its purpose the compulsion of the 
employee concerned to accept a demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest 
between employer and employee. If the dismissal is not for that purpose, it cannot 
succeed as a ground in terms of section 187(1)(c) of the LRA. In this case, the 
applicant was required to agree to work on a full-time basis, i.e. working a full-day 
instead of a half day. This was a dispute of mutual interest between the applicant as 
employee and the respondent as employer and therefore fell within the ambit of 
section 187(1)(c) of the LRA.  
 
The issue the court had to decide upon was whether there was a fair reason for the 
dismissal. If the dismissal was not automatically unfair, then it is important to 




 that if the dismissal was not automatically unfair, it would be 
important to establish whether there was a fair reason for the dismissal. It was unfair 
to require the applicant to work on a full-time basis when the cause of problems faced 
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by the department could have been solved by distributing the workload between the 
other employees of the company. Given the applicant’s medical problem, the 
alternative proposed by the respondent that she should work full days was 
unreasonable. Therefore, the respondent’s offer of a full-time position had been 
intended to force the applicant out of her job, knowing that the applicant was unable 
to take the position because of her incapacity.  
 
The applicant’s dismissal was found not to be a dismissal in terms of medical 
incapacity, but an automatically unfair dismissal, without a fair reason and was 
procedurally unfair, based on the disclosures that she had made. The decision to 
retrench the applicant was a “sham” as the real reason for her dismissal was because 
of the disclosures made concerning irregular trade sharing. On this basis the court 
found that the predominant reason for the applicant’s dismissal was because of the 
disclosures that were made. In terms of s 3 of the PDA, the employee had suffered an 
occupational detriment thus making the dismissal automatically unfair.  
 
It is submitted that the decision of the Labour Court was correct in this case and the 
examination of both the LRA and the PDA is proof that the court applied its mind to 
the issues at hand. This case is an illustration of how the PDA will protect disclosures 
that are made with good faith and a reasonable belief that the information is correct. 
Thus, if an employee discloses information in accordance with the Act they will be 
protected. Note must be taken that the requirements of good faith and reasonable 
belief are vital requirements that an employee must have when he/she discloses 
information. It is submitted that this case is an example of how the court will examine 
other cases such as this to find a way forward for whistleblowers to be protected under 
the Act.  
 
In the case of Sekgobela v State Information Technology (Pty) Ltd
162
 the applicant   
alleged that he was subjected to an occupational detriment in that he was 
automatically unfairly dismissed for having made a protected disclosure in terms of 
section 3 of the PDA. The issues before the court were (i) was the applicant’s 
disclosure defined as such in terms of s 1 of the Act and was the disclosure protected 
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and, (ii) was the primary reason for the applicant’s dismissal due to the disclosure 
made and if so, did the applicant suffer an occupational detriment in terms of s 1 and s 
3 of the PDA. 
 
The applicant was employed as a Progamme Manager. The applicant claimed that he 
had written a letter to the Chief Executive Officer setting out two grievances that he 
had. The first pertained to his performance review of October 2003, and the second 
pertained to the three issues which were subsequently submitted to the Public 
Protector in respect of certain “perceived irregularities” in respect of the CALMIS 
Implementation project, the OSIS-project and Tender 0199.
163
 The applicant claimed 
that he had approached the Public Protector because he believed that the CEO would 
not attend to his grievances.  
 
The applicant believes that due to his disclosures he was subjected to a disciplinary 
enquiry where he received a warning which was overturned on appeal, had his job 
responsibilities removed, later suspended and charged with a host of charges, one of 
them being a charge for incompatibility for which he had to attend a hearing and, 




Looking at the issues before it, the court held that (i) in terms of s 1 of the PDA, the 
applicant’s disclosure did fall into the definition of what a disclosure is in terms of the 
Act and was deemed to be a protected disclosure due to the failure of the respondent’s 
employees complying with a legal obligation to which they were subject; (ii) that the 
disclosure was protected in terms of s 8(1)(a) of the Act and; (iii) that the information 
disclosed was an impropriety in terms of s 1(iv) of the Act. The court further held that 
the applicant’s disclosure was made in good faith and with a reasonable belief that the 
information was substantially true and not made for the purposes of personal gain.
165
   
 
In looking at the issue of occupational detriment, the court held
166
 that the applicant 
had provided enough evidence to the court for it to believe that the predominant 
reason for the applicant’s dismissal was due to the disclosure made. Therefore, the 
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applicant had suffered an occupational detriment in terms of s 1(vi) of the Act and the 
dismissal of the applicant is deemed to be automatically unfair in terms of s 3 of the 
PDA.  
 
This is yet another illustration of the Labour Court applying the law in terms of the 
PDA correctly and taking cases such as this, where a whistleblowing has to endure an 
occupational detriment in the form of suspension and dismissal for disclosing relevant 
information forward. The implications of an award such as this, is an encouragement 
to future whistleblowers who believe that they have relevant information that needs to 
be disclosed in order to prevent fraud and corruption. Yet again, it must be noted that 
the whistleblower will be protected if they can prove that their disclosures were made 
in good faith and with a reasonable belief and not for purposes of personal gain. 
Substantial evidential proof of a disclosure will always be considered by the court and 
will help the court to establish reasonable belief in the substantial truth of the 
allegation. 
 
McWilliams v International Development and Change Services,
167
 heard at the CCMA 
is another case illustrating an occupational detriment in terms of s 1(vi) of the PDA. 
The applicant submitted that he had resigned from his position owing to certain 
grievances that he had raised and it was due to these grievances that he was made to 
apologise for the fraud that he had not committed and found guilty of fraudulently 
completing call reports and given a First Written Warning. 
 
The issue the court had to decide upon was whether the applicant’s constructive 
dismissal was due predominantly to his disclosures. 
 
The applicant was employed as a Field Marketing Executive. Following the 
applicant’s disclosure of fraud to senior management, he was told that a disciplinary 
hearing would take place and that in order to protect his identity as the whistleblower, 
he would have to plead guilty to fraud along with the other accused. The applicant 
was in agreement with this suggestion and was assured by the CEO that there would 
be no repercussions for him. Unfortunately this was not so considering that the 
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applicant was made to apologise publicly for the fraud that he did not commit and was 
identified as the whistleblower. The applicant thereafter received First Written 
Warning from the respondent.  
 
On this basis the applicant resigned from his position stating the reasons as public 
humiliation suffered at the hands of the respondent, being identified as the 
whistleblower and, loss of trust in management.  
 
The Commissioner examined the definition of an occupational detriment in terms of s 
1 of the Act and also looked at s 3 of the Act in terms of an employee not being 
subjected to an occupational detriment for making a protected disclosure. The 
Commissioner held that the applicant had substantially followed the prescribed 
grievance procedures when making his complaint, thus making his disclosures 
protected under the auspices of the Act in terms of s 1(ix) and s 6 of the PDA. 
 
The Commissioner held that the applicant’s option to resign was a reasonable option 
considering that the trust relationship between the parties was irreparably breached. 
On this basis, the court held that the applicant succeeded in proving that he was 
constructively dismissed for having made a disclosure that amounted to a protected 
disclosure in terms of s 1 of the Act.  
 
It is submitted that this case illustrates that Commissioners are also applying their 
minds to cases of whistleblowing, examining and applying the relevant sections of the 
PDA in a way that benefits the whistleblower. The outcome of this case illustrates 
how courts are beginning to examine cases of occupational detriments thoroughly. An 
outcome such as this is a warning to employers not to punish whistleblowers for 
disclosing relevant information by subjecting them to occupational detriments as a 
form of punishment, but to rather look at how they can deal and investigate the 
disclosures in the correct manner.  
 
Theron v Minister of Correctional Services & Another
168
 illustrates how the court 
dealt with the issues concerning what constitutes a protected disclosure in terms of s 9 
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of the PDA, and also what constitutes a occupational detriment in terms of s 1 of the 
Act.  
 
The applicant was a medical doctor who had provided medical care to prisoners at 
Pollsmoor Prison 22 years. The applicant disclosed information in a report concerning 
the standards of healthcare at the prison. The applicant had, on numerous occasions, 
complained about these problems to a number of officials at the Department of 
Correctional Services and the Department of Health and action was not taken.  The 
applicant then submitted the report to the Inspecting Judge of Prisons and to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Correctional Services, who both compiled further 
reports criticizing the healthcare at the prison. The applicant submitted that it was on 
the basis of his disclosures that he was transferred from Pollsmoor prison to a 
community health centre elsewhere and that there was a direct link between him being 
transferred and the disclosure that was made. The applicant lodged a dispute 
concerning an alleged occupational detriment and further sought an order setting aside 
the decision to remove him from Pollsmoor prison pending the outcome of an unfair 
labour practice.   
 
The court dealt with the issues by examining the relevant provisions of the PDA, in 
particular, a disclosure in terms of s 9 of the Act. The court also relied heavily on the 
decision of the Tshishonga case.
169
 The court found that in terms of s 9(2)(c)
170
 the 
applicant contended that he had previously made disclosures of the same information 
to his employer and no action had been taken within a reasonable period.  The court 
found that it was common cause that the applicant had complained to both the 
Department of Correctional Services and the Department of Health. In terms of s 
9(2)(d),
171
 the court found the fact that the health of prisoners had been or was likely 
to be endangered was of a sufficiently serious consideration. In terms of s 9(3) the 
court found that the applicant did act reasonably in making the disclosures to the 
office of the Inspecting Judge and the Portfolio Committee as these bodies had a 
direct link to the Department of Correctional Services and could in all likelihood, deal 
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with his concerns. The court also had to consider whether in terms of s 9 of the Act, 
the applicant had made the disclosures in good faith and with a reasonable belief that 
the information was substantially true and not made for purposes of personal gain. 
After a thorough examination of s 9 of the Act, the court held that the applicant had 
fulfilled the requirements set down in s 9 of the Act, and the disclosed the information 
with the required elements of good faith and a reasonable belief that the information 
was substantially true. This was determined by the fact that the applicant had 
previously made the same disclosures because of his concern about the healthcare 
standards at the prison. In terms of the occupational detriment the court found that 
there was a direct nexus between the disclosure and the applicant’s transfer from 
Pollsmoor Prison to the community health centre. Therefore in terms of s 1(vi) and s 3 
of the Act, the court determined that the applicant did suffer an occupational 




It is submitted that this case was determined correctly and, it is encouraging to see 
how the Labour Court yet again applied its mind to the sections of the Act in order to 
provide protection to the whistleblower. As Niewoudt AJ relied heavily on the 
findings of the Tshishonga case, it proves that this was an important decision for 
whistleblowers and will no doubt be used in the future as a guideline to other cases 
concerning disclosures of information. It must be noted yet again that in order to be 
protected in terms of the PDA, it is always helpful to have substantial evidential proof 
in the form of documentation to back up the requirement of a reasonable belief proof.  
 
5.1.2 Appropriate Relief 
 
The case of Tshishonga v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Another
173
 (discussed in detail in chapter 4) was taken on appeal to the Labour Appeal 
Court
174
 in respect of the award of compensation for an occupational detriment 
suffered by Mr Tshishonga (respondent). Arising out of a disciplinary inquiry 
instituted by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Mr 
Tshishonga sued for compensation arising out of an unfair labour practice. Mr 
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Tshishonga contended that the suspension and disciplinary proceedings against him 
were tantamount to an occupational detriment following his disclosures to the media. 
In the court a quo, Pillay J found for Tshishonga and ordered the appellants to pay 
twelve months remuneration at the rate applicable to a Director-General. In 
justification of the award, Pillay J took into account the fact that subjection to an 
occupational detriment for whistleblowing is “a very serious form of discrimination” 




The learned judge stated that the longer the dispute endured, the greater the stress on 
the employee which was interpreted as a continuation of the retaliation against the 
employee by the Department. Furthermore, the Department’s failure to testify or offer 
any explanation aggravated the claim against it, as well as the insults and ill-treatment 
which the employee had to endure.  
 
Pillay J went further by stating
176
 that in her view, suspension and being charged with 
misconduct is a step away from being dismissed and therefore a dismissal for making 
a protected disclosure should attract as much as 24 months remuneration.   
 
It was on the basis of this compensation award to Mr Tshishonga that the appellants 
took the case on appeal, stating that the award for compensation was excessive, and 
that Pillay J had erred in making the award of compensation.  
 
Counsel for the Department of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (Mr Bezuidenhout) 
conceded before the appeal court that the following factors which Mr Tshishonga 
suffered at the hands of the Department, did fall within the definition of an 
occupational detriment, and, should be taken into account when making an award for 
compensation:  
• the embarrassment and humiliation suffered by the respondent by being 
removed with immediate effect from the Master’s business unit without being 
given any reasons, and thereafter, being subjected to a suspension and 
disciplinary hearing. This embarrassment and humiliation affected not only 
Tshishonga, but his wife and school going children as well; 
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• Tshishonga suffered further humiliation at the hands of the then Minister of 
Justice on national television, by being referred to as a “dunderhead” and that 
he was “at most a timid public servant and at worst the sort of person who 
would not be able to box himself out of a wet paper bag”, and that he was 
rapped over the knuckles for poor work performance; 
• he suffered gross humiliation by being moved to a position which was non-
existent at the time and kept in that position without any work or instructions 
coming his way; 
• he suffered victimisation and harassment by being subpoenaed to an 
interrogation in terms of s417 and s418 of the Companies Act by Mr Motala, 
where he had to give evidence which turned out to be irrelevant. It was later 
found that the only reason he was subpoenaed was to embarrass him; 
• he had to pay attorney and counsel costs of over R100 000 for protecting his 
rights and interests at the inquiry, which the Department failed to repay; 
• he paid a further amount of R77 000 for an attorney to defend him at the 
disciplinary inquiry where he was found not guilty; and 
• he suffered psychological trauma because of the humiliation, victimisation and 
harassment by the Department after his disclosures to the media, and had to 
receive trauma counselling as a result of the Department’s relentless pursuit of 





The court considered the above points which constituted non-patrimonial loss in order 
to determine the appropriate compensation, in particular, the fact that he had suffered 
the indignity of unfortunate, intemperate attacks made by the Minister on national 
television which was compounded by the role played by Tshishonga in seeking to 
promote integrity in government. Furthermore, he had suffered the indignity of losing 




The court stated that the Department of Justice was obligated to show deference to the 
PDA considering that it had promoted the Act and therefore knew the importance of 
the Act in promoting the constitutional values of accountability and transparency in 
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the public administration of this country.
179
 On this basis the court justified a 
compensatory award. 
 
In determining quantum of damages, the court looked at the factors set out by Harms 
JA (as he then was) in the case of Mogale v Seima
180
 which it considered to be of 
particular relevance: “the main factors determining quantum in damages is the 
seriousness of the defamation, the nature and extent of the publication, the reputation 
and the motives and conduct of the defendants which are relevant”.  
 
It is submitted that this case is a clear example of the psychological harm that a 
whistleblower can suffer in the form of an occupational detriment when disclosing 
information that is relevant, when trying to bring about an end to fraud and 
corruption. Regardless of the fact that the disclosures were found to be protected, and 
justice was done, the psychological harm suffered by the whistleblower was 
significant. Therefore it is safe to say, looking at the above facts, that, the sacrifice an 
employee makes in seeing justice being done by disclosing information is a big 
responsibility. It is submitted that what is also relevant is the fact that, the courts 
cannot err in making judgments concerning compensation. Section 94(4) the LRA 
clearly stated that compensation that may be awarded to an employee in respect of an 
unfair labour practice must be ‘just and equitable’ and may not be more than 12 
months’ remuneration. Therefore, once the court has established that the employee 
has been subjected to an occupational detriment, it must determine the compensation 
in a ‘just and equitable’ manner, bearing in mind that it may not be more than 12 
months’ remuneration. It is therefore submitted that this decision will be used as a 
precedent in future cases where compensation for employees having suffered an 
occupational detriment has to be determined. This decision also illustrates the fact that 
regardless of how badly the employee has suffered due to an occupational detriment, 
the courts cannot in determining compensation move away from established 
legislation to make an order that he/she deems is just and equitable. 
5.2 United Kingdom cases and the implications of those disclosures 
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As discussed previously, South Africa considered and borrowed from the United 
Kingdom’s Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) extensively in order to establish its 
Protected Disclosures Act. Both the PDA and PIDA are similar in their requirements 
concerning disclosures of information and the definition of a protected disclosure. 
These requirements are examined closely when a case concerning whistleblowing 
needs to be decided. In terms of substantiated allegations, it is submitted that 
regardless of whether you are a whistleblower from the United Kingdom or South 
Africa, occupational detriments suffered are equal in severity and the remedies 
available to these employees are also similar. Below is a discussion of United 
Kingdom case law where the particular courts had to decide upon the remedies and 
action to be taken when employees have suffered a particular occupation detriment at 
the hands of their employer/s. 
 
 In the case of ALM Medical Services Ltd v Bladon,
181
 Lord Justice Mummery began 
by setting out the provisions and aim of the Act because this was the first appeal case 
to go to the court of appeal on the construction and application of the “protected 
disclosure” (provisions inserted into Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996 by 
the Public Interest Disclosures Act 1998 with effect from 2 July 1998).
182
 The aim of 
the provision is to protect employees from unfair treatment in respect of victimisation, 
and dismissal for reasonably raising genuine concerns about wrongdoing in the 
workplace in a responsible way. The issues the court had to determine were (i) 
whether Mr Bladon had made a protected disclosure and, (ii) if the primary reason for 
the dismissal was due to the disclosure that was made.   
 
Mr Bladon was a registered nurse who was employed by ALM Medical Services in 
one of its nursing home.  He made a disclosure in writing relating to patient welfare 
and care at Lowther View Home. An inspection, followed by an investigation was 
carried out.  A month later, Mr Bladon was given a warning which was followed by a 
disciplinary hearing where he was dismissed for committing serious breaches of his 
contract. The respondents disputed the fact that the reason for the applicant’s 
dismissal was based on the fact the he had made a protected disclosure.  
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The court considered section 47B and section 103A of the ERA which states that an 
employee may not be subjected to an occupational detriment by his employer because 
he/she has made a protected disclosure, and if subjected to an occupational detriment 
in these circumstances, the dismissal would be deemed an unfair dismissal in terms of 
PIDA. These sections were looked at by the court to establish whether Mr Bladon had 
suffered an occupational detriment. The court also looked at s 43G of the Act to 
establish whether the disclosure is protected. In terms of this section, a whistleblower 
must disclose the information in good faith and having a reasonable belief that the 
information disclosed is substantially true and not made for purposes of personal gain. 
 
In examining the evidence and the above sections of PIDA, the tribunal held that Mr 
Bladon had been subjected to an occupational detriment within the meaning of section 
47B,
183
  and that he was unfairly dismissed in accordance with section 103A
184
 
because the principal reason for his dismissal was due to the disclosure that was made.   
The court came to the above conclusion based on the fact the disclosure was relevant 
because it related to the health or safety of a patient, and a failure to comply with a 
legal obligation would possibly have led to the potential commission of a criminal 
offence. Mr Bladon had made the disclosures in good faith and with a reasonable 
belief that the information was true.
185
 The appeal was allowed and the case remitted 
to the employment tribunal for rehearing. 
 
It is submitted that the decision the court came to was correct and the implications of 
such a finding is that it will be used in future cases dealing with occupational 
detriment where the courts will examine PIDA to make sure that employers are not 
subjecting employees to occupational detriments primarily for reasons of making 
protected disclosures. This decision also comes as a warning to employers that the 
courts will not sit by and allow employees to be subjected to unfair dismissals when 
their disclosures are relevant in exposing wrongdoing in terms of the Act.   
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In Lucas v Chichester Diocesan Housing Association Ltd
186
 the applicant submitted 
that she had been unfairly dismissed in terms of s 103A of the Act because she had 
made a protected disclosure in terms of s 43B of the Act. The issue that the court had 
to decide upon was whether the disclosure was made in good faith and whether the 
applicant’s dismissal was due to the disclosure made. 
 
The applicant was employed on a contract basis for a maximum of 18 months and 
during this period made a disclosure concerning misuse of funding based on the fact 
that it deprived her of hours of work that she was promised, and it also constituted a 
breach of the contractual relationship. The applicant submitted that after the 
disclosure her contract was terminated based on the fact that her relationship with her 
colleagues was becoming strained and it was having an adverse effect on her work.  
 
In looking at how to approach cases under the protected disclosure provisions the 
court referred to the case of Street v Derbyshire Unemployed Workers’ 
Centre
187
where it was held
188
 that a court must assess on a broad and common sense 
basis whether the disclosure meets the requirements in s 43 C of the Act and whether 
the disclosure was indeed made in good faith and not with an ulterior motive such as 
personal antagonism which might have been the predominant purpose for making the 
disclosure. 
 
On examining the evidence, the court held that the applicant’s allegations were 
substantiated and made in good faith in terms of s 43C of the Act and, her disclosure 
was based on very real concerns that constituted a reasonable belief that she had 
expressed about the financial irregularities she encountered from the early stages of 
her work. The court further held
189
 that from the evidence, it could not be inferred that 
the disclosure was motivated by spite following the actions by Ms Mercer in relation 
to the cutting of the applicant’s hours, therefore, on this basis the disclosure was made 
in good faith and the applicant did suffer an occupational detriment in terms of s 103A 
by having her hours cut. The appeal was allowed by the court. 
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It is submitted that this case is important in that it highlights the fact that for a 
disclosure to be protected, it must be made in good faith without an ulterior motive 
that can become the predominant factor for making the disclosure. The court referring 
to the Street case and highlighting the issue of good faith is indicative of the fact that 
whistleblowers must have the elements of good faith and a reasonable belief in order 
that their disclosures are deemed to be protected under the Act. These elements are 
essential for a disclosure to be protected. The outcome of this case will no doubt 
further whistleblowing cases in terms of good faith and a reasonable belief and also 
the fact that in terms of s 103A of the Act, an employer cannot subject an employee to 
an occupational detriment or dismiss an employee for reasons of making a protected 
disclosure.   
 
In the case of Mama East African Women’s Group v Dobson
190
  the applicant claimed 
that she had suffered an occupational detriment by her employer in terms of s 103A of 
the Act in that she was unfairly dismissed on the ground of having made a protected 
disclosure. The issue the court had to determine was whether the applicant had 
suffered an occupational detriment in terms of s 103A for primarily making a 
protected disclosure. 
 
The applicant was employed by the Trustees of the Mama East African Women’s 
Group who managed a small charity whose aim was to support Somali women living 
in Sheffield and, to provide them with training in English as a second language. The 
applicant disclosed information that she had received from a student (Ms Said) 
concerning another student (Ms Roda Soulieman) who allegedly mistreated children 
at a crèche that the Trustees operated. The applicant reported the information to a 
member of the Trustees’ group and on his advice, reported the matter to the Centre 
Manager who began an investigation into the matter which revealed no evidence of 
any ill-treatment of the children.  
 
The applicant was called to a disciplinary hearing where she was found guilty of 
acting in an unprofessional manner and on this basis was dismissed for unprofessional 
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  namely, that of making false allegations without any evidence and failing 
to follow proper procedure.  
 
The court examined s 103A of the Act to determine whether the applicant had 
suffered an occupational detriment, s 43B to establish whether the disclosure qualified 
as a protected disclosure and, s 43C relating to the procedure in disclosing 
information to another person who is not his/her employer . 
 
The court found that according to s 43B of the Act, the applicant had a reasonable 
belief that the disclosure tended to show that a criminal offence had been committed 
and, in terms of s 43 of the Act the applicant had fulfilled the requirement of good 
faith. Regarding the issue of the applicant not following procedure, the court held that 
the applicant’s disclosure to the Trustee was reasonable in the circumstances and did 
not breach confidentiality, as it was entirely inappropriate for the Centre Manager to 
investigate this serious matter where the alleged abuser was her own sister.  
 
The court concluded that the applicant did suffer an occupational detriment in terms 
of s 103A of the Act in that her dismissal was due predominantly to the disclosure 
made. On this basis the dismissal was deemed to be an unfair dismissal. 
  
The court pointed out
192
  that “there is a very strong vindication of whistleblowers so 
that their action is protected. This does not mean that all of their claims and 
allegations have to be supported. They have to be investigated and, provided the 
disclosure meets the terms of the Employment Rights Act 1996, action against them is 
unlawful”. Courts support the protection of whistleblowers where the disclosure was 
made in good faith and with a reasonable belief, even if on investigation they are 
found to be untrue. 
 
It is submitted that this case was decided correctly and in terms of the Act, bringing 
attention yet again to the elements of good faith and a reasonable belief that must be 
present when employees disclose information. This case illustrates that the findings in 
this case can be taken forward and applied to other cases dealing with issues of 
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occupational detriment. An important lesson to be learned from this case is that before 
disclosing any information, it is important to investigate the truthfulness of it. It is of 
vital importance that when disclosing information, there be some evidential proof to 
strengthen your case, even if on investigation, the allegations turn out to be a mistaken 
belief or untrue.    
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the courts in the above cases have approached the 
matters in a similar way, and have decided the issues along the same lines as the 
South African courts. Occupational detriment/s and victimisation suffered by the 







Unsubstantiated allegations - A look at motive and liability 
 





It is submitted that on many occasions unsubstantiated allegations are disclosed by 
aggrieved employees who in their opinion or estimation, have decided that by 
disclosing information that they believe to be true, are acting in the best interests of 
the company. It is submitted that unsubstantiated allegations are becoming more 
frequent and prevalent in the workplace, and this chapter will discuss this issue in 
detail. Consideration must be taken that the Act requires that disclosures be made in 
good faith and with a reasonable belief and seems to be the central pivotal point on 
determining whether a disclosure is substantiated or not. 
 
Case law on the subject will be discussed, as well as the issues of good faith and 
reasonable belief which seem to be the central elements required for a disclosure to be 
determined as substantiated or unsubstantiated.  
 
Illustrated below is a hypothetical scenario that could illustrate whether a disclosure is 
substantiated or unsubstantiated: 
 
Where an employee of a company decides to disclose a number of allegations 
concerning management and other employees of a particular department within that 
company. The employee believes that the allegations disclosed are reasonable because 
he/she has evidential proof to substantiate the allegations made. Therefore there is 
reasonable belief on the part of the employee that the information is correct because 
of the evidential proof. The employee further believes that the disclosures are made in 
good faith and in the best interests of the company. As far as the allegations are 
concerned, the employee believes that all procedures set out in the company’s policy 
were followed which makes the disclosures protected in terms of the Protected 
                                                 
193
 Irish orator, philosopher and politician. www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Edmund_Burke/ 
(Accessed: 21 July 2009). 
 97
Disclosures Act. On the face of it, it seems as though the employee has a solid case 
considering that the employee believes that he/she has fulfilled the requirements of 
both good faith and a reasonable belief. However, note must be taken that the 
employee previously disclosed similar allegations in regard to other employees in 
various departments within the same company, and further, it was a known fact that 
the relationship between the employee and management was historically problematic. 
The question which arises is: are the disclosures/allegations really made with good 
faith and a reasonable belief? What will the court examine to determine whether these 
allegations are substantiated or unsubstantiated? 
 
In another hypothetical scenario, an employee discloses information concerning a 
member of the management team of that company. Evidential proof of the allegation 
is given to the CEO of the company by the employee, who starts an investigation into 
the allegations. The documentation is such that the reputation of the entire company 
would be ruined if the allegation was not investigated and was leaked to the media. 
However, note must be taken that the employee has had a ‘bone to pick’ with that 
particular member of the management team for a long time. The question that arises is 
whether the elements of good faith and reasonable belief exist in this scenario. Yet 
again, what will the court examine in order to determine whether the disclosure is 
substantiated or unsubstantiated, considering that the PDA requires a disclosure to be 
made in good faith and with a reasonable belief? Would this disclosure be protected 
or not, considering that there is evidential proof of that allegation which makes a solid 
case? 
 
These questions will hopefully be answered and the hypothetical scenarios evaluated 
once the discussion on good faith and reasonable belief has been established.  
 
It is submitted that there are many motives which play a role in whistleblowing. The 
most common motives being moral justification, revenge, greed and fear. In a report 
written by the Director and Commander of the National Anti-Corruption Unit,
194
 
Grobler, discusses these motives which he believes play an important part in 
whistleblowing.  
                                                 
194
 “Whistleblowing : Practical Issues” Director Stefan Grobler, Commander, National Anti-Corruption 
Unit, SAP Service, Head Office, Pretoria. CON.042001.001 COR. 
 98
In the case of moral justification, the whistleblower divulges information because 
he/she is so disgusted by the actions of another that he/she feels that it should be 
reported. In this case the whistleblower is quite prepared to support their claims by 
handing over evidential proof and in some cases is also prepared to assist in the 
investigation. There are however, whistleblowers in this instance, which prefer to 
divulge the information and then leave the rest up to the relevant authorities to 
investigate. Then there are others who feel that their moral duty has been fulfilled and 
wish to remain anonymous after handing over all the evidential proof to substantiate 
the allegations that they have made.  
 
In cases of revenge (which is also a very powerful motive for whistleblowing) as per 
the above scenario, revenge is used in order to get back at another colleague or 
management for some perceived injustice. This motive usually causes the 
whistleblowers judgement to be clouded, and it is this factor that must be taken into 
consideration when analysing the truth of the information that was disclosed. 
 
Greed as a motivating factor is probably the most dangerous of all motivating factors 
in cases of whistleblowing. Our courts take exception to people who report incidences 
that they perceive their colleagues were involved in solely for financial reasons. One 
of the redeeming factors in this situation is the fact that when a person has received 
money in order to inform on their colleagues, it negatively affects their credibility and 
this is more than likely to cause the courts to investigate every little detail to attempt 
to get to the bottom of the situation. 
 
There are also incidences where whistleblowers divulge information in order to take 
the attention away from them as per the above scenario. Fear of being caught out as an 
accomplice in a crime is a big motivating factor. In cases where the whistleblower is 
found to be an accomplice in a crime, blackmail is usually also involved. In cases 
such as these, the whistleblower chooses to divulge information for the purpose or in 
the hope of receiving lenient treatment especially where they have previously been 
involved in some sort of criminal activity. 
 
 99
With the enactment of the PDA, employees have the assurance that if they decide to 
disclose information on corruption or illegalities in the workplace, they have the 
protection of the PDA. This has resulted in employees having a sense of security.  
 
However, what happens when employees deliberately misrepresent information about 
the company by whom they are employed? Is there a right or wrong motivation for 
whistleblowing?  
 
Where it is found that “whistleblowers” have disclosed information that was found to 
be deliberately false, different considerations emerge. In the Tshishonga case Pillay J 
held that “the purpose of the Act is not to protect disclosures that are deliberately 
made to embarrass or harass the employer, neither is slander and deliberate 




It is submitted that society must be protected against disclosures that are made for 
malicious and vindictive reasons. Allegations such as these have caused immeasurable 
damage to both companies/organisations and victims. Damage to one’s dignity and 
the invasion of privacy is not easy to measure and therefore it is of the utmost 
importance to find a way in which organisations/companies can prevent these 
whistleblowers from alleging false and damaging information. To reiterate, section 
9(1) of the PDA states that if an employee discloses information in good faith and 
reasonably believes that the information disclosed and the allegation/s contained in it 
is/are substantially true, then the disclosure is one that is protected. Section 6 of the 
PDA states that a disclosure made to the employer in good faith is a protected one. It 
is therefore submitted, that if it is found that a disclosure of information was made 
that was known to be deliberately false or to embarrass or harass an employer, and 
then it is safe to say that in terms of s9 and s6 of the Act, that disclosure will not be 
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6.1 Good Faith 
 
Good faith is a subjective element which makes it incredibly difficult to determine a 
standard and also whether the whistleblower does or did indeed possess this element 
when the disclosure was made. Although good faith is a subjective element, it is 
relevant to disclosures of information because good faith is linked very closely to 
motive. Pillay J in the Tshishonga case
196
 pointed out that it is possible that an 
employee may reasonably believe that his/her disclosures are true, and gain nothing 
from making them, but the element of his/her good faith or motive would probably be 
questionable if the information does not disclose an impropriety or if the disclosure is 
not aimed directly at remedying a wrong. Furthermore, because good faith is a finding 
of fact, the court must consider cumulatively, all the evidence in order to determine 
whether the disclosure was made in good faith or whether there was an ulterior 




6.1.1 Defining good faith 
 
In the Tshishonga case, Pillay J stated
198
 that “shorn of context, the words ‘in good 
faith’ have a core meaning of honesty. Introduce context, and it calls for further 
elaboration. Thus, in the context of a claim or representation, the sole issue as to 
honesty may just turn on its truth. But even where the content of the statement is true 
or reasonably believed by its maker to be true, an issue of honesty may still creep in 
according to whether it is made with sincerity of intention for which the Act provides 
protection or for an ulterior and, say, malicious purpose”. Pillay J further stated
199
 that 
“by setting good faith as a specific requirement, the legislature must have intended 
that it should include something more than reasonable belief and the absence of 
personal gain”. So, if one looks at the definition, it becomes apparent that there is no 
standard to test what good faith is because it is a subjective concept and differs from 
person to person based on their individual perceptions. Good faith is required to test 
the quality of the information. The benefit of the doubt has to be given to a person 
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who discloses information stating that it was made in so-called “good faith” because 
of the difficulty of proving whether it really is good faith or not.  
 
A discussion of case law below will shed some light on this somewhat very grey area 
of good faith and how it is determined by courts in cases of whistleblowing. 
 
The leading case dealing with the issue of good faith is the case of Street v Derbyshire 
Unemployed Workers Centre 
200
 (a United Kingdom case), were the applicant that she 
was entitled to be regarded as unfairly dismissed under s 103A of the Act. The court 
of appeal held that an employee can fail the good faith test and lose protection under 
PIDA
201
 where a tribunal finds that his/her dominant or predominant motive (which is 
linked very closely to good faith) for making the disclosure was unrelated to the 
public interest objectives of the Act. The court undertook a preponderance test to 
determine whether the applicant’s motive was one of good faith or not. The issue that 
the court had to decide was whether the applicant did in fact have good faith when 
disclosing information. 
 
The applicant worked as an administrator for the Derbyshire Workers’ Centre which 
is a voluntary non-profit-making organisation providing advice and assistance to 
unemployed people in North East Derbyshire. The applicant wrote a letter to the 
Treasurer of the Borough Council making various allegations against the Manager of 
the Centre. The applicant justified her course of action in not following the proper 
procedure in that she did not trust the Centre’s Management Committee because she 
believed that her disclosures would be covered up and she would be victimised. 
 
Following the investigations of the disclosures made by the applicant, the report stated 
that the applicant was misguided and malicious and, that all the allegations were 
unfounded and possibly required serious disciplinary proceedings to be taken against 
her.
202
  The applicant was suspended pending an investigation into the “serious 
matters” that were referred to within the report.  
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After the disciplinary hearing the applicant was dismissed for gross misconduct and 
breach of trust on the basis of her ‘unfounded and libellous” allegations against the 




The applicant appealed internally against her dismissal but was unsuccessful. She then 
appealed to the Employment Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ET) for interim 
relief maintaining that she had been unfairly dismissed on account of her disclosure 







The ET found that the applicant’s disclosures were qualifying disclosures under 
section 43B(1)(b)
206
 of PIDA as they were disclosures that she had reasonably 
believed tended to show the Centre Manager’s failure to comply with legal 
obligations to which he was subject.
207
 The ET then had to consider whether those 
qualifying disclosures became protected disclosures in terms of s 43C of PIDA 
(disclosures made in good faith to an employer or other responsible person) to 43H of 
PIDA (disclosures made in good faith in wider case not covered by s 43C-F, but 
subject to the additional requirements set out in s 43G(1)(b) to (e) of PIDA).  
 
The critical issue before the ET was then to determine exactly what the requirement of 
good faith is. In looking at s 43C-H of the Act, the ET held that good faith adds to the 
requirement of reasonable belief in its substantial truth and found that the applicant 
believed that the definition of “good faith” was simply that it meant “honestly” and it 
added nothing to that concept where, a reasonable belief in the substantial truth of the 
allegation is also required. On this basis the ET concluded that none of the applicant’s 
disclosures were protected because they had not been made in good faith because her 
underlying motive was predominantly her personal antagonism towards the Centre’s 
Manager.  
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The ET clearly took the view that even though there was an overlap between the 
concept of good faith and reasonable belief, good faith added a motive to the 
disclosure and dismissed the applicant’s claim to automatic protection under section 
103A of PIDA. 
 
The case was taken on appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (hereinafter 
referred to as the EAT) where the findings of the ET were upheld. The EAT found 
that it was important for the Tribunal to assess motive and it agreed that good faith 
involves the deployment of an honest intention
208
. The EAT held that it was not the 
purpose of the PIDA to allow grudges to be promoted and disclosures to be made in 
order to advance personal antagonism. The EAT found that the applicant’s personal 
antagonism was her dominant, if not her sole motive for making the disclosures which 
meant that her disclosures were not made in good faith. On this basis the appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Lord Justice Wall went further to comment that he concurred with the finding of the 





“that a person may reasonably believe that the information disclosed and 
any allegation contained in it is substantially true, and still not make the 
disclosure in good faith”. It is submitted that this is because good faith is 
a question of motivation and because we are human, a person may well 
honestly believe something to be true, but, as in this case, can be 
motivated by personal antagonism when disclosing this to someone else. 
Lord Wall went further to say that motivation is a complex concept and 
a person making a protected disclosure may have mixed motives 
because it is “hardly likely that they will have warm feelings for the 




Lord Wall concurred with the ET and EAT in that the applicant’s predominant 
motivation for disclosing the information was not directed at remedying the wrongs 
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It is submitted that although the findings of this case are harsh, they are necessary in 
that the decision will prevent other whistleblowers from disclosing information for 
reasons that are vindictive and malicious. This case will no doubt be used by other 
courts as a guideline on the issue of good faith and how it is determined, as noted in 
the case of Lucas
212
 (discussed in Chapter 5) where the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
(EAT) referred to the Street case when determining and trying to establish exactly 
what good faith is. The legislature’s intention was to prevent any disclosures from 
being protected, and whistleblowers need to understand that they will not be protected 
if they do not have the required good faith and reasonable belief stipulated within the 
Act. It is submitted that the implications of a decision such as this, is that the courts in 
future will look more closely at motivation to establish whether there are mixed 
motives and whether predominant motive for disclosing the information was good 
faith or something else.  
 
It is submitted that an employee disclosing information will most times have a 
predominant motive which will cloud whatever other motives he/she has. This was 
illustrated in the case of Aziz v Muskett & Tottenham Legal Advice Centre
213
 where 
the court held that a disclosure made as a means to exert pressure for a pay rise is not 
a disclosure made in good faith because the underlying motive for the disclosure is for 
reasons of blackmail and extortion thus, making the disclosure unprotected and not in 
terms of s 43C of PIDA. With a decision such as in the Street case, whistleblowers 
must now examine their motives carefully and be cautious against their predominant 
motive being something other than good faith.  
 
It is further submitted that when courts are trying to establish motive, caution must be 
taken because there will be times when a whistleblower’s predominant motive will 
not be one of good faith but the information disclosed might be substantially true. In 
the Lucas case, the EAT cautioned other courts that they should not lightly find that a 
disclosure was not made in good faith. The answer as to how the courts establish a 
finding on a case such as that is still to be determined because, it is a debatable point 
as to whether a person who has a bad motive but has revealed a true disclosure is 
protected under the Act. 
                                                 
212




In terms of onus of proving good faith and/or other motive/s, in the Lucas case and the 
Bachnak v Emerging Markets
214
 case the EAT held that the employer must assert that 
there is a lack of good faith and any evidence it relies upon should be set out in 
advance so that the applicant can respond to it. Since malice is both an exceptional 
and serious allegation in a working relationship, the employer must produce cogent 
evidence which the court is able to weigh up together with other evidence in the case 
before deciding whether some dominant or predominant ulterior motive meant that the 
protection that the person has under the PIDA should be forfeited.  
 
6.1.2 Other cases dealing with good faith 
 
In the South African case based on the PDA, Roos v Commissioner Stone NO & 
Others,
215
 the applicant had raised concerns regarding the tender procedures. On 
review, the court held
216
 that the conduct of the applicant would not be protected by 
the PDA because the purpose of the Act was not to give licence to employees to make 
unsubstantiated and disparaging remarks about their employers and later hide behind 
the Act. On this basis the disclosure was found not to be a bona fide disclosure and 
therefore did not fall under the protection of the ambit of the PDA in terms of section 
9(1) which provides that a general protected disclosure is any disclosure made in good 
faith by an employee who reasonably believes that the information disclosed, (and any 
allegation contained in it) are substantively true and the disclosure is not made for 
purposes of personal gain. The court dismissed the application on this basis. 
 
It is submitted that the implications of this decision are far reaching in that it makes 
future whistleblowers aware of the fact that the PDA was not created to protect 
disclosures that are made purely for the reason to harass or embarrass the employer. 
Neither will the PDA protect disclosures that are unsubstantiated made for purposes 
of vindictiveness or maliciousness. Future whistleblowers when making a disclosure 
will be aware that the PDA is created to protect genuine concerns and suspicions. 
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The case of Jabari v Telkom SA (Pty) Ltd
217
 was not determined as a whistleblowing 
case under the PDA, but a discussion around the issue of good faith is relevant 
because it illustrates how an employee can under the guise of good faith and 
reasonable belief harass an employer thereby becoming a nuisance in the workplace. 
Looking at the facts of the case, it is submitted that this case is not about 
incompatibility but rather about disclosure of information and the issue of good faith 
hence the victimization and unfair dismissal. The court made a correct finding based 
on incompatibility and found no evidence that the applicant was incompatible with the 
“corporate culture” of the respondent. This was so, because this case was in fact not a 
case concerning incompatibility at all but rather a case concerning protected 
disclosures. If the respondent had initially investigated the allegations as disclosures 
in terms of the PDA, the outcome of the case would have been entirely different, in 
that, the disclosures that the applicant had made would have on investigation, be 
found to be pure mischief making, and further that the element of good faith on the 
applicant’s side would not have been present. 
 
The applicant was dismissed for incompatibility based on the irretrievable breakdown 
of the employment relationship based on the fact that the applicant continually 
challenged and questioned decisions and did not take, and/or execute instructions 
from his superiors. The applicant was also arrogant, insubordinate and uncooperative 
and habitually instituted grievance proceedings against the respondent and did not 
prosecute these grievances to finality. As a result the respondent devoted a large 
amount of human resources, time, and funds to defending these cases. Between April 
and September, the applicant had lodged five grievances against the respondent with 
the CCMA. 
 
It is submitted that, if this was a true incompatibility case, the respondents should 
have done whatever they could to find a solution to address the applicant’s 
incompatibility.  However, the court found that the respondents had no remedial 
options or alternatives in place to remedy the applicant’s incompatibility. The 
applicant had also not been given an opportunity to confront the alleged 
disharmonious behavioural conduct he was accused of and there was no opportunity 
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that was given to him to benefit from any counselling in order to restore an amicable 
employment relationship with the respondent. On the basis the court found that the 
dominant reason for the applicant’s dismissal was predicated on the fact that the 
applicant initiated grievance proceedings against the respondent’s management, 




The court further stated
219
 that the respondent’s reasons for the applicant’s dismissal 
were not sustainable. The applicant was victimized and unfairly dismissed for 
exercising his constitutional and statutory rights and on this basis the dismissal was 
rendered automatically unfair.  
 
It is submitted that if an employee is unhappy in the workplace, then there is a very 
strong possibility that the employee would try to cause unpleasantness in the work 
environment by disclosing information that is untrue or fabricated as in the Jabari 
case.  
 
6.2 Reasonable belief 
 
In terms of reasonable belief, the PDA does not require an employee to prove the truth 
of information disclosed, but if the employee believes that the information is true, 
then a bona fide disclosure can be inferred. To reiterate, in the MTN
220
 case, the court 
highlighted the fact that, in addition to good faith, a reasonable belief in the 
substantial truth of the allegation must be present when making disclosures. In other 
words, the whistleblower must seriously believe that his/her disclosure is true.  
 
In the Tshishonga case, Pillay J stated
221
 that the reasonableness of the belief must 
relate to the information being substantially true. Furthermore, a reason to believe 
pitches the test as subjective in that the employee who makes the disclosure has to 
hold the belief and objective in the sense that the belief has to be reasonable. 
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However, it is submitted that if a reasonable belief is determined by personal 
knowledge, then it would frustrate the operation of the PDA by setting a very high 
standard. Thus, a mistaken belief or one that is factually inaccurate can also be 
reasonable, unless the information is so inaccurate that the public has no interest in its 
disclosure. It is important to note that, if an employee discloses information which 
he/she believes is made with a reasonable belief, based on opinion, hearsay or gossip, 
the PDA will not protect him/her, as discussed in Chapter 4 under “gossip in the 
workplace”. 
 
Below is a discussion of UK cases dealing with whether a disclosure was made with 
the required reasonable belief in terms of PIDA. Short of s 43D and s 43E, s 43B to s 
43H require that a disclosure will qualify for protection if it is made with a reasonable 
belief. 
 
In the case of Darnton v University of Surrey
222
  the court had to determine whether 
the applicant’s disclosure was made with a reasonable belief that the information is 
substantially true.  
 
The applicant was employed by the University as a full time lecturer at the Surrey 
European Management School. The relationship between the applicant and the Head 
of the School was not an amicable one which led to the applicant complaining about 
being bullied and harassed by the Head of the School. Arising from the complaint the 
applicant and the University went into an agreement which was accepted by both 
parties. A misunderstanding arose between the parties concerning the agreement as to 
whether the applicant was entitled to accept or reject work as he thought fit from other 
Universities while still being paid by the Surrey European Management School. 
Arising from this situation, the applicant wrote a letter disclosing information about 
the Head of the School. The applicant’s services after the disclosure of information 
were terminated.  
 
The applicant submitted that his disclosure was a qualified one falling under the 
protection of section 43B of PIDA and that he reasonably believed that the disclosure 
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tended to show that a criminal offence had been committed by the University or that 
the University was in breach of various legal obligations.  
 
The court in determining the issue reiterated that the ERA and PIDA were designed to 
protect whistleblowers and proceeded to examine the relevant sections in order to 
determine whether the applicant had a reasonable belief or not. Section 43A of the Act 
defines a protected disclosure and proceeds to stipulate reasonable belief as a factor 
that would determine whether the disclosure is qualified or not. In s 43B the court 
noted that a disclosure qualifies for protection, if in the reasonable belief of the 
employee, it tended to show a relevant failure. The court proceeded to examine s 43C-
H where reasonable belief was stipulated as a requirement in order that the disclosure 
be a protected qualifying disclosure, but noted that s 43F, s 43G and s 43H stated that 
for a disclosure to qualify for protection, it must show that the employee reasonably 
believed that the information disclosed and any allegation contained in it was 




that it had to consider both the law and common sense to the 
circumstances which include the belief in the factual basis as well as what the facts 
tend to show in order to determine whether the applicant did hold a reasonable belief 
that the information disclosed was true. The court went further by saying that the 
more the worker claims to have direct knowledge of matters subject to the disclosure, 
the more relevant the belief in the truth is that the applicant has a reasonable belief. 
The court stated
224
that according to s 43B, it is not possible to expect a person 
disclosing information to hold the belief that the information and the allegation 
disclosed is substantially true. The court obtained considerable assistance from a 
passage in a book written by John Bowyers
225
 stating that: 
  
“To achieve protection under any of the several parts of the Act, the 
worker must have a "reasonable belief" in the truth of the information as 
tending to show one or more of the six matters listed which he has 
disclosed, although that belief need not be correct (section 43B(1)) ... 
The control of abuse is that it must have been reasonable for the 
employee to believe that the information disclosed was true. This may 
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mean that under the Act, an employee who has a reasonable belief 
regarding a specific malpractice which turns out to be a mistaken belief 
would still qualify for protection, because the disclosure would be 
deemed a qualifying disclosure. However, in each case, the 
reasonableness of the belief will be dependent upon the volume and 
quality of information available to the worker”.  
 
The court held that reasonable belief must be based on facts as understood by the 




It is submitted that to determining whether a disclosure was made with a reasonable 
belief is difficult, however the whistleblower must exercise personal judgment on 
his/her part regarding the information, evidence and resources available to him/her 
concerning the disclosure. Note must be taken by the employee that there must be 
more than unsubstantiated rumours in order that the disclosure be deemed a qualifying 
disclosure. The court decided correctly in this case, in stating that it is unreasonable to 
require the whistleblower to hold the belief that both the fact basis of the disclosure 
and what it tends to show are substantially true. However, it is submitted that the more 
evidential proof in the factual basis there is, the easier it is to determine reasonable 
belief in the substantive truth of the information even if it turns out to be a mistaken 
belief. As submitted previously, evidential proof in the form of documentation will 
always provide back up in determining reasonable belief. 
 
The court’s approach to reasonable belief
227
 was followed in other cases such as 
Haney v Brent Mind & Anor
228
 where the court stated: 
  
“in our opinion, the determination of the factual accuracy of the 
disclosure by the tribunal will, in many cases, be an important tool in 
determining whether the employer held the reasonable belief that the 
disclosure tended to show a relevant failure. Thus, if an employment 
tribunal finds that an employee’s factual allegation of something he 
claims to have seen himself is false, that will be highly relevant to the 
question of the employee’s reasonable belief. It is extremely difficult to 
see how an employee can reasonably believe that an allegation tends to 
show that there has been a relevant failure if he knew or believed that 
the factual basis was false, unless there may somehow have been an 
honest mistake on his part.” 
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This case illustrates quite clearly how important the element of reasonable belief is 
when disclosing information that the employee believes to be a malpractice. It is also 
important to note that in this case, the court looked at both the subjective and 
objective elements of a reasonable belief. The above quote summarises succinctly 
how the courts can determine whether an employee has a reasonable belief or not. 
 
In the case of Bolton School v Evans
229
  the applicant claimed that he had a reasonable 
belief that disclosing the information concerning security issues of the computer 
system was in the best interest of the school and its student body and that he had the 
requisite elements of good faith and reasonable belief in terms of s 43B and s 43C of 
PIDA. The applicant further claimed that his constructive dismissal was because of 
his disclosure in terms of s 43B.   
 
The applicant was employed by the respondent as a teacher in its Information and 
Communication Technology Department. The respondents installed a new computer 
system and, although the applicant was not part of the installation team and project he 
showed interest in this project because his main concern was security issues 
surrounding the new system because he believed that the security protection was 
inadequate. The applicant proved his doubts about the system when he was able to 
access the system quite easily. On this basis the applicant was given a written warning 




The Employment Tribunal examined s 43B of PIDA and found that the Act requires 
an employee to have a reasonable belief in matters being disclosed and that this 
requirement was inserted in order to achieve a fair balance between the interests of the 
worker who suspects malpractice and those of an employer who could be damaged by 
unfounded allegations. It was further stated that “to allow an employer to disregard a 
Public Interest Disclosures Act decision in this way would be to drive a coach and 
horses through the intention of the legislature that the whistleblower should have 
employment protection”.  The case was appealed and referred to the EAT. 
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In looking at the issues, the EAT referred to the Darnton
231
 case where it stated that if 
an employee makes a disclosure in good faith to his employer or provides relevant 
qualifying information, then provided he is not committing a criminal offence in 
making the disclosure, he is protected from dismissal and detrimental action short of 
dismissal. Furthermore, the information may be inaccurate or wrong but that does not 
remove the protection, provided that the employee had a reasonable belief that the 
information tended to show one or more of the matters set out in s 43B of PIDA. 
 
The EAT found that when examining the requirements of s 43B of Act, it seemed as 
though the law protects the disclosure of information which the employee reasonably 
believes tends to demonstrate the kind of wrongdoing but does not protect the actions 
of the employee which are directed to establishing the reasonableness of that belief. 
 
It is submitted that the findings of this case are relevant in that the employee having a 
reasonable belief that the information disclosed is substantially true is one thing, but 
when the employee commits an offence in sourcing the information, that becomes 
another issue. The finding of this case will be warning to future whistleblowers that 
the Act is able to protect the employee if the information disclosed is with a 
reasonable belief and substantially true, but will not condone sourcing the information 
illegally to prove the reasonableness of the information. The finding of this case will 
be referred to often in cases such as this, to highlight the fact that the Act will protect 
information that is made in good faith, with a reasonable belief and sourced in a way 
that is above reproach. 
 
In the case of Babula v Waltham Forest College
232
 the applicant claimed that his 
constructive dismissal was due to the fact that he made a protected disclosure in terms 
of s 43 of PIDA. The issue the court had to decide on was whether the disclosure was 
made with a reasonable belief and whether the applicant’s dismissal must be regarded 
as automatically unfair under section 103A of the ERA because the reason for it was 
that he had made a protected disclosure within the provisions of the ERA 1996, 
section 43A and 43B(1)(a) and (b)”.  
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The applicant was a college lecturer who became concerned that his predecessor had 
made remarks that were deemed to incite racial hatred by informing the Muslim 
students that he wished that an incident like the September 11
th
 incident in New York 
would occur in London and proceeded to divided up his class into Muslim and non-
Muslim groups and ignored the non-Muslim students whilst teaching religion in the 
class to the Muslim students.  
 
The applicant reported his concerns to the college authorities. When these concerns 
were ignored, he decided to report the matter to the police informing the college in 
writing immediately after reporting the incident to the police authorities.  
 
The applicant claimed that it was this disclosure of information that caused the college 
to dismiss him. He then took his case to the Employment Tribunal stating that he had 
made a qualifying disclosure under section 43B of the ERA 1996 as he: 
(i) reasonably believed that a criminal offence of incitement to racial hatred under the 
Public Order Act 1986 had been committed and was likely to be committed again in 
the future by Mr Jalil;  
(ii) that he reasonably believed that Mrs Lambert was unlikely to report the 
commission of the aforesaid criminal offence to the authorities and had failed to 
comply with a legal obligation to report such offence;  
(iii) that he reasonably believed that the health or safety of individuals would be 
endangered by Mr Jalil’s comments; and  
(iv) that he reasonably believed that Mrs Lambert’s lack of action to the disclosures 




The Employment Tribunal struck out applicant’s claim, stating that it was bound by 
the decision in  Kraus v Penna plc and another
234
 which the tribunal stated was 
authority for the proposition that a disclosure is not a qualifying disclosure unless a 
criminal offence, or legal obligation that was capable of a breach actually existed. The 
tribunal further stated that the applicant’s predecessor’s comments were an incitement 
to religious hatred and not racial hatred, and since there no such offence at the time, 
the applicant’s disclosure could not be protected. The tribunal found against 
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reasonable belief, stating that, reasonable belief relates to factual information in the 
possession of the employee and what he/she perceives to be the facts based on what 
he/she believes to be reasonable.
235
 Therefore in the light of decision in Kraus the 
tribunal found that the applicant did not make a qualifying disclosure under section 
43B(1)(a) and dismissed the case. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
 
The Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal and held that the case of Kraus 
was wrong in law and should no longer be followed. The court held that when 
determining whether a disclosure is a qualifying disclosure in terms s 43 of the Act, 
the whistleblower must be able to show that he/she reasonably believes that the 
disclosure tends to show that a criminal offence is likely to be committed or a legal 
obligation is breached. The issue is the relevance of the whistleblower’s reasonable 
belief and not whether they are right or wrong. The court agreed with the Darnton 
case where it was stated that a belief may be reasonable and yet be wrong. The fact 
that the whistleblower is wrong is not the issue, instead of importance is whether the 
belief is reasonable and whether the disclosure is made in good faith. 
 
The court held that although Kraus was decided correctly on its facts, it was not a 
correct statement of law and was wrongly decided and should therefore not be 
followed. Lord Justice Thomas stated
236
 that the word “belief” in section 43B(1) is 
subjective in that it is the particular belief held by the worker. However, the belief 
must be reasonable and that is the objective test. Lord Justice Thomas went further in 
saying that in Street’s case the concept of good faith added an important element and 
is the additional element of protection for the employee in a case such as the 
applicant’s. 
 
The court held that the applicant had identified a criminal offence which was the 
incitement to racial hatred and a legal obligation which was the college’s equal 
opportunities policy. On this basis the applicant’s belief was not only reasonable but 
also made in good faith which made the disclosure protected under s 43 of the Act. 
 
                                                 
235
 See fn 231, para 31. 
236
 See fn 231, para 82. 
 115
This case illustrates the fact that a whistleblower’s belief may be reasonable even 
though it turns out to be wrong. The onus of proving whether the belief is reasonable 
is a matter for the court to determine. Reasonable belief and good faith are the pivotal 
elements around which the court will decide on whether a disclosure is protected or 
not under the Act. Both elements are important in that they support each other, but the 
concept of good faith adds an element of protection for an employee when disclosing 
information. This decision is relevant in taking the law forward when the courts 




Throughout this chapter, reference has been made concerning the importance of the 
elements of good faith and a reasonable belief. Sections 43B-H of PIDA and s 1 to s 9 
of the PDA require that good faith and a reasonable belief be present when a 
disclosure is made. However, the questions that arise are:  
● whether good faith and reasonable belief can be separated or whether both 
elements must always be included in a disclosure; 
● can a whistleblowing case be determined only on one element i.e. can a case 
be decided only on reasonable belief or only on good faith; and 
● how relevant is the element of good faith or reasonable belief in 
whistleblowing cases.  
 
If we refer to the hypothetical scenario one at the beginning of this chapter, on the 
face of it, the requirements for a general protected disclosure in terms of section 9 of 
the Act have been fulfilled. However, in examining the element of good faith, 
attention must be paid to the fact that the employee has previously made similar 
allegations concerning other members of staff within the company and the 
relationship between the employee and management is historically problematic. Can 
one then deduce from the facts, that the element of good faith is questionable? In the 
discussion on Street’s case above, the court stated that good faith is a question of 
motivation and involves the deployment of an honest intention. Further, one must 
look at the motivation of the person disclosing information to determine whether the 
disclosure was based on an underlying predominant motive or not, since good faith is 
linked to motivation. There is a possibility that the employee’s underlying motive 
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could be one of bad faith, even though in the Tshishonga case, the court stated that 
seldom is there warm fuzzy feelings towards someone that you are disclosing 
information about. To determine whether the employee has disclosed these allegations 
in good faith, it is dependent upon how the courts will interpret good faith and the 
circumstances surrounding those allegations.  
 
It is submitted that good faith is an essential requirement within the Act, because it is 
linked to motive when disclosures are made. When a disclosure is made with an 
underlying good motive and with sincerity of intention, the disclosure then fulfils the 
good faith requirement within the Act. As Pillay J stated in the case of Tshishonga if 
the content of a statement is true or reasonably believed by its maker to be true, there 
is still an issue of honesty which can creep in according to whether the statement was 
made with sincerity of intention for which the Act provides protection. It is therefore 
submitted that in this scenario, taking into account the facts of the case, and the above 
statement of Pillay J, the employee does not fulfil the requirement of good faith or the 
sincerity of intention which is required by the Act, even though there is a reasonable 
belief by the employee that the disclosure is true. On this basis, the disclosures made 
by the employee are not protected by the Act.  
 
Referring to hypothetical scenario two, the evidential proof makes for a solid case, 
because it is this evidence that leads to the investigation. It is submitted that if the 
evidence was not serious enough, the investigation would not have been initiated. On 
this basis we can assume that the evidence was good. However, taking the facts of the 
case into account, the employee had a ‘bone to pick’ with that particular member of 
the management team for a long time. The question that arises is, does good faith exist 
in this case, and, can the case be determined only on the basis of a reasonable belief? 
This is a difficult question considering that the evidence proved provided a solid case, 
and the employee had a reason to believe that the evidential proof was true, but, the 
good faith element was absent. As Pillay J in the Tshishonga case stated
237
, “a 
malicious motive cannot disqualify the disclosure if the information is solid, if it did 
then the unwelcome consequence would be that a disclosure would be unprotected 
even if it benefits society”. 
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It is submitted that the Act specifically included the element of good faith for a 
reason, because it is linked to motivation and sincerity of intention. Therefore, it is 
submitted that disclosures must include the element of good faith in order that the 
requirements of the Act are fulfilled. It is also submitted that although there was 
evidential proof to substantiate the claim, the disclosure would not be a protected one 
under the Act, because it lacked the element of good faith. Taking into account the 
above statement by Pillay J, it is submitted that a malicious motive must disqualify a 
disclosure because if it did not, it defeats the object of having a requirement of good 
faith and leaves the flood gates open for mala fide motives. It is therefore submitted 
that the benefit to society is not the determining factor in deciding the element of good 
faith.  
 
To answer the questions of whether whistleblowing cases can be determined only on 
one element, and how relevant the element of good faith or reasonable belief is in 
whistleblowing cases, it is submitted that good faith and reasonable belief cannot be 
separated when deciding these cases. To reiterate, good faith is linked to motivation, 
and even though there might not be ‘warm feelings’ about the person against whom 
the disclosure is made. Therefore, a whistleblower cannot be consumed by an ulterior 
motive in order to stop the wrongdoing and still claim protection under the Act.  
 
In determining these cases, it is submitted that the courts must always do a 
proportionality test to determine the dominant motive of the whistleblower.  
 
It is submitted, that on this basis, good faith and a reasonable belief are extremely 
important requirements when making disclosures, taking into account the fact that the 
Act requires both good faith and a reasonable belief to be present if the disclosure is 
to be protected by the Act. 
 
6.3 Onus of Proof 
 
 “He who alleges must prove” is relevant in terms of onus or burden of proof. It is 




 refers to the terms “burden of proof” or “onus of proof” as “the duty that a 
litigant has to adduce evidence sufficient enough to convince a court that the claim 
should succeed”. 
 
The test for determining who bears the onus of proof was set out in the Pillay v 
Krishna
239
case as: “the person who makes the positive assertion is generally called 
upon to prove it, with the effect that the burden of proof lies generally on the person 
who seeks to alter the status quo”. 
 
In civil cases the burden of proof is discharged by a balance of probability which 
means that the probability of the case must be such that that it is convincing enough 
that the particular state of affairs existed. The civil standard of proof is applied 
consistently in regard to a balance of probabilities irrespective of the particular cause 
of action. Schwikkard et al
240
 refers to the Miller v Minister of Pensions
241
case where 
Lord Denning expressed the civil standard of proof as follows: 
 
“It must carry a reasonable degree of probability but not so high as is 
required in a criminal case. If the evidence is such that the tribunal can 
say ‘we think it more probable than not’, the burden is discharged, but if 
the probabilities are equal it is not”. 
 
However, according to Schwikkard et al, the suggestion that there are different 
standards of proof dependent on the nature of the facts is not correct and 
rejected in South African law. What is required is that the person alleging must 
on a balance of probability be able to show their innocence.  
  
The question that arises in regard to whistleblowing cases is: who has the onus to 
proof that the allegations were made in good faith and with a reasonable belief. 
 
In the Street case
242
, Auld LJ states that when trying to determine a dominant or 
predominant motive of a disclosure when considering whether a disclosure is made in 
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good faith, “they” should look for a malicious motive, because depending on the facts, 
may often find that a malicious motive is the higher threshold necessary for the proof 
of malice than bad faith in PIDA. Auld LJ however does not specify with whom this 
burden of proof must lay. However, he does refer to the word “they” in considering 
whether the disclosure was made in good faith therefore, it is inferred by this word, 
that he is talking about the court proving whether the disclosure was made in good 
faith and with a reasonable belief that the information disclosed in substantially true. 
Pillay J in Tshishonga
243
 held that the court in the Street case did not believe that the 
employee bears the onus of proving good faith. Furthermore, to expect the employee 
to be saddled with a burden of proof will set the standard too high and, if that standard 
is not met in terms of the PDA, the disclosure could be disqualified which would 
hinder an enquiry into whether the employer subjected the employee to an 
occupational detriment in breach of the PDA. Pillay J further states that the employer 
bears the burden of proving that it did not commit an unfair labour practice or unfairly 
dismiss the employee. The court in the Lucas
244
 case also referred to the Street case in 
terms of onus of proof and states that Auld LJ in Street only expresses some views on 
the degree of proof required to determine the existence of bad faith but does not say 
whether there is a burden of proof and on whom it lies. Therefore, it seems as though 
the court must consider all the evidence and decide for itself whether the dominant or 
predominant motive is an ulterior one in which case it will not attract the protection of 
the Act. Further, where there is an improper motive that is alleged in a disclosure, it 
must be made clear to the whistleblower that the onus of proving is his/hers. 
 
It is therefore submitted that there are three aspects such as good faith, bad faith and, 
occupational detriment that need to be distinguished in regard to onus/burden of 
proof. In examining the judgments of the above cases, it is clear that, in terms of good 
faith, the employee has the onus of proving that the disclosure was made with the 
required element of good faith. The onus of proving bad faith or a dominant or 
predominant motive other than good faith is on the employer and must be determined 
by the court in considering all the evidence before them. However, if the employee 
makes a disclosure of information knowing that the motive was improper, then it 
should be made clear to them from the beginning by the employer that the onus of 
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proving otherwise is squarely on his/her shoulders. In terms of an occupational 
detriment the onus is on the employee to prove that he/she was in fact dismissed and 
on the employer to show that he/she did not commit an unfair labour practice by 
dismissing an employee for the disclosure of information that he/she made. 
 
It is submitted that in some cases it is possible that the burden of proof shifts 
from one party to another as illustrated in the Street case. Initially the applicant 
bore the onus of proving her good faith, but this burden shifted when the 
respondent claimed that the applicant’s motive had changed to an underlying 
motive of bad faith. The onus was then shifted to the respondent to prove the 
claim made. It was left up to the court to adjudicate and determine on the 
evidence of the case whether this was so. On a balance of probability the 
applicant was unable to prove that her motive was one of good faith when 
disclosing the information. 
 
It is submitted that although the outcome of the Street case was a harsh reality, 
it is my opinion that whistleblowing cases in South Africa should be examined 
in a similar way to prevent employees getting away with disclosures made for 
reasons other than good faith. It is submitted that even though Pillay J in 
Tshishonga held that to saddle the employee with a burden of proof would set 
too high a standard, this is the only way to prevent whistleblowers with a bad 
motive finding a loophole in the Act and getting away with their disclosures 
being protected by the Act. It is submitted that if the standard of proving good 
faith and a reasonable belief is set at a high standard, then it dissuades 
employees disclosing information that they know is not true and allows 
employees with relevant information and a motive that is good to disclosure 
information. It is conceded that there are times that a belief ends up being a 
mistaken belief but yet again, the whistleblower must be able to prove that their 
reasonable belief and good faith was in accordance with the Act and the reason 
for their disclosure was because of a true concern for the organisation or public. 
Ultimately it is up to the court to decide on the case on the basis of the evidence 






The Psychology of Unsubstantiated Allegations 
 
This chapter will discuss the psychology behind allegations that are found to be 
unsubstantiated and untrue. To determine the psychology behind a person’s motive is 
not an easy task, however, the findings help to explain why employees feel the 
necessity to make allegations that later turn out to be unsubstantiated, untrue and 
sometimes malicious and damaging to both the company and other employees within 
that company.  
 
From the outset, the point to highlight is that most employees are honest, loyal and 
concerned with completing the tasks that they are given to the best of their ability. 
However, there are employees whose behaviours and attitudes are potentially 





 case (discussed in chapter 6, page 104) illustrates the point how some 
employees intentionally set out to make the daily lives of others miserable, by 
displaying behaviour which can become an obstruction in the workplace. The 
respondent described the applicant as someone who was arrogant, insubordinate and 
uncooperative, who habitually instituted grievance proceedings against them, never 
prosecuting these grievances to finality, resulting in them devoting a large amount of 
human resources, time, and funds in defending these cases. The applicant was also 
described as an employee who fought against every policy decision that management 
decided upon for the company. The applicant went as far as defaming a client who 
successfully sued him in a civil case for R40 000 which he was ordered to pay. On the 
basis of the above, the respondent dismissed the applicant for incompatibility. 
Unsurprisingly, the applicant appealed against this decision, playing the victim of an 
unfair dismissal, which resulted in him being reinstated in his position. 
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In the book “Snakes in Suits – when psychopaths go to work”
246
, psychopaths are 
defined as people who are without conscience and incapable of empathy, guilt, or 
loyalty to anyone but themselves. Antisocial personality disorder is defined as a 
disorder that includes personality traits such as lack of empathy, grandiosity and 
shallow emotion. This disorder is three to four times more common than psychopathy 




A classic description of antisocial behaviour in “Understanding Abnormal 
Behaviour”
248




(i) superficial charm and good intelligence – they are often capable in social 
activities and adept at manipulating others; 
(ii) shallow emotions and lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse – what is absent is 
genuine emotional feelings and concern over detrimental consequences of 
their behaviour; 
(iii) behaviour indicative of little life plan or order – the actions of antisocial 
personalities are not well planned and are often difficult to understand or 
predict; 
(iv) failure to learn from experiences and absence of anxiety – although the 
behaviours may be punished, the same behaviour may be repeated with little 
anxiety; and 
(v) unreliability, insincerity and untruthfulness – irresponsibility and the ability to 




Psychopaths more often than not come across as superficially charming with a good 
intelligence and are able to manipulate others easily. On the surface they appear 
normal and in control. In more recent research, Hare
251
 states that most people fall in 
between being a psychopath or being anti-social therefore employers must be careful 
when trying to diagnose psychopathic or anti-social behaviour in their employees. It is 
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submitted, that with Hare’s statement in mind, most employees have a certain level of 
antisocial tendencies and some even have psychopathic tendencies, but some 
employees do display higher levels of antisocial or psychopathic tendencies than 
others. However, this does not make them psychopaths but rather employees who 
display anti-social behaviour and have difficulty fitting into a work environment 
where they have to get on with other employees. In the Jabari case, the respondent 
labelled him as being incompatible with his environment, which he disagreed with. 
From the outset however, his employers realised that he showed an incompatibility to 
working within that particular environment. He showed signs of anti-social behaviour 
that should have triggered some kind of warning within the organisation. The question 
which arises is, when should employers start taking note and action of this type of 
behaviour?  
 
An interesting fact is that, it does not seem as though Mr Jabari was behaving in this 
manner so as to divert attention away from himself because of poor work performance 
(which is what one would think). Instead, on the contrary, management conceded the 
fact that Mr Jabari had consistently and competently performed his duties in terms of 
his contract of employment and was promoted to a managerial level after satisfying 
the promotion criteria and received positive work performance appraisals.
252
 
According to management, the only time Mr Jabari’s work suffered and his focus 
shifted was as a result of being constantly engaged in litigation which prevented him 
from carrying out his duties as efficiently as he had done previously. On this basis, 
there had to be another explanation for his behaviour.  
 
Psychopaths are able to manipulate their colleagues like pawns without them even 
knowing what is happening. They are adept at convincing their colleagues that they 
are good people who are misunderstood, and very quickly win over people convincing 
them that they are good friends and confidants. Their manipulation techniques 
dominate a large part of their work life and it is very difficult to pin them down to 
anything. They try to endear themselves to particular colleagues, making them believe 
that they are friends, but whom they know is more gullible than the others. Once the 
psychopath/antisocial person knows that he/she has the loyalty of these colleagues, 
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then he/she is able to work his/her destructive behaviour with the help of these 
colleagues. Psychopaths sometimes go so far as trying to derail the careers of co-
workers which can sometimes end in disciplinary action for the unsuspecting victim.  
 
One of the most amazing traits of people such as these is the ability to stay calm and 
look as though they are focussed. Most times they will not let their guard down and 
show how they really feel in company or in public. However, their reactions in private 
are something else. When psychopaths are challenged or they realise that they are 
being investigated in some way or other, their personalities change and they become 
overt bullies which is one of the tools that they use. The person begins threatening and 
intimidating the people that he/she knows are investigating him/her and sometimes 





The question that one asks is how can this behaviour or situation in the workplace be 
prevented or stopped?  
 
It is submitted that, having a psychopath or an antisocial person in a working 
environment is sometimes an emotionally draining and physically harmful experience. 
However, in order to answer the above question, one must understand that the best 
way for a company to prevent or stop behaviour and situations such as the above, and 
to defend themselves against such situations, is to learn as much as they can about 
psychopaths and their nature. This will enable them to see past their numerous masks 
to the real underlying motives. In learning about the modus operandi of psychopaths, 
you can also learn more about yourself and what your weak points are, so that when 
you are being challenged you are able to deal with those challenges regardless of 
whether they are directed at your personality or character without getting involved in 
a dispute that may take a long time to resolve.  
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Caution must however be taken in labelling a person within an institution or 
organisation a psychopath since the connotation is a negative one, which may lead to 




It is submitted, that a suggestion that management might consider when dealing with a 
situation in the workplace where employees show strong signs of psychopathic 
tendencies, is to be rational, dealing with the employee in a way that “nips the 
problem in the bud” immediately, thus preventing the situation from spreading and 
getting worse. It is submitted that it would be detrimental for the company, if 
situations such as there are not dealt with in a manner that prevents it from getting 
worse. Unfortunately, employees who have strong psychopathic tendencies or are 
anti-social in their behaviour, are attuned to weaknesses within management and will 
play on those weaknesses, making the situation worse. Management must have the 
capacity to put a stop to destructive behaviour immediately they are alerted to it. This 
can include investigating the matter and acting upon it thereby diffusing a potentially 
disastrous situation in an ethically correct manner. 
 
An interesting aspect of the psychology of whistleblowing was highlighted by the 
empirical study done in the Nelson Mandela Metropole in Port Elizabeth with a total 
of 387 employees by Perks and Smith.
255
 I will discuss some of the findings which I 
believe to be relevant. 
 
Some of the demographic characteristics of the respondents were highlighted as 
follows:  
 
• the majority of the respondents were males (56%); 
• 45% of the respondents were between the ages of 25 and 34; 
• 50% of the respondents had 1-3 dependants while 43% had no dependants; 
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• 27% of the respondents only had a grade 12 qualification while 38% had a 
bachelors degree and 36% a national certificate or diploma; 
• the majority of respondents were white (43%), while blacks and coloureds 
were 33% and 18% respectively of the total sample; 
• 45% of the respondents earned a salary of between R5000 and R12000, while 
17% earned less than R5000 and 38% earned more than R12000; and 
• a total of 147 or (38%) of the respondents had engaged in the act of 
whistleblowing. 
 
Of those respondents who had blown the whistle, the following was found:  
 
• the majority of the respondents (86%) were still employed by their 
organization, while 14% had left as a result of whistle-blowing); 
• 81% of the respondents were treated fairly by their companies while engaging 
in the act of whistleblowing; and 
• 84% indicated that they would be willing to blow the whistle in the future if 





 conclusion and recommendations after their study was 
particularly interesting.   
 
It was found that there was a significant link between age and personal viewpoints of 
employees in that the older employees had a very different perception about 
whistleblowing in comparison to their younger colleagues. A possible reason for this, 
is that the new dispensation in the country which emphasises transparency, equal 
rights and ethical values which younger employees have grown up with, would impact 
more on them, whereas the older employees, having grown up under the old 
dispensation would have a different mindset. 
 
It was also found that employees with dependents were less likely to blow the whistle 
in comparison to their colleagues who had no dependents. This was probably based on 
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the fact that if they blew the whistle and were dismissed for doing so, they would not 
be able to support their dependents whereas employees without dependents were more 
open to blowing the whistle on wrongdoing considering that they did not have as 
much to lose in comparison to the colleagues with families who had more 
responsibilities.  
 
Ethnic groups differed significantly in their personal viewpoints on whistleblowing. A 
possible reason for this could be the situation as discussed in Chapter 8 and also the 
fact that blowing the whistle is sometimes seen in a negative light.   
 
Also significant was the relationship between income levels and personal viewpoints 
of employees regarding whistleblowing in the workplace. Employees with lower 
levels of income felt that they did not have as much to lose when reporting 
wrongdoing, in comparison to their colleagues with higher levels of income, who 
were reluctant to blow the whistle for fear of losing their jobs and losing their high 
income levels. A possible reason for this could be the fear of suffering an 
occupational detriment and victimisation which would impact on their jobs and 
income. 
 
The recommendations made included that organisations should put in place an ethics 
policy which all employees regardless of age, ethnic group and salary level could 
relate to. This policy should show a significant relationship between a supportive 
organisation and the whistleblower. Whistleblowers should be assured that if they 
blow the whistle the organisation will be able to protect them and they will be safe 
from losing their jobs or their security within the workplace. 
 




“• The workplace must have a personal code of ethics, based on guidelines 
from the Act (PDA); 
• The internal policy must include a clear statement that malpractices are taken 
seriously and confidentiality is respected so as to prevent whistle-blowing 
externally; 
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• The internal system should have proper communication channels and the 
organisation should have a supportive environment starting with the 
incorporation of ethical conduct in their vision and value statements; 
• An ethics committee should be established and be responsible for ensuring 
that systems are in place. This committee should choose a dedicated ethics 
officer to whom wrongdoings in the organisation can be reported; 
• The process to resolve wrongdoings must be dealt with professionally, with 
commitment from top management;  
• At all times, management should have an open-door policy regarding 
employee complaints; 
• Allegations must be investigated promptly and thoroughly; 
• The individual blowing the whistle must act with honesty and integrity and 
there should be penalties for false allegations and rewards for bringing justice; 
• Ethics training, in particular on whistle-blowing, should be given to new and 
to existing employees on a periodic basis to raise awareness and as 
reinforcement of ethical principles; 
• Mechanisms such as a toll-free number (hotline) managed by a private 
company, access to independent advice, guidelines on how to raise concerns 
outside the organisation if necessary, should be indicated; 
• An ethical audit should be conducted annually and visible steps be taken to 
address concerns raised”. 
 
Perks and Smith’s study highlights the many psychological factors that are relevant 
when the issue of whistleblowing arises. It is not as cut and dried as one would expect 
and there are many different variables that one has to consider when looking at issues 
such as ethical and psychological factors of blowing the whistle.  
 
It is submitted that ultimately it is up to the company to find the best possible way to 
deal with and respond to allegations of wrongdoing within the workplace in the most 
efficient way. Managers have to have their “ear to the ground” and respond 
immediately to anything that they suspect could go wrong, applying the policies that 
are in place and knowing that their actions could either make or break their 
organisations. It is the responsibility of management to make sure that troublemakers 
are not given a chance to destroy the camaraderie that is in the workplace by alleging 
all sorts of unjustified allegations concerning colleagues and management in order 
that they can look good, and in so doing, destroying the relationship between the 
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organisation and employees. As discussed above, it would be to the detriment of the 
company if it does not respond in a manner that can prevent situations that could turn 
out to be unpleasant. 
 
It is further submitted, that office gossips be watched carefully and hearsay evidence 
examined closely before any conclusions are made. Companies should have a firm 
policy regarding hearsay evidence in that all hearsay evidence should be substantiated 
with hard evidence because hearsay evidence is tantamount to vicious gossip without 
hard evidence to prove otherwise. 
 
7.1 Recommendations  
 
In terms of ethics which would fall under the auspices of good faith in relation to 
whistleblowing, Perks et al
258
 state that:  
 
“whistle-blowing is a very important ethical issue as it guards against the 
negative social, economic and environmental impact of multi-national 
corporations invading global markets”.  
 
This statement proves that whistleblowing is an ethical issue and the two go hand in 
hand, i.e. you cannot have one without the other.  
 





“Law is seen as a device for enforcing the ethical views of a society: so 
long as we act within the law we act in ways that are ethically acceptable 
in our society”.  
 
However, there are objections to this, one being, that in societies in which there are 
several cultures there is insufficient agreement on ethical issues for the law to enforce 
anything that can be seen as an ethical consensus and the other objection being that 
the law permits behaviour that many people consider ethically unacceptable.
260
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The question then is, what is the solution to the problem in respect of unsubstantiated 
allegations? How can we prevent this from happening? 
 
It is submitted that a solution would be to recommend that organisations create 
whistleblowing and ethics policies that could be put in place. The creation of these 
policies would be designed in a way that will: 
 
● help to develop a culture of openness, accountability and integrity;  
● encourage employees to raise concerns about wrongdoing internally; 
● help to bring about good relations within the organisation by avoiding 
incidents where the organisation’s reputation is publicly tarnished when wider 
disclosures are made; 
● contribute to the efficient running of the organisation and the delivery of 
services; and 




A whistleblowing policy demonstrates that an organisation is committed to ensuring 
its affairs are carried out ethically, honestly and with high standards.  
 
• It is suggested that the content of an ethics policy include amongst others, 
most importantly to whom and what it applies to. Time frames for concerns to 
be dealt with and feedback provided regarding the progress and outcome of 
the investigation should be clearly stipulated. The policy should state clearly 
that the employer is committed to tackling malpractice and wrongdoing and 
ensures that these issues will be dealt with seriously, taking into consideration 
the issue of confidentiality of the whistleblower, if he/she requests it. The 
policy should set out the relationship between the whistleblowing policy and 
the company’s other procedures which allows concerns to be raised 
independently from the line management, recognising the fact that employees 
may raise their concerns externally which will be lawful and that if they want 
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In conjunction with a whistleblower policy, organisations could also create a strict set 
of ethical codes. A code of ethics is not a new concept because there are many 
companies that already have ethical codes of practice in place. However, these codes 
need to be revised, making compliance vital for all members of the organisation.   
 
An ethical code may be styled as a code of professional responsibility which can do 
away with difficult issues such as what behaviour is ethical. Some codes of ethics are 
often social issues. Some ethical codes set out procedures to be used in cases of 
specific ethical situations such as when to accept gifts, conflicts of interest, whether 
the code of ethics was violated and what remedies should be imposed for that 
violation. The effectiveness of codes of ethics depends largely on what management is 
trying to achieve. Codes of ethics must be taken seriously and violations of them 
should lead to remedies that are metered out by the organization. Some contraventions 
can also violate a law or regulation and can be punished by the appropriate 
governmental organ or institution. It is submitted that ethics codes are distinct from 
moral codes which apply to the culture, education and religion of a whole society. 
 
Organisations should encourage ethics training and this should be given periodically 
to help employees recognise particular ethical dilemmas that may arise. 
Organisations, within their ethical codes, must review their standing on 
whistleblowing. This would suggest an openness and willingness to work with the 
whistleblower/s to overcome fraud and corruption within their organisations.  
 
Apart from a code of ethics, an ethics committee should be formed as the watchdog 
for compliance. This committee will be seen as a deterrence to employees who are 
tempted to commit fraud and corruption.   
 
According to Barker and Dawood,
263
 it is the responsibility of the company and each 
individual employee to understand and follow their code of ethics policy. In doing so, 
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the company will create a good reputation, develop integrity and inevitably receive 
support from their peers and superiors. All organisations should have an ethics policy 
in place which all employees regardless of his or her rank within the organisation 
must abide by, and if they do not abide to it, then the consequences of such deviation 
must be clearly explained to the employee who may face appropriate disciplinary 
action. It must be clear to all employees of the organisation that no one is above 
reproach of violating the code of ethics. Ethics policies create a culture of good 
governance which includes values such as honesty, fairness and trust. It is not unfair 
or unjust to recommend that organisations implement harsh codes of ethics which will 




 further state that: 
  
“the ethical code of conduct has to be incorporated into the corporate 
culture and the procedures of the organization. In line with the policy 
and the code of ethics, there has to be an ambiance of support and 
cooperation from the staff. The corporate dream is to be part of an 
organization that strives for excellence, and where there is a climate of 
personal and organizational growth, that the individual employee’s 
development is nurtured and defined. Stemming from this ideal, the code 
of ethics ought to be a document that each employee owns and honours”.  
 
With ongoing ethics training the organisation will be able to reinforce ethical 




 suggests that the following practices could minimise wrongdoing in the 
workplace: 
 
• signal the importance of ethical conduct through the organisation’s vision and 
value statement; 
• have a designated ethics officer; 
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• use an integrity test when screening job applications; 
• provide ways for employees to report the questionable actions of peers and 
superiors, such as providing an ethics hotline; 
• develop enforcement procedures that contain stiff disciplinary and dismissal 
procedures; 
• treat allegations of wrongdoing seriously and treat both parties fairly; 
• document the organisations’s ethical rules through a written Code of Ethics; 
• appoint an ethics committee to implement organisation ethics initiatives and 
supervise the ethics officers; 
• emphasise the importance of ethical conduct in training; 
• conduct an ethical audit and take visible steps to address concerns raised; and 
• constantly communicate the organisation’s ethical standards and principles”. 
 
Another solution would be to charge the employee with misconduct which will 




Taking into consideration the above, it is apparent that to create policy an organisation 
must have the time and the capacity to do so, making sure that it is carried through to 
completion. Policy creation is a long process and will not be achieved overnight, but 
once it has been created, there is a strong possibility that it would deter employees 
from disclosing information that is untrue and damaging to their victim/s and/or the 
organisation. If organisations look at the long term benefits, it would be worth their 
while to create such policy.  
 
In these circumstances, policies created should be adhered to. It would be disastrous 
in this respect, if ethical policies are not adhered to. The only way this can work is for 
everyone within the organisation (from management to messenger) to comply with the 
provisions within the particular policy.  
 
As said above, it is ultimately up to the company to include harsher remedies and to 
put in place an ethical code of conduct and policies which need to be strictly complied 
with. It is submitted that if a true whistleblower with real concerns, you will abide by 
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the procedures stipulated within the company’s code of conduct or ethics code to get 
your concerns investigated. If internal disclosures do not work out then the whistle 
blower can rely upon the PDA and follow the procedures stipulated within it in order 
to make an external disclosure knowing that they will be protected. Add to that the 
element of good faith and a reasonable belief with evidential proof, and the 
whistleblowers disclosure will be one that is protected under the Act. 
 
To conclude, a quote from Immanuel Kant, puts into perspective the above  
 
“In law a man is guilty when he violates the rights of others. In ethics he is guilty if 
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Non-Disclosure of Information 
 
8.1 Other examples of whistleblowing not taken seriously 
 
Despite the best rules, regulations and legislation to protect whistleblowers, the reality 
of the situation is that whistleblowers are often subjected to serious retaliation by their 
employers. Below is an example of where employees were brave enough to speak out 
about wrongdoing, as well as the shortcomings that hamper whistleblowing. 
 
Factory workers lodged complaints in writing with the Department of Labour 
concerning their working conditions at a chemical factory in Lenasia. Their 
complaints included the fact that workers were locked in the premises for up to 16 
hours a day in unsafe conditions. They were locked up with gas bottles and fire 
extinguishers that were not in working order; a lack of ventilation and the absence of 
an emergency alarm system. The Labour Department did not respond to these 
complaints appropriately. Workers did not complain to their employer directly for fear 
of major retaliation and victimization. Three months after the complaint was lodged, a 
fire broke out in the factory caused by a series of explosions of gas bottles. 
Consequently, eleven factory workers died. Failure to address legitimate concerns 
when raised resulted in innocent workers paying the ultimate price.
267
 The lesson to 
be learnt from the above is that employers are still victimising their employees for 
disclosing information and because of this, employees are afraid to report incidents 
directly to their employers for fear of victimisation and dismissal. Surprising is the 
fact that the Labour Department did not heed these complaints, thus putting innocent 
employees at risk of being hurt. 
 
Although the PDA and the LRA protect whistleblowers, companies are still not 
willing to open themselves up to complaints which they can sometimes deal with 
quickly and easily. Instead, whistleblowers are scrutinized and seen as the “bad 
people” who are just causing trouble. They are victimized and suffer occupational 
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detriment most of the time. It is only the brave who are willing to take the issue 
further, either to the CCMA or to the Labour Court in order to prove that their 
complaints are legitimate. Most times, when companies are involved in improprieties, 
the effects of whistleblowing are disastrous for the whistleblower. Companies who 
run their businesses ethically are the companies willing to investigate complaints and 
eventually separate the wheat from the chaff. Most whistleblowers have the best 
interests of the company at heart, and want to prevent corruption from taking place. 
Their disclosures will be made in good faith and legitimate. It is very important to 
think of the retaliation against and victimization of a person who, in good faith, 
suddenly realizes that he/she is in a position to disclose information as a 
whistleblower that is to the benefit of the company. It is just unfortunate that the PDA 
is sometimes unable to protect these bona fide whistleblowers.  
 
Without a proper understanding of the realities of whistleblowing and the true 
dilemma of the whistleblower, it is very difficult for there to be effective 
whistleblowing protection.  
 
8.2 Derivative Misconduct 
 
Derivative misconduct is an important added aspect to be examined when discussing 
whistleblowing. As much as employees would like to blow the whistle, they are 
deterred from doing so because of the stigma of whistleblowing, and the fear that they 
will be called troublemakers, busybodies and disloyal employees. It is submitted that 
in some cultures whistleblowers are still seen as school children “splitting” on each 
other which is something that is unforgivable and literally constitutes a mortal sin. 
Unfortunately this mental attitude sometimes extends itself into the workplace. 
 
“Derivative misconduct is the term given to an employee’s refusal to divulge 
information that might help his or her employer identify the perpetrator of 
some other misconduct – it is called derivative because the employee guilty of 
that form of misconduct is taken to task, not for involvement in the primary 
misconduct, but for refusing to assist the employer in its quest to apprehend 
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The idea of derivative misconduct in South Africa appears to have originated in the 
case of Food and Allied Workers Union v Amalgamated Beverages Industries
269
 In 
this case, the company’s drivers and crewmen returned to work after an illegal strike 
and a group of workers then assaulted a “scab” driver who was seriously injured. 
Crewman was seen leaving the room after the assault but none could be individually 
recognised. However, the crewmen’s clocking records indicated which crewmen were 
on the premises at the time of the assault. All the workers at the scene were charged 
because the company was unable to identify the actual assailants. A mass disciplinary 
inquiry was conducted, but none of the accused employees were prepared to give 
evidence. None came forward to protest their innocence or offer help in identifying 
the culprits. On the basis of assault and refusal by the employees to give evidence, the 
company dismissed them. The court upheld the dismissal as being justifiable, on the 
basis that all the evidence was consistent with the inference that all the employees 
present at that time either participated in the assault or lent their support to it and that 
they had all acted with common purpose. 
 
Derivative misconduct was also an issue in the case of Chauke & Others v Lee Service 
Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors
270
 which involved a case of industrial sabotage. All the 
workers in the department in which newly-sprayed cars were scratched or deliberately 
dented were asked after each incident to identify the culprits. They refused to do so. 
Further incidences of sabotage occurred. Finally in desperation, the employer 
assembled the workers in the paint shop and gave them an ultimatum, that if the 
sabotage continued they would all be dismissed. The ultimatum was softened by the 
offer of a reward for information which would lead to the detection of the culprits. 
This also did not work and the sabotage continued.  
 
The employer dismissed all the workers in the paint shop, and as a result, the 
employees took their case to the Labour Court on the basis that they were 
procedurally and substantively unfairly dismissed. The Labour Court rejected the 
employees complaints of procedural and substantive unfairness and upheld the 
dismissal. 
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The case was then taken to the Labour Appeal Court where the court found that the 
object of the sabotage was to deliberately slow down production by damaging 
property which would cause the company losses in terms of delays, time and labour 
costs. The court held that there was common purpose and shared responsibility for the 
primary misconduct of the employees, and the company could not be faulted for 
treating the misconduct as a collective issue and responding to it collectively by 
dismissing all the employees. The court therefore on this basis upheld the dismissal as 
justifiable. 
 
Derivative misconduct is relevant to whistleblowing because, as much as employees 
want to disclose information, the possible fear of intimidation by other employees 








Not many academics have written about the consequences of unsubstantiated 
allegations and the element of bad faith that is attached to these disclosures. However, 
there are many questions which arise out of this issue. One, being whether the 
consequences of disclosing unsubstantiated allegations should be more serious, in 
view of the fact that the reputation of the victims and the company are left in 
disrepute.  
 
This dissertation was written to highlight the importance of whistleblowing but also to 
highlight the importance of having good faith and a reasonable belief when making 
those disclosures.  
 
The investigation into any kind of allegation or disclosure takes up a large amount of 
organizational time and money. Investigating allegations or disclosures that turn out 
to be unsubstantiated, untrue and for malicious or vindictive reasons are even worse.  
Attached to these kinds of disclosures is the psychological stress and trauma that the 
victims have to endure.  
 
After examining the Act and relevant case law, it was apparent that the issues of good 
faith and reasonable belief left a loophole within the Act and made this a grey area of 
law. It is submitted that the courts must, when deciding on an outcome to a 
whistleblowing case, do a proportionality test to determine the underlying motive of 
the whistleblower. 
  
Tshishonga’s case is a good illustration of how the court applied its mind, closely 
examining the Act and the issues surrounding good faith and a reasonable belief. Each 
aspect of that case was examined and the Act applied in order to determine whether 
the disclosures were protected or unprotected. 
 
It is submitted that Jabari’s case should have been determined differently even though 
it was not a whistleblowing case, the issue of good faith should have been examined. 
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It is important to examine a whistleblower’s motive and underlying factors when 
determining an outcome for a case. It is obvious from the facts of this case that there 
were definitely elements of maliciousness and vindictiveness which are detrimental 
elements to have within a working relationship and which can destroy numerous 
employees within that environment. If these elements were obvious in the facts of the 
case, then there is a very strong possibility that the element of good faith is absent. If 
the element of good faith is absent from any disclosure then the disclosure does not 
fall under the protection of the Act. If there are elements such as maliciousness, 
vindictiveness and lack of good faith present in a disclosure, then there cannot 
possibly be a reasonable belief on the part of the whistleblower that his/her allegations 
are true. In this case, it is obvious that there was more than just the issue of 
incompatibility. If the elements of good faith and reasonable belief had been looked at 
more closely, then the outcome of the case as said above would have been decided 
differently.  
 
Street’s case on the other hand is an example of how the court examined the case, 
specifically looking at the issue of good faith, and found that it is possible for the 
element of good faith to result in bad faith. Here the court examined the predominant 
motive for disclosing information to determine whether the element of good faith was 
present or not and found that Mrs Street’s personal antagonism was her dominant or 
sole motive causing her disclosure to be made in bad faith. However, in the Lucas 
case the court made a point of warning other tribunals and courts that they should not 
lightly find that a disclosure was not made in good faith considering that malice is 
both an exceptional and serious allegation in the working relationship. 
 
Darnton’s case is in my opinion, a very good precedent case in terms of reasonable 
belief and good faith. The EAT decided correctly in this case, by attaching the 
element of good faith to the element of reasonable belief in order to determine 
whether the disclosure was protected or not. 
 
In discussions concerning unsubstantiated allegations, the SALRC recommended 
“that an employee’s or worker’s actions should not be criminalized where he or she 
knowingly makes a false disclosure. The Commission noted that a person who 
deliberately or recklessly discloses false information does not qualify as a 
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whistleblower and might also be guilty of criminal defamation, crimen injuria or 
fraud at common law. An employee may be guilty of misconduct as well, and quite 
possibly misconduct justifying dismissal. It was further argued that prosecution for 





The Commission received a wide range of submissions. It was recommended that 
where an employee or worker knowingly makes a false disclosure it should not be 
criminalized and that it should not be made an offence to subject an employee or a 
worker to an occupational detriment.  Criminally charging a person who has made a 
false allegation will definitely defeat the purpose and object of the Act, and since they 
will not fall under the ambit of the PDA, they will be subjected to disciplinary 
proceedings and dismissal in worst case scenarios.  
 
Although the comments from the SALRC recommendations are debatable, it is 
submitted that criminally charging someone, where the disclosure made was found to 
be clearly for malicious purposes, would not defeat the object and purpose of the Act. 
Instead it is submitted that it would be a positive move that may dissuade malicious 
employees from disclosing information if there is a threat of criminal liability.  
 
However, the possibility that the victim might charge, and sue them civilly, is an 
added stress. This is because the court processes take a long time and the fact that they 
would have to wade through court papers and the fact of having to go through the 
entire process again. It also reinforces the allegations in a new public forum. This 
would not suit the interest of the victim of the malicious “disclosure”. 
 
It is clear that the point of the PDA is to encourage whistleblowing, but on the other 
hand, the PDA did not intend to expose parties to malicious or unsubstantiated gossip.  
In the case of Grieve v Denel
272
 and CWU & Another v MTN
273
 the court upheld the 
principle that for a disclosure to be protected it must prima facie have been made in 
good faith and that the protection offered by the PDA towards employees is not 
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unconditional. The PDA sets out defined parameters as to what constitutes a protected 
disclosure. The requirement that disclosures made in general circumstances must be 
based on good faith and a reasonable belief in the substantial truth of the allegation 
balances the interests of protecting the whistleblower and the interests of a potential 
victim of malicious disclosures. 
 
The requirement of reasonable belief in the substantial truth of the allegation as well 
as good faith is borne out in the Rand Water Board case, where the allegations were 






 case, the EAT, drawing on the Court of Appeal, stated that tribunals 
should not lightly find that a disclosure was not made in good faith, as malice is both 
exceptional and a serious allegation in a working relationship. The employer ought to 
produce cogent evidence which the tribunal should then weigh up together with other 
evidence in the case before deciding whether some dominant or predominant ulterior 
motive meant that the protection that the person has under the PIDA should be 
forfeited. 
 
Good faith and a reasonable belief emerge from both the PDA and PIDA (I will 
however refer to the PDA considering it is the South African Act) as essential 
elements which must be attached to whistleblowing. It is submitted that good faith is 
an essential requirement within the PDA because it is linked to motive. When a 
disclosure is made in good faith with an underlying good motive and with sincerity of 
intention, the disclosure fulfils the good faith requirement within the PDA. Any 
disclosure made for personal gain is not protected by the PDA.  
 
Because good faith and a reasonable belief are essential requirements within the PDA, 
the two cannot be separated when deciding whistleblowing cases. To reiterate, good 
faith is linked to motivation, and even though there might not be ‘warm feelings’ 
about the person against whom the disclosure is made, an underlying good motive 
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must be present. A whistleblower therefore cannot be consumed by an ulterior motive 
in order to stop the wrongdoing and still claim protection under the PDA. 
 
As Pillay J in the Tshishonga case stated
276
, “a malicious motive cannot disqualify the 
disclosure if the information is solid, if it did then the unwelcome consequence would 
be that a disclosure would be unprotected even if it benefits society”. It is submitted 
that even if the whistleblower has reason to believe and evidential proof which makes 
a solid case, his/her motive must be one made with the sincerity of intention and with 
an underlying motive that is good. If the element of good faith is not present when a 
disclosure is made, but the disclosure of information is solid, it is submitted that the 
disclosure cannot be protected, because it would defeat the object of the Act in having 
a requirement of good faith and leaves the flood gates open for mala fide motives. It is 
therefore submitted that the benefit to society is not the determining factor in deciding 
the element of good faith and a malicious motive must disqualify a disclosure from 
the protection of the PDA. 
 
It is submitted that in determining whistleblowing cases, the courts must always do a 
proportionality test in order to determine the dominant motive of the whistleblower in 
order to determine whether the disclosure would be a protected or unprotected 
disclosure in terms of the PDA. 
 
The issues of good faith and a reasonable belief are a very grey area within the Act 
and is no doubt a debatable topic. The PDA intimates that if a disclosure is made in 
good faith then the requirement of proof of the validity of the employee’s suspicions 
is not needed simply because the purpose of the Act would be undermined if genuine 
concerns or suspicions were not protected, even if they proved to be unfounded. This 
has been discussed above, however, it has left a loophole in the PDA for 
whistleblowers to disclose information and use the PDA as a shield to hide behind, 
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Even though the Report from the SALRC, Project 123 recommends that criminal 
liability should not be included in the provisions of the Act, my opinion on this is 
rather ambivalent. I will justify this by saying that on the one hand, if disclosures are 
deliberately made falsely, then, automatically the person does not fall under the 
protection of the Act because neither the element of good faith nor reasonable belief is 
present in their disclosure. He/she is therefore not considered a whistleblower in terms 
of the Act. But, on the other hand, if the whistleblower is charged with crimen injuria 
then it would deter future whistleblowers from repeating the error of deliberately 
disclosing false information. 
 
The remedies available to the organization are disciplinary action with an outcome of 
either suspension, transfer, or in the case of serious misconduct, dismissal of the 
employee. The problem however does not disappear because in most cases the 
employee will walk away and the cycle will be repeated. It is this cycle which has to 
be prevented from reoccurring. The only way forward would be a consideration of 
criminal liability for disclosures where it is clear that those disclosures were made in 
bad faith. If consideration of criminal liability is not an option, then the consequences 
should be such that they would deter any other pseudo whistleblower/s from wanting 
to defame other employee/s or employer/s within his/her workplace by deliberately 
and with intent disclosing untrue allegations. Each case however, would have to be 
judged on its own merits.  
 
A remedy for the victims of unsubstantiated allegations is that they can pursue a civil 
claim by suing the person for defamation, violation of their dignity along with pain 
and suffering. But this is a long and drawn out process that most victims just do not 
want to go through. If this route is followed, the action will be a private one including 
all sorts of costs. Generally, by this time most victims will not want to pursue this 
route. Therefore, it is suggested that the Act be amended to include a section on the 
remedies for the victim such as compensation from the whistleblower where the 
disclosure was clearly made for malicious reasons and in bad faith. 
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Criminal liability and severe consequences attached to deliberately false, malicious 
and vindictive allegations being made would be a deterrent for pseudo 
whistleblowers. If pseudo whistleblowers are made an example of, others who want to 
follow that same route would then think twice about the consequences of making false 
allegations in order to get back at management for their unhappiness.  
 
The view of the SALRC that criminal liability would defeat the object, purpose and 
aim of the Act is noted, however, it is submitted that to include criminal liability in 
the Act, would be a positive move because it would deter other pseudo whistleblowers 
disclosing information that is deliberately malicious and vindictive. 
 
Some whistleblowers may be afraid of disclosing information in case their allegations 
on investigation are found to be unsubstantiated and untrue. However, their fears 
would be unfounded because the PDA is there to protect them. Whistleblowers have 
no need to fear criminal liability if their motives are correct and the disclosure were 
made in good faith and with a reasonable belief.  
 
Besides criminal liability being included in the Act, I believe another solution, would 
be for organizations to have harsher punishment available for people who disclose 
untruthful allegations maliciously and vindictively. By having harsher consequences it 
would put a stop to these types of allegations or at least deter future unsubstantiated 
allegations. Having said that, I believe that a reasonable belief should be accompanied 
by some kind of evidential proof regardless of how serious or not the allegation is. 
This will put a stop to hearsay or gossip being reported. The evidential proof will 
justify the allegation even if it is found out later that the allegation was incorrectly 
made. When evidential proof is given about an allegation and the person has the 
element of good faith, it causes the person to be credible and the allegation is taken 
more seriously than if the person anonymously makes the allegation with no 
evidential proof. Evidential proof shows from the beginning that there is a valid 
concern.  
 
In terms of good faith and a reasonable belief, each element must be looked at closely 
and courts must apply their minds to each individual case. My observation is that the 
UK tends to look more closely at these elements in comparison to SA as illustrated in 
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the Street case which has been discussed above. It might be an idea for the SA courts 
and even employers to learn from this.  
 
Good faith is a subjective element and hard to prove, therefore the surrounding 
circumstances of the case must be considered first, before a decision can be made that 
the allegation was not made in good faith. This must be decided cautiously. 
 
It is recommended that the legislators of the PDA make the requirements of good faith 
and reasonable belief stricter, than and not as flexible as they are now, to prevent 
pseudo whistleblowers using the Act to hide behind and causing time to be wasted in 
investigating these allegations and leaving a trail of destruction behind them. It must 
be noted though, that as said above in the discussion concerning comments and 
recommendations in the SALRC Report, Project 123 concerning good faith, that if the 
requirements of good faith are too strict and if we consider criminal liability for false 
allegations being made, it may deter other whistleblowers from using the Act and 
disclosing information for fear of not meeting the requirements and the consequences 
thereof. Stricter requirements for good faith and reasonable belief would prevent the 
abuse of the PDA by employees who claim to have made the allegation in good faith 
and with a reasonable belief and on investigation finding out that the allegation was 
made for no other reason except for malicious and vindictive reasons simply because 
they have a bone to pick with the organization.  
 
Even though legislators are not keen to include criminal liability and a stricter 
requirement for good faith, there are circumstances in which the Act should stipulate 
criminal liability depending upon how damaging the disclosures have been.  
 
The PDA should be an Act which allows true whistleblowers to feel completely safe 
in disclosing their concerns, knowing that they will not suffer any kind of 
occupational detriment but at the same time also an Act that makes pseudo 
whistleblowers think twice before abusing this piece of legislation which was enacted 




Even though it would be difficult to criminally charge a pseudo whistleblower 
because of the fact that there is not much you can criminally charge them with, the 
organization can take into account the damage caused, and a harsher finding can be 
considered and looked at. It is suggested that organizations, create stricter policies and 
procedures be put in place to deter pseudo whistleblowers. 
 
In relation to the Protected Disclosures Act, I recommend that: 
 
• a provision be inserted with stricter requirements of good faith; 
• reasonable belief be accompanied by evidential proof regardless of 
whether the disclosure is made internally or not, i.e. every disclosure made 
must have evidential proof attached; 
• a provision stipulating harsh consequences attached to untrue allegations 
where it is clear that the disclosures were made in bad faith i.e. instant 
dismissal, criminal liability, civil liability for victims; 
• a remedy be made available within a provision for victims of untrue 
allegations i.e. compensation paid to the victim by the whistleblower or 
company;  
• a provision stipulating strict time measures regarding investigation of 
disclosures from time disclosure is made to investigation and remedies; 
and 
 
In relation to organizations, I recommend that: 
 
• all organizations have a whistleblowing policy, hotlines and training for 
staff on how to utilise the policy; 
• policies should have strict measures in place and highlight the 
consequences of disclosures made in bad faith; 
• policies include a stricter adherence to good faith and reasonable belief, in 
line with the PDA; 
• whistleblowing and ethics policies work hand in hand in preventing 
unsubstantiated allegations, both highlighting the element of good faith; 
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• organisations should stipulate reasonable time frames when investigating 
disclosures in order that disclosures are investigated timeously; 
• companies/organizations/institutions apply their minds to all allegations 
made, investigating motive as well as all aspects of the case;  
 
In relation to Courts and Tribunals, I recommend that: 
 
• the courts apply their minds to the requirement of good faith, reasonable 
belief and motive taking into account all the surrounding circumstances of 
the case; 
• tribunals such as the CCMA apply their minds to the issue of good faith, 
reasonable belief and motive. 
 
Finally, the objective and aim of the PDA is to protect whistleblowers that raise 
genuine concerns and to contribute to the eradication of corruption within the 
workplace. The Act should be dealt with as a piece of legislation that can control the 
endemic corruption and fraud in both public and private organisations. It is important 
that organisations create a culture that encourages firstly, and most importantly, 
internal whistleblowing and confidential assistance to employees who are unsure 
whether to disclose information concerning wrongdoing or not. 
 
Organisations that are open and transparent have nothing to fear from a 
whistleblower, but this is only achieved once there is a culture of whistleblowing that 
organisations adhere to. In order to do this organisations must have in place policies 
concerning whistleblowing which include a clear statement that malpractice is taken 
seriously, and a list of what amounts to malpractice, a reassurance that confidentiality 
will be adhered to when an employee raises concerns, a clear outline and warning of 
penalties available for making false and malicious allegations outlining the 
requirements of good faith and a reasonable belief and a clear outline of the 
procedures in making disclosures. There should be a relationship of trust between the 
organisation and its employees that will bring about a conducive atmosphere that will 
allow employees to disclose information that is a concern to them. 
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Whistleblowing has been written about extensively by academic writers and there has 
been a fair amount of debate surrounding the topic. Our newly elected President 
(Jacob Zuma) at his inauguration speech stated that corruption is one of the key 
elements which must be eradicated.  
 
With the above recommendations in mind, hopefully the problem of pseudo 
whistleblowers and the trail of destruction they leave can be prevented. 
  
Since our Act is a fairly new piece of legislation, there will no doubt be many more 
recommendations, comments and changes to the Act.  
 
If the above recommendations for the amendment of the PDA are considered, the 
implementation of said recommendations will not be an overnight process. However, 
with this in place together with organisations implementing their policies, it would be 
safe to say that there would definitely be a way forward in preventing pseudo 
whistleblowers from deliberately causing mischief and damage. 
 
It is hoped that this dissertation has achieved what it set out to do and that it serves to 
expand existing research within this particular topic. 
 
“Any change, any loss, does not make us victims. Others can shake you, surprise you, 
disappoint you, but they can’t prevent you from acting, from taking the situation you’re 
presented with and moving on. No matter where you are in life, no matter what your 
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